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Abstract 
This investigation is conducted against the background of current attempts to rehabilitate and 
revive the now defunct Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The poor track record of many irrigation 
schemes (despite huge investments) in the former homelands has prompted the government to 
reconsider its active and direct role in small-scale irrigation farming. This has resulted in the 
closure of many irrigation schemes including Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The new policy 
framework in South Africa, known as the irrigation management transfer, is premised on the 
transfer of ownership, authority and responsibility of small-scale irrigation schemes from 
government to the farmers. 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme was a state-driven, top-down initiative. This study argues that the 
justifications for the Tyhefu irrigation scheme were conflated, with the result that the need for 
political control of the Tyhefu area far outweighed the considerations regarding the financial 
viability and sustainability of the proposed project. Given the repressive political climate of 
the time in South Africa, the planners' proposals were a mechanism for the realization of the 
socio-political and economic agendas of the apartheid state and Ciskei government. 
Although technical factors critical for project success were examined, little or no attention 
was paid to the socio-economic aspects. For the planners, the main requirements for success 
entailed centralized managerial control, no participation of the beneficiaries, capital intensive 
and sophisticated agricultural techniques and the production of high value crops. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the nature of the planning and implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme was ill-conceived, short-sighted and misguided. 
A review of the literature on irrigation development on the African continent provided useful 
insights for this study. The lessons from irrigation development experience in Sub-Saharan 
Africa indicate that the continent is littered with examples of derelict and costly failures. 
What stands out in many of these irrigation projects is their over-emphasis on technical issues 
to the complete neglect of human and other social aspects. Working partnerships between the 
farmers and irrigation scheme management could, thus, not be realized. Almost without 
exception the case studies used here indicate that the industrious type of farmer was never 
developed as was envisioned in the planning documents. Neither were rural livelihoods 
improved in a sustainable manner. 
The findings of this study suggest that irrigation management transfer is a complex and 
delicate process. In this new set of arrangements, beneficiaries face formidable challenges in 
terms of capacity (human and financial) if small-scale irrigation farming is to become a 
viable sector. No doubt, the viability and sustainability of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme 
demands a comprehensive package of interventions that address various issues of markets 
and marketing, capital investment and access to finance, technology, education and training, 
support and extension services. It is evident that institutional aspects and the related issue of 
functional literacy require much more attention than thus far. As a result, at the moment 
there is no possibility for independent agricultural production. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This investigation is conducted against the background of current attempts to rehabilitate and 
revive Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme (TIS). Tyhefu irrigation scheme is one of several irrigation 
schemes established in the Eastern Cape between 1976 and 1985, including Keiskammahoek 
(1976), Ncora and Shiloh (1979), Zanyokhwe and Xonxa-Bilatye (1985). Whilst most of 
these performed reasonably well, there was a marked decline during the late 1980s which led 
to their eventual collapse. On the whole these irrigation schemes suffered from a combination 
of technical , institutional and organisational constraints which include inter alia poor 
management, project planning and design; lack of farmer participation and consultation, 
farmer selection, quality of extension and other types of support services. 
The concept of small-scale farmer is highly contested and value laden. Whilst small-scale 
farming is viewed as an important policy objective by the government and an important 
sector of agricultural development, the concept remains ill-defined and controversial. Up 
until now the government has not articulated any clear and comprehensive policy or strategy. 
There is a need for the clarification of the concept and what it actually means in practice. 
Not only are several terms used to define small-scale farmers , there is also, increasing 
realization that this group is not homogenous. The terms used include smallholder, resource-
poor farmers , subsistence farmers , peasant farmers, food-deficit farmers, household food 
security farmers, land reform beneficiaries and emerging farmers (Machete and Mollel, 
1999:3). In addition several criteria are used to classify them in terms farm size, purpose of 
production, income level and racial group. 
In this study small-scale farming refers to black farmers who are found largely in the former 
homelands, whose primary objective is market-oriented farming. Implied is the assumption 
that these farmers are constrained in terms of their capacity (human and financial) and 
complementary resources such as research, support and extension services, access to markets, 
marketing and key production inputs. 
With approximately 60 percent of the total population of the Eastern Cape living in the rural 
areas of the former Transkei and Ciskei, improving agricultural productivity, especially 
small-scale farming, is a crucial but not a sufficient condition for the eradication of poverty. 
There is widespread skepticism regarding the potential of small-scale farming to generate 
sustainable rural livelihoods. Currently, the small-scale farming sector continues to battle 
with the seemingly insurmountable task of moving from its subsistence status to market-
oriented production. It is well known that the agricultural sector in the homelands performed 
dismally compared with the white commercial agricultural sector. Whether agricultural 
productivity can be improved remains controversial. Several studies (Manona, 1999) raise 
doubt about the potential of agriculture to generate increased livelihoods for the rural 
population. Manona in his study of the Melani village, in the Eastern Cape, illustrates the 
virtual collapse of agriculture and the consequent dependence of rural people on wage labour, 
remittances and social welfare for their livelihoods. The question is whether agriculture 
should be left depressed as it is or whether alternative ways should be found to address the 
problem, especially in view of the absence of employment opportunities. 
A major feature of the agricultural sector in South Africa has been its dual structure. The 
dualism with significant differences in cost, infrastructure and level of production is well 
documented (Kirsten and Vink, 2000; Lipton, 1977; Schrire, 1992; World Bank, 1994). 
According to these sources agricultural development has been viewed in terms of the 
efficient, capital intensive, largely white-owned, technologically advanced, large-scale 
commercial sector. Consequently, the government believed that this kind of agriculture to be 
tlle one to contribute to economic development. Conversely, small-scale agriculture has been 
characterized as a traditional, backward, unproductive and inefficient subsistence sector and 
generally associated with the homelands. Kassier and Groenewald (1992:347) describe the 
commercial farming sector as reminiscent of the farming sectors in the developed world, 
producing surpluses and using considerable amounts of purchased inputs. In turn, the 
subsistence sector has many of the characteristics of subsistence farming as experienced 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Extension and support services have always emphasized the dichotomy between commercial 
and subsistence agriculture. As a result major service institutions were biased in favour of 
white commercial agriculture. All this was made possible by a long history of direct state 
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intervention in South African agriculture. Effectively, therefore, whilst the interests of white 
commercial farmers were met through various institutional support structures such as finance, 
marketing structures, technical services, pricing policy, many small-scale farmers in the 
homelands either had limited or no access to support services. Where such services existed 
the quality has been inferior. The cumulative effect of these measures is a small-scale 
farming sector that has been restricted to low input levels. Consequently, small-scale farming 
has not been able to meet the needs of the rural population, who thereby became net food 
importers from the white agricultural sector (World Bank, 1994:22). This situation has been 
compounded by mass migration of the rural population to urban areas in search of 
employment, resulting in labour shortages in agriculture. Vaughan (1992:421) argues "the 
historical undermining of smallholder production, which so substantially reduced the 
significance of the peasantry as a social and economic category, contributed to the 
widespread assumption that a smallholder class no longer exists as a significant locus of 
production in South Africa agriculture". 
Small-scale farming has a long history in South Africa and has been promoted in various 
guises since the Tomlinson Commission 's report in 1955. Tomlinson Commission promoted 
the concept of small-scale farming as a means of alleviating poverty and promoting economic 
development. The Commission believed that small-scale farming in "traditional black areas" 
had the potential to produce surplus agricultural commodities (1955: 117). The concept of 
"economic unit" farm size was central. Tomlinson envisioned the emergence of a middle 
class farmer group with the capacity to produce a livable income through full-time farming. 
The viability of this strategy required the provision of supporting infrastructure in terms of 
farm inputs, transport and agricultural extension in addition to the planning of the farm areas 
into economic units. The government rejected these recommendations, with the result that 
viable small-scale farming never became a reality. 
Generally, the results of small-farmer development programmes have been disappointing. 
They have failed to bring about the expected social and economic development of the rural 
population. Van Rooyen and Nene (1996:329) sum up small-scale farmer development as 
follows "experience with small farmer strategies highlights several problems, of which 
insufficient participation, lack of ownership, ad hoc pa11icipant selection, lack of property 
rights to farm land and deficient support services playa significant role, in failing to establish 
3 
a small farmer category in the country", The shortcomings in the promotion of small-scale 
farming suggest "the concept was never introduced under fully supportive conditions under 
which large-scale farming was promoted in the commercial areas" (van Rooyen and Nene 
(1996:327), 
The current climate is hostile to the development of small-scale farmers, despite various 
legislative and policy changes initiated since 1994, Prospects for revitalising agriculture in the 
former homelands and establishing a new class of emerging farmers are bleak, The dual 
nature of agriculture remains very much intact. Until such time a supportive environment is 
provided, small-scale farming cannot be judged what its potential is, 
Goals of the Research 
This investigation was conducted against the background of current attempts to rehabilitate 
and revive the now defunct Tyhefu irrigation scheme, The poor track record of many 
irrigation schemes in the former homelands has prompted the government to reconsider its 
active and direct role in small-scale irrigation farming, This has resulted in the closure of 
many irrigation schemes including the Tyhefu irrigation scheme, The new policy framework 
in South Africa, known as the irrigation management transfer, is premised on the transfer of 
ownership, authority and responsibility of small-scale irrigation schemes from government to 
the farmers. The research examines the following interrelated issues: 
• To identifY the main constraints, challenges and needs the farmers face at the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme 
• To establish progress made with regard to the rehabilitation and revival of the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme 
• Can small-scale irrigation farming at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme generate 
sustainable rural livelihoods? 
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Structure of the Study 
This study is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter One - Introduction 
This chapter provides the background to the study. 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three 
These chapters provide the theoretical basis to the study. 
Chapter Two - Irrigation Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This chapter focuses on irrigation development in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to provide a 
comparative perspective on irrigation development in South Africa. It begins with a brief 
review of selected case studies on the African continent. An attempt is made to identify and 
discuss the commonalities and shortcomings that emerge in the various case studies. Lastly, 
this chapter explores irrigation management transfer programmes, as one of the measures 
instituted by governments to transfer either complete or partial responsibility for the 
management of public irrigation systems to water user groups or other non-governmental 
organisations. These measures are part of the rehabilitation process and implemented against 
the backdrop of the high failure rate of the many irrigation schemes and macro-economic 
reform measures. 
Chapter Three - Irrigation Development in South Africa 
This chapter provides a brief history of land dispossession and proletarianisation of the Black 
maj ority in South Africa. The history of irrigation development in the so-called white South 
Africa and the homelands is presented. Selected case studies are used to illuminate the 
discussion. The last part of the chapter discusses post-1994 agricultural policy and the 
approach to dealing with small-scale irrigation schemes in the homelands. 
Chapter Four - The Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme: An Illusion of Development 
This chapter examines the planning and implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The 
last part looks at the current process of reviving and rehabi litating the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme. 
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Chapter Five - Data Presentation and Analysis 
The survey research approach was adopted in order to obtain the required information. For 
the purposes of this study the questionnaire method was used. The researcher decided to use 
personal interviews instead of mailed questionnaires. These promoted flexibil ity by allowing 
the researcher to clarify questions, to probe and make sure that all the questions have been 
answered. In addition, the low level of literacy in the community favoured the use of this 
approach. 
Given the problems of unwillingness of the people to cooperate with the researcher in the 
community and mistrust, the sampling procedure used in this study is snowball sampling. 
This is a form of non-probability sampling. Interviews of approximately an hour and a half 
took place at the respondents homes. Information obtained from interviews was 
supplemented by informal discussions with various stakeholders and villagers. Where 
necessary telephone calls are made to clarify points with key informants and to keep up to 
date about new developments. 
Once all the interviews were completed, data was analysed in the light of the stated objectives 
ofthe study. 
Chapter Six - Conclusion 
This chapter gives the overall conclusions based on consolidating main arguments, findings 
and data analysis. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
It is hoped the study will contribute to the available body of literature for the understanding 
of irrigation development in South Africa. Equally important, it seeks to shed light into the 
many challenges and constraints small-scale irrigation fanners in the former homelands are 
faced with. FllIihermore, it seeks to stimulate debate among policy makers and rural 
development practitioners. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Introduction 
The post-World War II (WWlI) era witnessed an increasing emphasis on irrigation as one of 
the major trends of agricultural development globally. As a result massive investments in 
irrigation, particularly in developing countries took place. The height of this investment was 
reached during the mid-1980s. This period saw about US $2,5000 to 3,000 million committed 
per year by external funding agencies (Ruotsi, 1995). After decades of rapid increases in 
investment in irrigation development, there has been an equally dramatic decline since the 
1980s. This reflected not only relatively low agricultural prices, rising construction costs and 
growing concerns about environmental sustainability, but also disillusionment by 
international institutions such as the World Bank, donors and other financial institutions with 
irrigation performance in Africa and elsewhere. Generally, the net impact of ilTigation on 
total agricultural production has been modest. Meanwhile, several irrigation schemes have 
required rehabilitation in a period of not more than ten years of their existence due to lack of 
maintenance, while others had to be abandoned. Therefore, early enthusiasm and optimism 
with irrigation development has been replaced by a more pragmatic evaluation of irrigation 
prospects. Given the poor track record of many irrigation schemes the role of irrigation in 
development has come under critical scrutiny. 
The problems experienced in many irrigation schemes have raised several issues: the 
appropriateness of irrigation development policies implemented by donors and governments 
during the past decades; is irrigation development necessary?; do current reforms such as 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) implemented in various countries, including South 
Africa, provide a viable solution? 
To provide a comparative perspective on irrigation development in South Africa, this chapter 
begins with a brief review of selected case studies on the African continent. A review of the 
literature reveals that the African experience is not unique, but shares many similarities with 
the South African situation. For example, many irrigation projects have suffered from a 
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combination of technical, institutional and organisational constraints. These include inter alia 
poor management, project planning and design, security of tenure, lack of farmer 
participation and consultation, farmer selection, size of the units, debt repayment, product 
prices, marketing, operation and maintenance, quality of extension and other types of support 
services. As will be discussed in this chapter, an examination of the Africa experience shows 
that the top-down or centrally planned approach in the planning and implementation of many 
irrigation schemes was unsustainable. A disturbing feature is that the lessons of evaluation 
studies on irrigation schemes failed to be incorporated in newly planned ones. As a result 
many of the shortcomings and problems identified in old irrigation schemes continued to be 
repeated and experienced. 
Lastly, this chapter wi ll explore the IMT programmes, as one of the measures instituted by 
governments to transfer either complete or partial responsibility for the management of public 
irrigation systems to water user groups or other non-governmental organisations. These 
measures are part of the rehabilitation process and implemented against the backdrop of the 
high failure rate of the many irrigation schemes and macro-economic reform measures. 
THE STATE OF IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT 
Estimates on the present and potential irrigated areas in Africa vary widely. Nevertheless, 
according to Ruotsi (1995) the total irrigated area on the African continent is between 12-13 
million hectares of which 5.02 million ha (40%) are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ruotsi (1995) 
summarises the value and practice of ilTigation in the following statement: 
The importance of irrigation varies a great deal from country to country, and while 
Egypt has 99% of its cultivated land under irrigation, a large country like Zaire 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) has only 0.2% of its arable land under irrigation. 
FUl1hermore, a wide range of water management situations can be observed in Africa, 
from simple traditional ones to highly sophisticated full-control irrigation schemes. In 
many African countries, the absence of medium-sized, commercial operators means 
that irrigation systems are polarised between a few, large-scale government schemes, 
and numerous very small-scale independent irrigators . The sharing of experience 
between these two types of irrigation systems has proved to be very difficult in most 
African countries. 
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According to Underhill (1983) with the exception of the Nile Delta, large-scale irrigation was 
unknown in Africa until this century (20th) . While large-scale formal irrigation dates back 
from the colonial period, "small-scale irrigation has been practiced since time immemorial in 
many varied forms according to local circumstances" (Underhill, 1983). The fo rmer were 
designed primarily for the production of cash crops, often highly mechanised, under the 
milllagement of government or private companies. Generally, traditional irrigation is poorly 
developed, using simple inexpensive technology. Ethnic groups such as the Chagga, the 
Sambaa and the Para of Northern Tanzania made elaborate networks of man-made channels. 
Irrigation schemes have been a popular form of development with governments, planners, 
donors and international agencies such as the World Bank. Official investment in irrigation 
has been channeled almost entirely into ambitious and expensive large-scale projects, few of 
which have justified their costs (Harri son, 1987: ISS). The main reason for this pre-
occupation according to Ball (J 986:342) is because they are highly visible, account for large 
expenditures in a short period, create an impression of activity and progress, and introduce a 
cash-flow into usually economically deprived areas. In addition, Ball argues "development 
banks have pressures brought upon them to speed up investment. This may lead to top-down 
planning causing imbalanced and extravagant development which often creates more debt 
thilll the participants can repay, and more dissatisfaction and misery than existed before the 
intrusion are engendered". 
A review of the literature (Bembridge, 1986b; Underhill, 1987; Groenewald, 1986; 
Carmthers, 1988) on the performance of irrigation schemes shows that the history of 
irrigation schemes in Africa is littered with examples of derelict projects. Ball (1986) 
describes this as an "unblemished record of failure", whilst Bembridge (1986b: 602) 
describes them as 'expensive fai lures, similarly Harrison (1987 : IS S) quoting a senior World 
Bank agriculturalist declares "irrigation in Africa a disaster area". In turn Vaughan (1997:8) 
notes that irrigation schemes in the former homelands in South Africa are generally perceived 
to have been unmitigated disasters. Furthermore, Bembridge (1986b: 607) argues "there is a 
large gap between predicted and actual performance. Schemes which were convincing on 
paper have yielded disappointing results giving very low rates of return on investment". 
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The above concerns are, also, reflected in the World Bank report (1981:76-78). The report 
notes that despite considerable investment in irrigation development in the 1970s there was 
hardly any increase in cultivated area in several countries because of land abandonment or 
rehabilitation needs, thereby offsetting subsequent additions to the developed area. According 
to the Report not all developed areas are farmed and not all farmed areas are harvested. 
Furthermore, yields have in most cases either stagnated or fallen. In addition to technical 
problems related to water management, insufficient levelling of land, soil problems, input 
supply bottlenecks, use of varieties not adapted to local needs, poor economic incentives to 
farmers are identified as prime factors of poor performance. 
The corollary of the high failure rate and cost of irrigation is a radical slowing down of the 
progress in African ilTigation due to a decline in investment. As Harrison (1987:157) argues 
"the expansion of irrigation in Africa has probably reached a standstill, where new land 
coming under irrigation barely balances the losses of irrigated land through deterioration. 
Meanwhile, major donors have become extremely cautious about investing in ambitious new 
irrigation projects, with the result that by 1985 the World Bank had virtually stopped lending 
for new large scale projects". 
These irrigation schemes are, generally, characterised by low productivity. As a result 
Bembridge (1986b: 600) argues that at present irrigation plays an insignificant role in African 
agriCUlture because of its failure "to bolster food production meaningfully and not succeeding 
significantly in softening climate-induced risk" (Groenewald, 1986:6 67). The highest 
production levels and farm incomes from irrigation schemes are reported in Asia and Latin 
America. According to FAO (1995) in Africa no comparable levels of productivity have 
taken place and performance has been disappointing. Harrison (1987 : 156) explains: 
The low yields are not surprising. The ... schemes are usually designed by engineers 
and based purely on physical considerations. Suitable crops are then chosen for 
promotion, with little or no regard for local needs or experience. Farmers are rarely 
consulted ... Pumping and control equipment is imported, and liable to the usual 
failures due to poor maintenance, lack of spare parts or fuel. The management of most 
projects has been highly centralised. Professionals ran the show and farmers little 
better than labourers, were to ld what to grow and where. Low prices paid to farmers 
did not help encourage efficient production. 
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According to Bembridge (1985 :99) the prospects for those that are still operating are not 
good. As Bembridge (l986b: 600) points out " ... with few exceptions the economic success 
of irrigation projects fa ll s far short of the expectations of planners, politicians and 
development agencies. Even on the few relatively successful projects there appear to be 
increasing social and ecological problems which will eventually have negative economic 
effects". Some of the earlier successes like the Gezira in the Sudan or the Kilombero in 
Tanzania are according to Moris, Thom and Norman (1984:1) candidates fo r rehabilitation 1 
According to Kortenhorst et al (1989: 19) notable exceptions of successful projects can be 
ascribed to the "fortunate" situations of a particularly lucky project concept or to a 
charismatic project manager. 
Selected Case Studies 
The Kwarre Irrigation Scheme in Nigeria is one of the expensive large-scale projects 
undertaken by the Department of Agriculture in Nigeria during the colonial period. It was 
initiated as a pilot irrigation project. Even though the scheme enjoyed partial success during 
its first few years, it has been defunct since 1963 . Despite its questionable "philosophy" and 
design, Kwarre irrigation scheme continued to serve as a model for large-scale irrigation 
development into the 1970s. K warre Irrigation Scheme was based on autocratic control of the 
farmers, who were often viewed as lazy and recalcitrant, by irrigation scheme management. 
The colonial officers concluded that the farmers needed to be coerced into taking up the land 
and cultivating it in the approved mrumer (Palmer-Jones, 1981 :83f 
IRehabilitation involves much more than the upgrading of the deteriorating irrigation infrastructure. Ultimately, 
the intention of many governments in Africa since the 1980s (in South Afr ica since 1994) has been to transfer 
either complete or partial responsibi li ty for the management of public irrigation systems to legal entities such as 
water user associations. Effectively, this gives the beneficiaries greater control over management, decision-
making and day-to-day running of the irrigation schemes, something that they have been denied in the past. 
2 As will be evident in all the case studies that wi ll be di scussed here total contro l of the fa rmers, with no 
decision-making powers was considered one of the main prerequis ites for the success of the irrigation schemes. 
Farmers did not have a sense of ownership and control over their own development. This type of development 
thinking which emphasised top-down and blueprint plans was not limited to irrigation schemes only but to the 
whole development endeavour in general. This was indicali ve of the colonisation / apal1heid process and 
societies in which superordinate (colonisers) and subord inate (colon ised) relations prevai led. It has since been 
real ised that prescriptive planning and imposed solutions have had little impact in improving the living 
standards of many communities. The current trend is that development should be part icipatory. 
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The institutional framework did not provide appropriate economic incentives for farmers but 
one that imposed penalties and compliance with the regulations. According to Palmer-Jones 
(198 1:86) "the assumption that the cause of the problems experienced was that farmers were 
not cooperative led management to disregard or deny the complaints of farmers, except where 
the farmer was socially or politically prominent, and to act in more authoritarian and arbitrary 
ways. The result was that farmers became more uncooperative, which helped to reinforce the 
attitude and views of management". In the final analysis, failure of the Kwarre Irrigation 
scheme can largely be ascribed to lack of adequate incentives to farmers , autocratic control 
coupled with the marginalisation of the farmers, bureaucratic ineptitude, inappropriate and 
inefficient supplies of inputs. 
On some of the irrigation schemes in Nigeria a highly skewed di stribution of benefits 
favouring those with the smallest need was evident (Palmer-Jones, 1980). These included the 
wealthy elite and tribal authorities who were not entirely dependent on agriculture. As a 
result the efficiency of these projects was not their primary concern. This made it impossible 
to forge cooperation among the fanners due to the inequalities that existed. 
In Gambia the World Bank Agricultural Development Project (ADP) initiated between 1972 
and 1977 an irrigation project, at a cost of US $1.5 million, to counter growing cereal 
imports. This it would achieve by expanding pump-irrigated rice production among 3000 
thousand smallholders. The Gambia had been expanding irrigated areas since the 1950s as 
pari of a drive to achieve greater self-sufficiency in rice. Initially the project did meet its 
objectives (for a few years) by increasing farm productivity, improving food security, while 
at the same time providing participating households with opportunities to invest in various 
assets (Webb, 1991 :339). When direct World Bank involvement ceased in 1977, project 
performance was already below original expectations. Less than two-thirds of the area 
earmarked for irrigation was developed. Meanwhile land was planted below its optimal 
capacity during the dry and wet season respectively. As a result, production never reached the 
levels predicted by the planners, especially during the wet season. Webb (1991 :347) explains 
"While yields were falling, farmers found themselves unable to adhere to the biannual 
cropping timetable. Given delays in ploughing and pumping, the dry season crop was often 
not completed before the rains arrived in June, thereby impinging on the wet season irrigated 
crop and on the cultivation on rainfed crops. As a result many farmers decided to suspend the 
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wet-season pump-irrigated rice crop and to return to former patterns of rainfed agriculture". 
An evaluation by the World Bank (1984) cited technical and soc io-economic reasons for 
failure. From the planner's point of view there was no question that the cause of the project's 
collapse was the failure of the project's participants to make 100 percent loan repayment) 
(Webb, 1991 :35 0). According to Webb on a superficial level this is true but points out that on 
a profound level the loan problem was merely a symptom of deeper ills relating to other areas 
of project design and implementation (199 1 :350). On the one hand there were technical 
deficiencies not only related to the qual ity, timely supply and suitability of the machinery to 
local conditions but also to its operation and maintenance. There was no training and 
extension programme for the participants in case of machinery fa ilure. The result was the 
improper use of machinery by untrained participating users. 
Also, the lack of user participation in the planning of the project contributed to widening the 
knowledge gap between the planners and the participants about the value and significance of 
the project. This is clearly evident in the reasons given by the farmers for participating in the 
project. Some farmers cited the need to achieve household food security, desire to earn cash, 
peer pressure or the betterment of the community. Webb (1991 :351) elaborates: 
In order to achieve national food securi ty objectives, and at the same time for the 
project to be economically viable, farmers were expected to cultivate two irrigated 
crops per year and to sell most of their harvest on the open market. The farmers on the 
other hand, equally concerned about food security, decided that irrigated rice yields 
during the wet season were too unpredictable, and that most of the rice should be 
consumed rather than sold. As a result, the double-cropping schedule was never 
achieved, and debts accumulated from the very first season. 
'Each household involved in the irrigation project was expected to pay for all the inputs suppl ied at the end of 
the harvesting period. Meanwhile, palticipation in the project "brought not just the potential for increased 
wealth, but also access to credit on a scale previously unknown ... Few households did not avail themselves orthe 
opportunity to acqui re implements through credit" (Webb, 1991 :345). The decline in yie lds as well as marketed 
surplus impacted d irectly on the ab ili ty to repay loans. From the onset loan repayments and recovelY posed 
difficulties. As a result a rul ing was issued to farmers that no further credit will be given unless repayment is up 
to date (Webb, 1991:348). Th is had little effect. On the who le this increased the running costs of an already 
ailing project. As the irrigation project fai led to live up to its original expectations as well as the farmers 
increasing indebtedness there was a consequent decline in the acquisition of productive assets and a rise in the 
dispossession rate of previously acquired assets. 
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Other institutional or management problems related to the fact that "project design left 
ownership and responsibility for the pumping equipment entirely in the hands of the state. No 
provision was made for eventual private ownership" (Webb, 1991 :350). According to 
Bembridge (1986b) and Backeberg et al (1996) this has increased over-dependence on 
government services and lack of sense of ownership on the part of participants. 
Further, the project found itself competing with other non-farm activities . The project was 
based on the assumption that the farmers would give priority to irrigated rather than rainfed 
crop because of its potential for higher yields. This would mean that farmers would, transfer 
labour from rainfed to irrigated crops. What seems clear is that the planners did not 
appreciate the various uses of labour and how the society coped with the various labour 
demands. In the end labour shortages were inevitable, which was met primarily through hired 
labour. 
Equally important, the explanation for the project's collapse lies with the neglect by the 
development planners of the social and sexual division of labour within the household as a 
production unit (Fisser, 1988: 19). Women have traditionally played an important role as 
primary producers and consumers operating independently from their husbands' control. This 
is true if one considers the role they played in the cultivation of rice both for consumption 
and private cash sale. The reaction of the women to the irrigation project was mixed. With 
irrigation many women transferred labour from their traditional private rainfed rice 
production to the pump-irrigated fields under their husbands' control (Webb, 1991 :343). 
Women were thus deprived of the opportunity to grow rice on their own account (Fisser, 
1988: 19). 
The immediate consequence of these problems was input supply uncertainties (such as 
periodic fuel shortages and that of spare parts) resulting in work delay or stoppages. Overall, 
the cumulative effect was the inability of the participants to adhere to the biannual cropping 
programme with a consequent decline in yields, the production of a marketable surplus and 
loan repayments. At the household level the impact of the project's demise in 1983 was a 
rapid decline in the standard of living, though this was felt differently by different 
households. Webb (1991) reports a sudden increase in divorce rates and migration by young 
men, a decline in the acquisition of productive assets and a rise in the dispossession rate of 
14 
previously acquired assets. Some had to resell their assets at a loss. 
According to Han-ison (1987: 156) the early years of the vast Rahad irrigation project in 
eastern Sudan was typical of the costly and damaging failures in this sphere. The project cost 
a total of $400 million, covering an area of 25km wide and 160km long. The land earmarked 
for development was taken over from its owners without compensation. The fon-ner owners 
of land became tenants. At the same time outsiders, in particular nomads, were brought in. 
The first two years of the project saw a drop in cotton yields by more than half and lower 
than projected prices due to low world market prices and an overvalued Sudanese currency. 
Farmers fowld themselves operating at a loss. A USAID evaluation concluded that tenants 
with no source of income other than the official activities were worse off with the project 
than they had been before (H=ison, 1987: 156). A view, also, expressed by Webb (1991 :339) 
who states "when development projects fail the first losers are the participants themselves. 
Having risked an investment in resources in the adoption of new technologies, it is they who 
bear the brunt of a scheme's demise". 
A careful examination of the institutional / management structure of the Rahad in-igation 
scheme reveals that the centralisation of power was at the core of poor project performance. 
Management took all decisions regarding types of crops to be grown, inputs, as well as the 
nature and timing of operations. Farmers had no voice in the day-to-day running of the 
scheme. They were expected to comply with all corporation directives, failure of which was 
dealt with stringently in terms of fines or evictions. "The rationale was that experts must 
know better than illiterate farmers. The opposite proved that the opposite is true. Corporation 
services such as tractor ploughing, seeding and weeding were often late, due to breakdowns, 
shortages of spare parts and fuel, lack of trained drivers and mechanics" (Harrison, 1987:156-
157). Undoubtedly, management failed dismally in providing even basic services such as 
timely land preparation services, provision of inputs as well as effective mechanical and 
support services. 
Niger has approximately 20 irrigation proj ects of different sizes in the Maggia valley. 
Problems relate to serious mistakes in project design, operation and maintenance of the 
in-igation schemes. Other problems relate to poor participant selection, enforced participation 
and labour shortages (Bembridge, 1986b: 607). 
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The performance of the Vuvu1ane Irrigation Scheme in Swaziland has not been spectacular 
either. It is managed as an "outgrower" with standard allotments. These have posed 
limitations on those successful farmers with proven entrepreneurial ability to increase their 
holdings. Farmers grow sugar cane on 70 percent of their land whilst the remainder can be 
used to grow crops of their choice. The irrigation scheme does not meet its operating costs. It 
receives subsidies from the state. Some tenants have failed to meet work requirements and 
have a debt load. After 20 years external management is still felt necessary partly because 
local staff have found it difficult to impose discipline (Fisser, 1988 :22). 
The World Bank's Bura irrigation and settlement project in south-eastern Kenya has also 
been a notable failure. The project was crippled when newly arrived settlers from the 
overcrowded highlands deserted in droves, often within days of arriving, because the health 
and education services they had been led to expect were not there (Harrison, 1987:62). In 
addition, infant mortality due to malaria and other resources were lacking. Furthermore, the 
complete ban on imports of chemical fertilisers which were provided free of charge during 
the early years of the project exacerbated the already poor situation. 
In Zimbabwe, the failure of irrigation development can, also, be ascribed to the same type of 
factors that have been iso lated in the case studies above. What seems to stand out in the then 
Rhodesia (as in South Africa), is the relationship between state policy vis-a-vis African 
population and irrigation development. This undoubtedly, influenced the limited success of 
many irrigation schemes. Using the example of two smallholder irrigation schemes in 
Karangaland, Weinrich (J 975) points out that smallholder irrigation was promoted in the late 
1960s by the Rhodesian government as a means of coping with an increasing population, 
widespread unemployment whilst not abandoning the policy of racial segregation. Large 
numbers of blacks were settled on comparatively small acreages, whilst what remained of the 
country's land resources could be reserved for the use of a comparatively small number of 
whites (Holbrook, 1992:25). Irrigation development was done on the basis of government 
constructing schemes for farmers without consultation with the would be beneficiaries. The 
government would, also, select the irrigators from within the local community and where 
there were no local people with an interest to irrigate, farmers would be brought in from other 
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provinces or districts (Chitsiko, 1999:4). Not only were the schemes expensive to construct, 
maintain and operate for the government, farmers did not see these as their own. As a strategy 
and policy, irrigation schemes in Rhodesia were not popular among the African population as 
Weinrich (1975 :312) points out "constant supervision, interference in their lives and 
regimentation bring forth nothing but bitterness and resentment". 
The question of whether the Gezira irrigation scheme in Sudan has been a success or not is 
an unresolved issue and has been debated for some time. Bembridge (1986b: 603) has 
described it as "one of the most successful in Africa" while Pollard (1981) refers to Gezira as 
"a study in failure", in turn Barnett (1977) labelled it as an "illusion of development". 
According to Pollard contrary to being a "model of agricultural development" and a "classic 
example of developing lmderdeveloped areas" Gezira has been dogged by problems 
(1981 :21). Bureaucratic centralised management, justified by the ideology of the "lazy 
tenant", "suppressed individuality, innovation, farmer motivation and best use of resources" 
(Groenewald, 1986:668). According to Barnett (1977:161) in the colonial situation the native 
had to be defined as the "other" in order that he could be treated in a way which legitimised 
measw'es of control, with the result that the administrative approach was adopted rather than 
any attempt at pmticipation. Thus, organisationally, the relationship between management 
and the farmers remained highly mechanistic and hierarchical. Farmers were given a low 
level of responsibility in terms of management and decision-making. Thus, as in the case 
studies discussed above, entrepreneurial decision making was vested in the hands of the 
"bureaucrats who eventually became the least equipped to do the job" Groenewald, 
1986:668). Referring to the impact of the Gezira irrigation scheme on the farmers, Pollard 
(1981 :21 , 29) argues "in the period of its operation Gezira has not fulfilled its promise of 
material prosperity for tenants ... development by any definition has yet to be realised for the 
Gezira people". Hoyle (1977) considers the ecological and health impact of the Gezira 
scheme to be negative. He mentions the high incidence of diseases such as bilharzia, malaria 
and the loss of tree cover as a result of the expm1sion of irrigation. 
The experience of irrigation development in South Africa will be the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Common Constraints to Successful Irrigation Development 
There are several commonalities that emerge in the various case studies discussed above. 
Clearly, the reasons for failure are numerous and complex in any given context. Constraints 
to irrigation development can basically be divided into three types: technical, institutional and 
socio-economic. The literature reviewed suggests that successful projects depend on the 
effective integration between technology, management, participants and the socio-economic 
situation, while poorly functioning projects suffer from lack of such integration (Bern bridge, 
1986b; 2000; Backeberg et aI , 2000). Groenewald (1986:668) similarly, views irrigation 
projects as consisting of three interactive subsystems: the social, economic and physical 
components. According to Groenewald any deficiencies or shortcomings in any of these 
elements or absence of synergy between them may cause sufficient distortions to cause a 
project to fail. As is evident above, the social aspect has often been neglected, with a strong 
emphasis on the technical components. As Bembridge (l986b: 612) argues "at the basis of 
this is the attitude of many project planners and managers who primarily measure the success 
of projects according to physical development and agricultural production. Such a view 
neglects the fact that projects have not only a technical but also an equally significant socio-
economic character." The issues raised in this paragraph will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
Firstly, experience has shown that many irrigation schemes have failed largely because of 
deficiencies in the project planning process, of which feasibility studies, physical design, 
beneficiary participation are important aspects. According to Gillet (Groenewald, 1986:669) 
project design deficiencies have been major contributors to failure. Research evidence 
suggests that donors, governments and other role players fail to allocate sufficient time for 
adequate and thorough project preparation. For the World Bank (1982) this results in projects 
taking longer to come to maturity and costing more than planned. In contrast, thorough 
project preparation does not necessarily mean an increase in the total cost of the project but 
rather guarantees better chances for implementing projects that are sustainable. Poor planning 
is related according to Cloete (1987:547) to the perception that ilTigation schemes can fu lfill 
an urgent need to improve food production through their perceived ability to transform 
production in a relatively shOIt space of time. Therefore, the urgency of implementation leads 
to insufficient pre-implementation planning. 
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Feasibility studies into the project' s future costs and benefits tend to be incomplete, 
exaggerated and umealistic. The nature and quality of project proposals on prospects of 
irrigation development in the Sahel is summarised in a USAID report by Moris, Thom and 
Norman (1984) " ... project proposals were riddled with inconsistencies, grossly overestimated 
benefits, failures to weigh likely implementation capacity, naive political assumptions and 
optimistic assumptions about revenues". As a consequence, feasibility studies are incomplete, 
lacking sound time-series data and being limited to those technical variables that can easily 
be measured and observed in the limited time available (Kortenhorst et ai, 1989:21). As it 
turns out, production costs are much higher than expected while net benefits to the farmers 
are often low or negative. Problems arise with meeting recurrent costs, which in the case of 
South Africa has had to be met by subsidies from the state. According to Kortenhorst et al 
(1989:21) great uncertainty regarding the benefits, combined with an almost absolute 
certainty (although not realised) about high costs and often umeliable supplies and services, 
often makes irrigation more risky than the farmers' original rain-fed agriculture. 
Equally important, yet ignored are farmers' abilities and constraints to build the necessary 
expertise in coping with the new demands. It has been taken for granted that farmers will 
have to perform, failure of which will be met by heavy penalties. Related to this is the fact 
that in addition to the top-down approach to development there was a strong emphasis on 
physical design aspects. In many instances technology choices have been inappropriate since 
it was not adapted to local physical, economic, social conditions as well as the participants' 
capabilities. For example, the appropriateness of the Taiwanese irrigation model in the 
Gambian case study was not fully evaluated and modified; instead it was transplanted and 
copied, resulting in the long-term in several technical deficiencies. 
The issue of consultation with the intended beneficiaries with the aim of securing their active 
involvement and to prepare for their training is an issue that has received lots of attention in 
the literature. This is an area that has been neglected completely and deliberately in many 
project concepts and plarming designs. Generally, there has been insufficient involvement in 
all phases of the project. The lack of consultation has not only posed a threat to the 
sustainability of irrigation projects but has been singled out as one of the primary causes of 
failure. This is in glaring contrast to the preparation of many government projects in 
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developed countries, where all who are directly or indirectly involved can have their say, and 
where the entire preparation process is allowed to take 10 years or more (Kortenhorst et ai, 
1989:21). Bembridge (l986b) captures this practice in the following paragraph: 
Frequently, the cart is being put before the horse in Third World lITIgation 
development planning. Political structures and means of communication that would 
enable the needs and desires of local people to be expressed ... are usually inadequate. 
Up to now small-scale farmers in Africa have had little say in their own development 
and needs. In-igation development projects are consequently often being imposed 
from above, with the resulting problem of trying to fit traditional farmers and socio-
economic systems into high technology farming systems .. . Planners tend to have a 
macro rather than a micro level approach. It is therefore not surpri sing to find that 
farmers often have a passive or negative attitude to projects. 
In such situations farmers are viewed "merely as a labour force needed to make the proj ect 
work" (Kortenhorst et ai, 1989:24). Whether the project meets the felt needs of the 
beneficiaries is not taken into consideration. Undoubtedly, this reduces the chances that the 
project's content matches the intended beneficiaries' real needs, wishes and interests. 
Furthermore, there is often insufficient socio-economic analysis of the merits of the project 
on the intended beneficiaries as well as national and regional level. 
Institutional aspects have not received priority III irrigation planning. Of particular 
importance are the managerial problems that have bedevilled many irrigation schemes in 
Africa. First, research evidence suggests that the competence and expertise of the managerial 
staff has been oven-ated. Not only were they ill-equipped to deal with many of the technical 
problems that arose at project level (even though their orientation emphasised attention to 
these), but were hopeless in dealing with any social problems that occuned. For example, 
this is evident in the unreliable and erratic nature of input supplies as well as poor operation 
and maintenance. Any problems that occurred were defined either as technical, or the result 
of the farmers' incompetence or their recalcitrant and uncooperative attitude. 
Organisationally, the farmers were a subordinate category in relation to the managerial staff, 
and defined as a group to be controlled and coerced under strictly defined guidelines. Farmers 
worked in a strictly controlled environment in which decisions were made for them by 
management. In practice, they were situated at the bottom of the bureaucratic structure and 
production chain. Compliance was emphasised, with severe penalties (e.g. eviction from the 
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land) imposed in the event of non-compliance. In effect, therefore, farmers were restricted in 
the manner and degree in which they could affect and influence decision-making. As a result, 
conflict between management and farmers was endemic in many irrigation schemes and 
manifested itself in many ways. The relationship can at best be characterised as adversarial in 
many cases. According to Palmer-Jones (1981:86) a cycle of conflict may develop where 
management disregards or denies the complaints of farmers because of assumptions that they 
are not cooperative. The relationship between scheme management vis-a-vis the farmers is 
described by Harrison (1987: 156) "the management of most projects has been highly 
centralised. Professionals ran the show and farmers, little better than labourers were told what 
to grow and where". Barnett (1977: 178-1 79) elaborates "if the tenants were considered to be 
capable of taking a greater pati in the management of the [Gezira 1 scheme, then large 
numbers of officials might become redundant. There is, then, a contradiction in the present 
organisation of production. It is not in the interests of the administrators as a class to pursue 
policies that will enable the tenants to patticipate more fully in management. There is also the 
associated contradiction that if there were fewer administrators then there might be more 
money available for the tenants". 
Even though in some irrigation schemes attempts at devolution were initiated, such efforts 
have largely failed. Referring to such attempts Barnett (1977: 164) states " .. . the core 
productive processes of the organisation have hardly altered ... The basic structural features, 
the relationships of authority and control, the division of profits, the determination of policy, 
remain the same, highly mechanistic and hierarchical. .. " It can thus be concluded that such a 
situation was not conducive for the training and skills development of the farmers. As 
Backeberg et aI, (1996 :59) argues "projects have been ineffective mainly because of 
inadequate decentralisation of power and responsibilities and non-accountability on the part 
of decision-makers. The project participants have over the past decades developed serious 
misgivings about their ability to manage their own affairs. This has resulted in farmers 
depending on government or government-appointed management agencies for the operation 
and maintenance of projects, resulting in inefficiency and cost-ineffectiveness". 
The role of expatriates in the management of irrigation schemes is worth mentioning. 
Expatriates, who were in most cases not conversant with the local culture, have at some point 
managed most of the irrigation schemes. As a group, they constituted a pri viledged class of 
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their own compared to the farmers. The nature of the relationship is epitomised in the 
statement by Scudder (1989:144). He argues that while external assistance at some point in 
time appears crucial, too litt le will prove insufficient to deal with the problems at hand, while 
too much substitutes outside control for local control, undermines local initiative, and runs 
the risk of creating factionalism, dependency or both. Using the example of Kenya's 
Provincial Irrigation Units Scudder further elaborates " ... they are dominated by foreign 
experts and money, therefore the control at overall policy level is largely foreign. The foreign 
irrigation experts take advantage of the absence of local irrigation experts to perpetuate their 
stay and domination. The notion of training for the local counterparts does not work as the 
latter are easily diverted to other functions . Thus a dependency situation is established and 
perpetuated" . 
Another social aspect of failure is the role played by irrigation development in the creation of 
rural elites, thereby increasing economic stratification and perpetuating relations of inequality 
(Holbrook, 1992: 18). A problem arises when irrigation development benefits the already 
small and priviledged el ite . This may be based on several social criteria such as kinship, age, 
education, religion, wealth, authority and proximity to sources of power and influence in a 
given setting. The fOliunate few who are selected as project participants are settled at high 
cost and become the recipients of incomes several times higher than those of their neighbours 
outside the project (including other participants in the project) (Holbrook, 1992: 19). Often 
this situation results in factional conf1ict as individuals compete over scarce resources. 
A major reason for failure accord ing to Harrison (1987: ISS) has been the high cost of formal 
projects which are more than double those of other continents. Not only are irrigation 
schemes in Africa expensive to build, but they also demand considerable cash outlays for 
their operation and maintenance. As Kortenhorst et al (1989: 16) quoting a 1984 FAO report 
point out" ... in South Asia, costs start at US $1600 per hectare. In Africa they start at US 
$9500 per hectare, raising problems not only of funding but sometimes of economic 
viability .. . " Harrison blames the geographic landscape of the African continent. He explains 
"Africa lacks basic infrastructure ... needed for large-scale construction works. These 
overheads ... have to be added to project costs in Africa. Foreign contractors are normally 
used for construction". Such costs call for more increased production. High investment costs 
require high net annual returns, which usually come from the production of high unit value 
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crops, but few cropping patterns can produce such high returns over extended areas (World 
Bank in Underhill, 1987:26). Scudder (1989:40) concurs " ... capital costs have been 
escalating with some exceeding $20 000 per hectare. Even with double cropping of high 
value crops, it is not possible to payoff such costs; indeed, frequently projects do not even 
cover reCUITent costs. Scudder echoing Bembridge's (1985:287) concerns questions why 
irrigation projects are implemented when their economic prospects are in doubt. Examples of 
irrigation projects which have failed to achieve increased yields and instead achieved lower 
benefits than had been estimated abound. 
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT TRANSFER 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) has been referred to variously in different countries: 
privatisation, government disengagement, post-responsibility, participatory management, 
commercialisation, self-management. IMT is justified on several grounds. First, the argument 
revolves around the need to relieve and reduce the financial burden on governments for 
operation and maintenance. Further, government bureaucracies lack the incentives and 
responsiveness to optimise management performance (Vermillion, 1997: I). Secondly, there's 
the urgent need to enhance productivity as well as improving the maintenance of irrigation 
facilities and irrigation service. Vermillion (1997 : 1) elaborates "farmers have a direct interest 
in enhancing and sustaining the quality and cost-efficiency of itTigation management. When 
given the authority and incentives to act collectively, fanners will act to contain the cost of 
water management while improving the operational performance because it is in their interest 
to do so". Lastl y, the objective is to promote a spirit of self-reliance among the farmers. Thus, 
the savings to government, improvement to the cost-effectiveness of operation and 
maintenance, can assess the success of IMT whether it maintains or increases the productivity 
of irrigated agriculture (Sam-Amoah and Gowing, 2001; Vermillion, 1997). 
Since the 1980s many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been transferring 
the authority and responsibility for the management of irrigation schemes to farmer groups, 
local and non-governmental organisations. The introduction of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) has seen many governments under pressure to reduce their overall 
budgets, including subsidies to the agricultural sector. Similarly, in South Africa following 
budgetary reprioritisation after 1994 financial support for management, operation and 
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maintenance of many irrigation schemes in the former homelands was withdrawn. The 
influence of GEAR as a macro-economic strategy is relevant here. According to Keating 
(Vermillion, 1997:1) among the key outcomes of the Earth Sununit, 1992, was the 
recommendations that water should be treated as an economic good, that water management 
be decentralised, and that farmers and other stakeholders should playa more important role in 
the management of natural resources, including water. Early efforts of this strategy and 
process can be traced back from the 1950s through the 1970s in the US, France, Colombia 
and Taiwan. 
Irrigation management transfer in its present form is relatively new. IMT can either involve 
transfer of full responsibility which involves the actual sale or disposal of all public assets, a 
case of complete privatisation, or a partial transfer. In most cases, IMT programmes are 
designed to transfer the bulk of the burden for operation and maintenance costs to users, thus 
reducing the demands for subsidies from the national budget (Vermillion & Johnson, 1990). 
Such is the case in South Africa. 
Irrigation management transfer is still a growing area of research. There is still a paucity of 
data on many aspects of IMT, to provide a comprehensive picture on its impact. While there 
is a growing body of literature on operational and financial performance, "less evidence is 
available on effects of management transfer on maintenance and economic performance of 
irrigated agriculture" (Vermillion, 1997 :v). At the same time comparative country studies are 
few, while comparisons between IMT and non -IMT cases are rare. Considering that 
governments initiated IMT to reduce the costs of operation and maintenance, it is surprising 
that a limited number of studies have been done on the impacts of IMT on governments. 
Equally, the absence of a standardised analytical paradigm to date makes it difficult to arrive 
at general conclusions or policy implications. 
Conclusion 
The lessons from irrigation development experience in Sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the 
continent is littered with examples of derelict and costly failures. What stands out in many of 
these irrigation projects is their over-emphasis on technical issues to the complete neglect of 
human and other social aspects . Generally, irrigation scheme management and consultants 
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were primru·ily oriented to dealing with the technical / agronomIc and not the human 
challenges associated with irrigation development. Farmers in all cases were situated at the 
bottom of the production chain. Farmers worked in a tightly controlled environment which 
emphasised compliance with all the irrigation management directives. In an environment in 
which centralisation of all functions was key, farmers were restricted in the extent to which 
they could affect and influence irrigation scheme management. Effectively, therefore, the 
farmers worked in an organisational context not suited to their needs. The reductionist 
approach adopted by the plrumers meant that working partnerships between the farmers ruld 
irrigation management could not be reali sed. In any case they were never designed to 
accommodate this. Almost without exception the case studies used here indicate that the 
industrious type of farmer was never de veloped as was envisioned in the planning documents. 
Neither were the rural livelihoods improved in a sustainable manner. 
The above literature review has shown that lack of attention to the human and social aspects 
is a recipe for disaster. The current trend is that development should be participatory where 
the beneficiaries play a major role in the development process. How far the reforms in 
irrigation development will ensure the viability and sustainability of the irrigation schemes 
remains to be seen. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Background 
It is not possible to discuss irrigation development as an agricultural strategy without 
reference to the history of dispossession and proletarianisation of the African peasantry in 
South Africa. The country has a long history of direct state intervention in the agricultural 
sector in support of white commercial agriculture to the exclusion and marginalisation of 
black farming. Effectively, this meant the systematic dispossession of crucial means of 
production that would offer some hope of the emergence of a black propeltied class 
(Kimemia, 2000 : 33). Through this several distortions were created, which not only ensured a 
highly skewed distribution of land ownership but also differential access to resources . This 
process of dispossession and proletarianisation of the African peasantry was given formal 
recognition through various policies and legislative measures. 
The transformation of traditional African farming from a surplus-producing entity and its 
eventual destruction has been a subject of considerable debate among academics (Bundy, 
1979; Beinart, 1987; Legassick and Wolpe, 1972; Levin and Neocosmos, 1987; Lipton, 1977; 
Hendricks, 1990; Lonsdale, 1987 and Krikler, 1987). Successful African farming occurred 
amidst chronic labour shortages in the mining sector and white commercial agriculture. These 
developments were a major source of concern for the white farmers, mining and industrial 
capital. ShOit of labour large settler farmers persuaded the colonial government to intervene 
on their behalf by limiting African competition in the market place and setting up native 
reserves of tiny pieces of land to create an artificial land shortage in order to force Africans to 
seek work (World Bank, 1994:46). What followed was a series of measures to constrain 
African farming and ensure a continued supply of labour. Most notable of these was the Glen 
Grey Act, No. 25 of 1894. According to Hendricks (1990) the Act reflected the combined 
interests of an alliance between the industrial capitalists, the white commercial farmers and 
the liberal merchants. Hendricks (1990:30) argues no doubt, the priority of the Glen Grey Act 
was to restrict the independence of the Africans and their possibility for reaping sustenance 
from the soil and compel the remainder into wage labour. 
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The systematic dispossession of Africans of their land through colonisation reached its zenith 
with the enactment of the Native Land Act, No. 27 of 1913 . The 1913 Land Act, regarded as 
a watershed in land policy in South Africa, laid the basis for South Africa's distinctive pattern 
of racially unequal ownership and destroyed independent peasant production: 13% of the land 
area as against 87% for whites. According to Brand et al (1992:355) the decades after the 
passage of this Act saw a large-scale conversion of peasant farmers into farm labourers. 
Other enabling legislation helped shape the present structure of agriculture glvmg white 
commercial agriculture a competitive edge over African farming. These include amongst 
others the following: Land and Agricultural Bank Act of 1912; Cooperative Societies Act, of 
1922, Native Trust and Land Act, NO.18 of 1936; Marketing Act of 1937. The cumulative 
effect of these was the elimination of a source of competition from Africans, transformation 
of the reserves from self-supporting and surplus producing areas to labour reservoirs and 
importers of food . As the World Bank (1994:22) states "small-scale farming has been unable 
to meet the needs of the rural population, who thereby became net food importers from the 
white agricultural sector". 
In addition to these policy measures, government support for commercial farming (direct 
state grants, loans and other government financed credit schemes, subsidies, tariff protection, 
tax concessions on machinery purchases and government spending on agricultural education, 
research and advisory services) further widened the gap between black and white farmers. 
These policies were closely intertwined with other socio-economic and political policies, 
which in effect meant institutionalized and perpetual underdevelopment of the black majority. 
Undoubtedly, therefore, the combined effect of these was the promotion of a highly 
mechanised and capital-intensive forms of agriculture - producing a marketable surplus in 
the presence of widespread poverty, unemployment and considerable costs to consumers. 
Kassier and Groenewald (1992:347) describe the commercial farming sector as reminiscent 
of the farming sectors in the developed world, producing surpluses and using considerable 
amounts of purchased inputs. The subsistence sector, on the other hand, has many of the 
characteristics, and shares many of the problems, of subsistence farming as experienced 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Irrigation was introduced to South Africa soon after the arrival of European settlers (Van 
Averbeke et aI, 1998:1). Several irrigation projects were developed between 1652 and 1912. 
Details of the early history of irrigation development, particularly during the colonial period 
to mid-1800s, are sketchy and vague. Information on irrigation development history is pieced 
from several sources which include diaries and journals of travellers. Vague accounts refer to 
"speculation as to the possibility of van Riebeeck having irrigated the first vegetable garden. 
However, definite reference is made to small-scale irrigation development along the Olifants 
River during 1797 (Bruwer and van Heerden, 1995:3). According to Malan (Bruwer and van 
Heerden, 1995:4) irrigation development by missionary societies for indigenous people took 
place between 1827 and 1840, a case being the development of irrigation at Cambria on one 
of the tributaries of the Gamtoos River in the Eastern Cape. Also in the Northen Cape the 
London Missionary Society is reported to have assisted the Tlhaping with irrigation in 
response to the persistent failure of seasonal harvests and a general decline in the condition of 
livestock. All these attempts appear to have been of a small-scale nature employing relatively 
inexpensive technology. Some irrigation projects formed part of town development whereby 
water was supplied for irrigation to certain plots within municipal boundaries, as in the case 
of Cradock4. 
The early history is generally characterised by uncoordinated irrigation developments. The 
establishment of the Hydraulic section in the Cape Colony in 1875 and the promulgation of 
the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act in 1912 were efforts designed to address this 
problem. The period from 1912 saw active attempts by the government to coordinate 
irrigation development. 
The impact of the Great Depression and the fact that the South African economy was crippled 
by an economic crisis exacerbated by a severe and protracted drought provided impetus for 
the Government for its continued commitment to extensive investment in agriculture. During 
, Bruwer and van Heerden (1995:4) explain "when the town of Cradock was founded fairly large plots with 
irrigation rights were laid out. These plots were supplied with water after the completion of the town weir during 
181 6. Some of the older towns have water furrows along streets, from which owners can divert water for 
irrigation onto their properties at certain timcs of the day or week". 
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this period the development of government irrigation schemes was designed primarily to 
address the poor white problem. This was a means of keeping whites productive in the rural 
areas who would probably otherwise have drifted to the towns and aggravated the already 
chronic unemployment problem (Shillington, 1986:328). This resulted in the construction of 
large dams such as the Great Fish and the Hartebeesport dam and the development of large-
scale irrigation schemes such as the Vioolsdrift, Rietrivier, Pongola, Boskop and Vaalharts. 
Settling farmers were usually allocated holdings of between 30 to 40ha. 
Apart from the fact that irrigation schemes were achieved at great expense to the State, large 
capital subsidies to irrigation boards to serve the interests of white irrigation farmers were 
made available. These were also made available to private irrigators for the development of 
private irrigation schemes. The promotion of commercial agriculture at the expense of 
African fanners through the provision of these subsidies and other extra economic measures 
is one of the enduring legacies of the apa11heid state. 
Extension surveys of these irrigation schemes found that irrigation efficiency was low. Three 
factors were identified as main causes: inappropriate design, poor management and low 
aptitude of the farmers. As Bruwer and van Heerden (1995:5) argues "this inefficiency leads 
to a wastage of irrigation water and suppression of crop yields and tends to increase inputs 
unnecessarily. Inigation farmers tend to over-irrigate in winter and under-irrigate in 
summer". Furthermore, in many of these early irrigation schemes water allocation was 
inadequate for the practice of full irrigation. The above together with the fact that the average 
age of the farmers was high, their educational level poor and lack of ambition were identified 
as having a negative impact on the viability and sustainability of the inigation schemes. 
Generally, plots were found to be small to form economically viable units "mainly because 
farmers were growing relatively cheap staple foods such as maize and wheat (van Averbeke 
et aI, 1998 : 1). Basically, few irrigation schemes operated on a cost recovery basis. Few (if 
any) recovered operating and maintenance costs. Eventually, many farmers left the irrigation 
schemes (Van Averbeke et aI , 1998:1). 
The plarming of new irrigation schemes took into consideration all the problems encountered 
with the old. Most importantly, a policy was fo llowed to select mainly new young farmers, 
with a reasonably high level of education, improved managerial ability and available capital, 
instead of the usual practice of auctioning new farms. 
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A dimension that has not been explored so far is that of land dispossession that accompanied 
the construction and development of the irrigation schemes. To illustrate this the Vaalharts 
Irrigation Scheme, in the Harts River Valley will be used as a case study. Vaughan (1997) 
argues "historically irrigation schemes were bound up with settler accumulation and African 
dispossession". In documenting the history of the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme, Shillington 
(J 986) provides useful insights into the broader trajectory of ilTigation development. The 
concept of agricultural irrigation in the Harts valley can be traced as far back as 1850. 
Shillington (1986:311) demonstrates how a combination of capital investment, technology 
and the state apparatus intervention were used in the development of the irrigation scheme. 
This region has witnessed the growth of the largest single irrigation scheme in Africa. 
It therefore provides a local perspective on the injection of high technology, capital-
intensive farming into a particular political economy. Furthermore, since the 
development of large-scale irrigation generally requires the coordination of huge 
capital investment, a large labour force, and the reorganisation of land allocation and 
usage, the only way to bring about the necessary degree of rural transformation has 
been through the successful combination of heavy capital investment and direct state 
intervention. 
This scenario according to Shillington contrasts sharply with the pre- and colonial situation 
which was generally marked by waning political commitment on the part of the state. As a 
result the project was abandoned several times before it eventual implementation. Thus the 
inability of the state to commit flll1ds frustrated earlier attempts to establish the ilTigation 
scheme in the Vaal/Harts valley. First, according to Shillington, (1986:321) the interests of 
commercial agriculture were of low priority compared with the struggle to establish a 
diamond monopoly in Kimberley. Besides the exhorbitant costs of irrigation development 
and the fact that investment in costly projects was viewed as a private enterprise, part of the 
Government's reluctance according to Shillington was the fact that Africans heavily 
inhabited the land. The area around the Vaal/Harts pedicle earmarked for irrigation was a 
contested one. The impact of colonial land alienation was increasingly being felt by Africans, 
as dispossession continued unabated. Fierce resistance accompanied land alienation. 
Successive colonial governments had to grapple with the idea of how to deal with African 
occupancy in this area. The attitude of the authorities is summarised by the statement of the 
inspector of locations, F.R. Thompson, who argued that the "the native locations were merely 
crownlands still undisposed of' (Shillington, 1986:319). 
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Shillington echoes BundY's5 views on African farmer prosperity during the 1800s. African 
farmers managed to out compete their white counterparts. Shillington adds "this was illusory 
and short-lived" due in large part to low rainfall which led to the persistent failure of seasonal 
harvests. Meanwhile, the ambitions of the colonialists to derive their livelihoods from the 
land full-time were thwarted by the realisation that irregular rainfall mitigated against the 
attainment of reliable returns "unless it was supported by heavy and determined investment in 
some large-scale system of irrigation" (Shillington, 1986:316). Thereby, bringing to the fore 
and reinforcing the need for the idea of irrigating the Vaal/Harts area. 
The result was a survey report on irrigation possibilities in the area in 1882. As the 
Government geared itse lf for the development fierce competition for access to land and water 
between the various racial groups intensified. Direct state intervention and capital investment 
in the Vaal/Harts area was evident in the 1930s when the government sought ways of dealing 
with the poor white problem and the economic crisis referred to earlier. Already at this time 
a commitment to extensive investment in agriculture to promote white agricultural interests 
was in place. The proposed development of a large-scale irrigation network appeared, also, a 
viable undertaking since it provided the 0ppOJiunity for South Africa to compete on world 
markets. 
Implementation of the irrigation scheme was made possible because "the state already had at 
its disposal a large pati of the necessary land since the confiscation of the Phokwani reserve 
which had been approved in 1897" (Shillington, 1986:329). The 19000 hectares of the Taung 
reserve required for the irrigation scheme were obtained after negotiations between the 
departments of land, agriculture, irrigation and Native Affairs, in exchange for a free supply 
of irrigation water to the rest of the reserve. To "compensate" for the loss of the 19000 ha of 
irrigable land, an equivalent area of non-irrigable land was offered. In an effort to rationalise 
the area under irrigation, evictions in the Majeng location occured in the 1970s. Protests and 
arrests ensued. 
5 Bundy' s book The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasanlly (1979) provides an account of how AtTicans 
responded to the new oPPOltunities offered by the mineral revolution. He paints a picture of a prosperous 
peasantry when he states" it was an era in which a large number of peasants, the majority of the Cape African 
people achieved and retained a measure of economic independence and as such the wage labour force was 
emasculated and insuffic ient for the times" (113-115). 
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Construction on the Vaal River storage dam commenced in 1933, providing the much needed 
relief work for the unemployed white labourers. Plots of 17-25 ha were made available on a 
probational), basis. Inputs were provided free until the farmers became "independent" . 
The former Bophuthatswana government replicated the Vaal harts model of irrigation 
development. As Shillington (1986:330) explains "in its attempt to decentralise and give 
greater credibility to its apartheid policies, the South African state, through its subsidiary the 
Bophuthatswana government, is now at last prepared to invest in the latent potential of 
African farmers .. . Consequently, the Bophuthatswana authorities have recently mounted a 
huge investment programme to utili se the Vaalhalis irrigation water for developing intensive 
African commercial agricu lture, along lines even more up to date and efficient than those of 
their neighbouring white agriculturalists". Thi s move necessitated a reorganisation of land 
allocation and usage in order to establish the Taung irrigation. Standardised plots were given 
to selected farmers on a probationary basis. 
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOMELANDS 
At least three approaches to agricultural development in the homelands Call be identified: 
betterment plarming, fanner support programmes and irrigation schemes. Generally, none of 
these brought any lasting benefit to the local population. Instead the reserves continued to 
slide into ever-increasing poverty and widespread environmental degradation. The irrigation 
schemes can be seen as Government's response to low agricultural productivity and "the 
absence of commercial agriculture in the homelands to what was attributed to the perceived 
lack of entrepreneurial and managerial ability among black farmers" "offering a deceptively 
simple solution to the problem" (Brand et aI, 1992:356; Cloete, 1987:546-547). This 
combined with the philosophy of optimal resource use was taken to dictate that expatriate 
management should be introduced to develop agriculture (Brand et aI, 1992:356). 
Consequently, large-scale centrally managed estate or project farming in both irrigated or 
dryland production became the main focus. 
Minor irrigation developments occurred before the publication of the Tomlinson Commission 
report in 1955. The Commission noted that interest in irrigation farming varied widely from 
region to region. It found that most enthusiasm was in some parts of the Transvaal. On the 
contrary interest in irrigation in the Transkei and Ciskei was considered to be low, with 28 
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out of 37 small irrigation schemes having fallen into disuse. The Commission found that 
irrigated holdings of 1,5 to 2 morgen (1,3 to 1, 7ha) "were large enough to provide a family 
with a living which would satisfy them, whereby the whole fami ly would work on the 
holding" (1955:121). Where irrigation schemes existed the Commission found that living 
conditions were better off. 
The Commission made elaborate recommendations regarding the future of irrigation schemes 
in the Bantustans (1955:121-122): 
Determined action be taken to improve and rep lan all existing schemes so that each holding can 
provide a fu ll-time living 
Irrigation schemes be regarded as integral parts of rehabilitation schemes 
The [Native] Trust should acquire ownersh ip of the land before fresh schemes are developed, all lands 
belonging to individual Bantu or tribes and which fall under the proposed scheme, should be bought up 
to permit of unh indered development of the schemes; whi le fonner owners of such lands should be 
given preference when holdings are allotted on completion of the schemes 
All schemes should be placed under proper control and supervis ion, with uniform regulations as 
regards water rates, credit facilities and conditions of settlement 
All schemes wh ich are not on Trust land should be proclaimed as betterment areas in terms of 
Proclamation No. 116 of 1949 
Those to whom irrigation holdings are allotted should be requ ired to relinquish all agricultural interests 
they may have in the remainder of the Bantu areas, in order to give the ir full time and attention to their 
holdings 
An agricultural officer should be appointed as superi ntendent of each large irrigation scheme or a group 
of smaller schemes in a single district. In the first instance, European technical officers should be 
employed until trained Bantu with sufficient experience, are able to take charge. 
Most of the irrigation schemes developed during the 1950s and 1960s followed the above 
recommendations closely. These were essentially aimed at providing participating farmers 
with an acceptable income from full-time farmi ng using relatively simple and inexpensive 
technology (Van Averbeke et aI, 1998:7). Examples of these are the Qamata irrigation 
scheme in Transkei and in Ciskei these can be found at Cata and Upper Gxulu. These 
irrigation schemes and many that followed emphasised top-down planning. This approach did 
not allow for farmer participation in the initial planning process, design and implementation 
phases. Thus, authoritarianism characteristic of the apartheid state and Ciskei government fed 
into irrigation scheme design. Farmer participation would run counter to the principles of 
exclusion, and the narrowing of political space on which the South African state was firmly 
grounded. Generally, strike action and or any form of unrest was not tolerated in any way. At 
best it was suppressed through violent means. Effectively, this meant that the farmers had no 
rights and no legal recourse . 
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Irrigation Development Consultants 
In its attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in an economic sense, Ciskei had to rely on the 
importation of economic and technical expertise (Holbrook, 1992: 177). In the field of 
agricultural development this group consisted of development specialists, who became the 
most influential actors in irrigation development. According to Holbrook (1992: 177) the 
political role of expatriates was more noticeable in the implementation and management of 
[irrigation] development schemes, for it was here they played a role in the allocation and 
control of resources under the auspices of the Ciskei state. 
The mam consulting agent in irrigation planning and implementation in the Ciskei and 
Transkei were Loxton, Verm and Associates. "The company aimed at the lucrative field of 
homeland development and billed itself as specialist agricultural consultants. It had been 
involved in a number of development projects in the homelands, generally, working on a 
contractual basis for a number of years" (Holbrook, 1992:203). 
Central to their approach was strict centralised control over all the activities of the farmers , 
capital intensive and technologically advanced agricultural projects with an emphasis on cash 
crops. Van Averbeke et al (1998:9) argues " it may have suited the consultancy firm to 
employ expensive technology, because it appears that their fee was a function of the total 
capital requirement for the establishment of the schemes. Furthermore, the use of 
sophisticated technology created the need for an external management agent, often provided 
for by a subsidiary of the same consultancy firm". Undoubtedly, the technology was not 
suited to the needs of the farmers and ensured that it was beyond their reach in terms of its 
use. 
In addition, the consultant's development plan was based on the assessment of the physical 
environment (water and soil analysis), engineering aspects, a market survey, crop technology 
criteria with little or no attention to the human aspects. This type of development was based 
on the mistaken assumption that technological innovations per se would be sufficiently 
attractive to automatically stimulate fanner participation (Backeberg et ai, 1996:59). 
34 
All the irrigation schemes that were planned and implemented by Loxton, VelID and 
Associates have not performed well. By 1994 when the democratically elected government 
came to power all were technically insolvent or defunct. Van Averbeke et al (1998:9) asks a 
particularly pertinent question "why the same model of irrigation development was allowed 
to be repeated over such a long period time6, using an approach which had long been shown 
to be ineffective in other parts of the world". 
The consultants proposed a dual function for the irrigation schemes (social and economic). 
The irrigation schemes were thus mainly divided into two components. Estate farming was 
designed to contribute to the GGP of the region. Also , profits generated would be used to pay 
for production and investment costs. Almost 75% of the irrigated land was reserved and used 
for estate farming. To realise the social objective, small plots and allotments were given to 
members of the community in exchange for making availab le their rainfed land for irrigation 
development. Farming here was geared towards subsistence rather than the maTket. However, 
farmers were able to sell some of their produce on the local market. In some irrigation 
schemes, such as Ncora, Tyhefu, Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, a third component was added. 
Its main objective was to create a selected and viable class of commercial farmers. This 
objective was never realised. Instead of becoming independent producers targeting 
production at maximising food security or dynamic entrepreneurs responding to market 
demands, they became at best glorified farm labourers (Van Averbeke et ai, 1998:8). 
Similarly, Vink and Kirsten (2000:20) argue "these farmers were little more than paid wage 
labourers with virtually no control over their production activities"'. 
Selected Case Studies 
The Qamata irrigation scheme regarded as the second largest smallholder irrigation scheme 
in Southern Africa was constructed in 1965/66 at a cost of R6 million. This amount excludes 
funds spent by the Government in terms of betterment planning. Bembridge described the 
irrigation scheme as a moribund and expensive failure. Bembridge conducted an indepth 
analysis of the proj ect in 1979. Management was autocratic, top-down and inefficient. 
6 Loxton, Venn and Associates have been involved in irrigation development in the homelands / self-
governing states since the 19605. 
7 For a full discussion on the pos ition of farmers and their relationship vis-a.-vis irr igation scheme management 
see Chapler 2 (Colllmon Constraints to Successful Irrigation Developmelll) 
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Because of lack of selection, farmers had little or no expenence of modern irrigation 
(Bembridge, 1986b: 603). The study by Bembridge found that the production potential of the 
project was well below its projected level, attributable to the lack of skills development 
among the farmers due to the incompetence of the extension officers and the quality and 
nature of extension thereof. Extension officers lacked training, guidance, motivation and 
clear-cut policies and lacked an objective and extension and development programme 
(Bembridge, 1986b: 604). The low yields achieved meant that the project could not / failed to 
provide and meet the basic needs of the farmers and improve the standard of living of the 
community, with the result the farmers were caught in a vicious cycle of poverty. According 
to (l986b: 604) farmers perceived that they were better off than before the project started. 
Other problems related to the lack of markets, finance for inputs and organised credit, size of 
the holdings, debts, poor coordination and cooperation between the various stakeholders, 
failure to provide land preparation services timely, and the deterioration of irrigation 
infrastructure due to poor maintenance. 
The disappointing results at Qamata irrigation scheme necessitated the implementation of a 
new approach at Ncora irrigation scheme (1979). Sound planning on a commercial basis and 
strict control of the activities of farmers were recommended by the politicians (Rossouw and 
Bembridge, 1989:88). The development plan proposed by the consultants focused mainly on 
the analysis of the physical envirornnent and a market survey, without regard for the social 
aspects. The commercialisation approach adopted sought to "stimulate demand for services 
and production inputs by modernising traditional agriculture, and at making the projects self-
supporting through fees paid by the farmers" (Rossouw and Bembridge, 1989:88). However, 
this approach was not innovative in any way. Farmer participation was overlooked, with the 
result that the needs and problems of the farmers were not addressed. Little scope was 
provided for the farmers to choose the services they needed since these were largely 
prescribed. The relationship between management and the farmers was often marred by 
conflict. 
The Xonxa-Bilatye irrigation scheme was established in 1985 and operated until its closure 
on 24 May 1994. It had a promising start but soon disintegrated. Several factors account for 
its failure. These are similar to the experience of other irrigation schemes highlighted above: 
failure of the govenunent to consult local people, conflicting claims over ownership of the 
irrigated land, lack of expertise in various critical areas (management, technical), poor 
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financial records resulting in overspending and unauthorised expenditure, absenteeism, poor 
supervision of the workforce, over-employment, abnormally high wages paid to non-
productive workers, general corruption, poor operation and maintenance. Generally, there 
was an absence of controls in various parts of the production chain. 
The experience of irrigation development in kwaZulu-Natal and kaNgwane in the form of 
contract farming offers another perspective. Small-scale irrigation development in the 
former kaNgwane has taken what can usefully be termed a classic small farmer route 
(Vaughan, 1997:5). The notion of "economic farming units" advocated by the Tomlinson 
Commission was adopted. KaNgwane is regarded as the only context within which the 
principle of economic units has been successfully applied. Arable land holdings have been 
demarcated into such units and re-allocated to small farmers . The situation in kaNgwane 
differs from the one in kwaZulu-Natal in that the homeland government in conjunction with a 
parastatal agricultural developmental agency, Agriwane, drove the agricultural model. In 
kwaZulu-Natal the small farmer development model was industry-led by sugar millers and 
timber companies. Agribusiness provided farmer support (credit and extension services), 
taking as collateral the small holders' harvest (McIntosh & Vaughan, 1995: 113). While 
enabling participation in commercial agriculture and facilitating production of additional 
income, this form of credit stifles entrepreneurial independence and effectively prevents 
farmers from managing their own budgets and causes tension between millers and farmers 
(Vaughan, 1997). In addition, this situation fostered over-dependence and reliance on the 
millers for operation and maintenance. However, "a narrowly focussed commodity interest, 
guaranteed markets and the retention from farmer income of adequate funds for operation and 
maintenance" has made it possible that these types of irrigation schemes achieve a celiain 
degree of success compared to government established irrigation schemes (Vaughan, 1997:6). 
The original pattern of traditional land settlement and allocation was accepted by the 
developers in kwaZulu-Natal, with the result that irrigation design has allowed the retention 
of traditional land holdings. Limited land re-allocation (accompanied by land grabbing and 
dispossession) occurred in some in'igation schemes through the intervention of traditional 
authorities, such as in the case of the Biyela irrigation scheme. The result is that irrigated 
holdings remained small and generally sub-economic, thereby preventing the development of 
a class of economically viable small farmers. Whilst at the same time limiting the opportunity 
for full -time fanning. This has necessitated the need for supplementary income. In contrast, 
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the kaNgwane experience allowed the farmers to obtain high net income through full-time 
farming, resulting in the emergence of successful small-scale fanners. 
Research on independent individual irrigation farmers in the former Transkei by 
McIntosh, Vaughan & Quinlan (1993) has highlighted numerous problems: "they have 
complained of the difficulties of obtaining adequate factors of production, assistance and 
farmer support. Appropriate and sufficient - land, capital, inputs, labour as well as technical 
advice on irrigation systems, information on crop water requirements and scheduling were 
hard to come by. Also, appropriate infrastructure is poorly developed". Crosby et al (2000) 
elaborates on the issue of lack of support services "The most serious of these is a lack of 
special ised irrigation extension technicians with regard to cropping aspects and lack of 
technical advice on engineering aspects. Maintenance support services are often poor or non-
existent. Spare parts are seldom locally available. Irrigation management and equipment 
installation and operation is usually conspicuous by its absence". 
Insecurity of tenure is widespread among the independent irrigators, resulting in 
unsustainable farming practices. The land used for irrigation was obtained either from the 
traditional authority, leased from a mission or was rented from other people. Concerns 
revolved around the nature of the contractual relationship - how binding it is. Vaughan 
(1997:9) summarises this situation as follows "The escalation in the productive value of the 
land as a result of irrigation development was the issue around which lease agreements 
typically disintegrated. Unrealistic rentals which had not taken account of the inevitable leap 
in land value consequent upon irrigation development lead to jealousy which caused lessors 
to take the land back". 
Community gardens present 111 urban and rural areas represent an important sector of 
irrigation farming. Crosby et al (2000) estimates that approximately 150 000 growers 
participate on community gardening projects in South Africa. Their success according to 
Crosby et al (2000) is in sharp contrast to the problems of many of the sophisticated top-
down managed larger irrigation schemes such as Tyhefu, Ncora, Qamata, Zanyokhwe and 
Keiskammahoek irrigation schemes. As farmers they have a greater degree of control and 
autonomy in decision making over most aspects of production. As a group their success 
depends to a large extent on their ability to cooperate around the shared water supply, 
infrastructure and equipment. A study by McIntosh, Quinlan and Vaughan (1993) in Transkei 
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revealed problems similar to the ones experienced by independent irrigators. Unavailability 
of inputs and lack of means to purchase inputs, poor transport facilities (and marketing) 
availability of labour were critical constraints. On the question of organisation Vaughan 
(1997) explains "organisation was difficult to create and sustain. Organisational incoherence 
impacted negatively when technological problems developed in the irrigation systems". Also, 
their dependence on the Department of Agriculture for maintenance of equipment has led to 
delays and frustration, impacting negatively on efficient functioning of the whole enterprise. 
Even though community garden experience is mixed, community gardens have improved 
food security and income of the participating households, and have offered production 
opportunities to the urban and rural poor. As Vaughan (1997:9) argues "most community 
gardens have not worked well as commercial ventures, but the development of community 
gardens has been an important food security intervention". 
IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN 
POST- APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
The process of formulating a new irrigation policy was initiated through a discussion 
document on future irrigation that was published in 1995 by the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (DW AF). This was followed by a joint publication from DW AF and the 
Department of Agriculture (DoA) entitled "Towards an Irrigation Policy for South Africa" 
(1996) . Subsequently a White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (1997) and 
the National Water Act, No. 36 1998, were adopted. 
Apartheid policies caused the skewed distribution of access to water and land and agricultural 
services. There is a great degree of complementarity between agricultural, land and irrigation 
policy in South Africa. These policies seek to address equity, efficiency and sustainability 
issues, something that was overlooked during the apartheid years. Theoretically, land reform 
is seen as inextricably linked with the restructuring of agriculture by opening up opportunities 
to emerging / new small-scale fanners, targeting in particular Blacks. The intention is to 
transform the inherited agrari an social structure characterized by racial inequalities in terms 
of landownership. This requires dealing with the artificial dualism created by centuries of 
dispossession, policy distortions and preferential treatment of white commercial agriculture 
which destroyed black farming . Specifically, the overall objectives of agricultural policy 
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reform involve creating opportunities for the smallholder and resource-poor farmers, 
improving efficiency and the competitiveness of the sector and utilising resources 
sustainably. 
Fulfilling these objectives requires an irrigation policy that allows for the efficient utilisation 
of water. In turn, the White Paper on National Water Policy and the National Water Act, No. 
36, 1998 make provision for water to be protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and 
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner to the benefit of all people (Department of 
Agriculture, 1998:64). Therefore, irrigation policy seeks to "provide an incentive framework 
to improve efficiency, develop criteria to be applied in the development of new irrigation 
capacity, which will address the inequalities resulting from past policies and open up 
irrigation possibilities to new farmers, provide for self-management of irrigation schemes and 
provide for training and extension" (Department of Agriculture, 1998:65). 
Despite these legislative and policy changes initiated since 1994, prospects for revitalising 
agriculture in the former homelands and establishing a new class of emerging farmers are 
bleak. At the moment land reform has failed to di slodge white (and the elite in the 
homelands) monopoly ownership of land. As it is, land reform has transformed ownership 
relations marginally. Even if widespread agrarian reform might be achieved, the impact of 
such reforms will be limited by the lack of access to inputs such as credit, training, and 
extension services. Small-scale irrigation farming faces critical challenges if it is to become a 
viable sector. The marked inequalities in the distribution of wealth and resources necessitate 
the carrying out of comprehensive rural and agricultural restructuring. 
Irrigation Management Transfer in South Africa 
Consistent with the overall agricultural policy principles there is a move away from 
government-owned irrigation schemes. The main objective is the transfer of ownership to the 
beneficiaries in a way that guarantees the chances of self-sustainability, efficiency and 
growth. The process requires the establishment of relevant institutional structures to allow 
legal transfer of ownership, farmer cooperation and appropriate support services. Effectively, 
this means that the irrigation schemes are to be totally owned, managed and maintained by 
participant farmers , in the form of Water User Associations (WUAs). The primary purpose of 
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WUAs is to provide for the effective representation of small-scale irrigation farmers on the 
irrigation schemes at a local level as well as managing water on behalf of their members. The 
establishment of WUAs provides small-scale irrigators with greater scope for self-
management. Maritz (n.d: 6) states "although WUAs are water management institutions their 
primary purpose is not water management. They operate on a restricted local level, and are in 
fact cooperative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related 
activities for their mutual benefit". The abi lity of the WUAs to assume their responsibilities is 
a formidable challenge. International experience has shown that developing the capacity of 
WUAs is long-term, and that it takes several years before they can be able to assume full 
responsibility. No doubt the Departments of Water Affairs and Agriculture need to playa 
crucial role in capacitating WUAs. 
There are two key innovations in the New Water Act: water charges' and redefined water 
allocations to balance supply and demand. The underlying rationale is that poor cost recovery 
is often regarded as one of the major stumbling blocks to the sustainability of irrigation 
schemes. Basically, few (if any) of the state irrigation schemes recovered full operation and 
maintenance costs. Prior to 1994 goverrunents in the former homelands were responsible for 
operation and maintenance and finance. Besides the fact that there was rampant corruption, 
irrigation scheme management found that their entire budgets were consumed in running and 
maintaining the economically non-viable irrigation schemes. The new policy requires that 
costs be recovered from beneficiaries. 
There are several motivating factors for the adoption of irrigation management transfer policy 
in South Africa. First, this revolves around the issue of disparities in the degree of support 
provided to state and private irrigation schemes. Secondly, the government found the 
financial burden of maintaining and operating unproductive irrigation schemes, through the 
provision of al1l1ual subsidies, impossible to justifY and sustain. Consequently, financial 
Generally, the record of cost-recovery has been disappointing, jeopardising the financia l viability of continued 
infrastructura l expansion (Alenee, 2002:699). There is evidence that in many rural communities the new water 
sources are under-utilised since many communities do not afford costs whether in the form of pre-paid meters or 
agreed-upon monthly tariffs. The result is that communities continue to use unsafe drinking water. In addition, 
questions about project sustainability abound. According to Ruiters and Stein (2002:266) Mvula Trust 
acknowledges that almost half of the projects it estab lished would fai l because of inability to maintain the 
system. They elaborate further "reasons for unsustainabil ity invariably include very real affordability constraints 
and an unwillingness to pay for communal standpipes ... Other impol1ant reasons for failure include poor quality 
of construction, areas within communities without service and intermittent supply" (Ruiters and Stein, 
2002:267). 
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support was withdrawn resulting in the collapse of many irrigation schemes. Lastly and most 
important external pressures on the government have dictated the path which the government 
should take with regard to service delivery. Specifically, the macro-economic strategy, 
GEAR, in line with WTO rules calls for deregulation and reduction of support (in terms of 
providing subsidies) for the agricultural sector. As such irrigated agriculture is deemed to be 
a lower order user of scarce resources and therefore must be seen to be moving towards self-
sustainability (Maritz, n.d :3). 
To facilitate the process, the government has undertaken to upgrade irrigation infrastructure 
of the existing irrigation schemes at government cost as a once-off subsidy before the transfer 
of ownership to the farmers or their institutional entity. There is no intention to develop new 
irrigation schemes. Also, the requirement is that each irrigation scheme be examined 
individually to determine its financial and economic viability. This is based on the fact that 
commercial banks and other lending institutions will finance only profitable projects. 
Irrigation scheme rehabilitation and upgrading is being used as the primary driver in the 
process to introduce irrigation management transfer to small-scale irrigation farmers (and to 
some extent commercial enterprises) (Maritz, n.d: 1 0). It is envisioned that the process be 
fully participatory. As such irrigation management transfer requires maximum involvement 
of all stakeholders in every aspect of project development. The key role players are the 
farmers, their committees, extension officers, consultants, relevant government departments, 
local government, non-governmental organisations. This differs considerably from the way in 
which the irrigation schemes were planned and operated in the past. 
Irrigation management transfer in South Africa is still in its infancy. As such it is not possible 
to give a comprehensive evaluation of the process. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that systematic dispossession of Africans which later 
culminated in the suppression of black farming and extensiye state support fo r white 
commercial farm ing has created distortions in the agricultural sector which have proved 
unsustainable. Effectively, therefore, whilst the interests of white commercial farmers were 
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met through various institutional SUpp0l1 structures such as finance, marketing structures, 
technical services, pricing policy, many small-scale farmers in the homelands either had 
limited or no access to support services. Where such services existed the quality has been 
inferior. The cumulative effect of these measures is an agricultural sector that has been 
restricted to low input levels. 
Generally, the performance of the irrigation schemes in the former homelands has been 
disappointing. They have, generally, been characterised by low productivity. Overall, they 
have failed to bring about the expected social and economic development of the participating 
farmers and the local population. 
On the whole these irrigation schemes suffered from a combination of technical, institutional 
and organisational constraints which include inter alia poor management, project planning 
and design; lack of farmer participation and consultation, farmer selection, quality of 
extension and other types of support services. What is evident is that policies designed to 
address agricultural development, in particular, irrigation development were ill-conceived, 
short-sighted and misguided. Irrigation development was a mechanism for the realisation of 
the political and economic agendas of the colonial and apartheid state as well as the 
homeland governments. 
The lessons from irrigation experience in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the current direction 
of irrigation development must be premised on farmer management and participative 
planning. This means beneficiaries must be partners in all development endeavours. 
Despite legislative and policy changes initiated Sll1ce 1994, prospects for revitalising 
agriculture in the former homelands and establishing a new class of emerging farmers are 
bleak. At the moment land reform has failed to dislodge white (and the elite in the 
homelands) monopoly ownership of land. As it is, land reform has transformed ownership 
relations marginally. Even if widespread agrarian reform might be achieved, the impact of 
such reforms will be limited by the lack of access to inputs such as credit, training, and 
extension services. Small-scale irrigation farming faces critical challenges if it is to become a 
viable sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TYHEFU IRRIGATION SCHEME: AN ILLUSION OF 
DEVELOPMENT' 
Introduction 
Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme consists of five settlements (Ndlambe, Pikoli, Ndwayana, Kalikeni, 
and Glenmore) along a stretch of approximately 25km of the lower Fish River. Of these five 
settlements Ndlambe is the focus of the study. 
The plalming and implementation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme was affected and 
influenced by broader Ciskeian politics. Various competing and conflicting interests sought a 
stake in the proposed irrigation development, thereby dividing the rural population in the 
process. On the one hand there was the need on the part of the apartheid / Ciskei government 
to assert its authority in the Tyhefu area through the installation of chiefly authority. At the 
village level a complex web of relationships and interactions existed: the role of the village 
elite, the Tribal Authority, Tyhefu irrigation scheme management and the farmers. The first 
part of this chapter examines the impact of the apartheid policies at the time and how these 
played themselves out at the village level. The second part looks at the plarming and 
implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The next section will focus on the plalming 
documents of the consultants, Loxton, Venn and Associates, the organization of the Tyhefu 
Irrigation scheme, its management structure as well as its economic performance. The last 
part looks at the current process of reviving and rehabilitating the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. 
Background 
Political and constitutional origins of the Ciskei can be traced back from the end of the 
nineteenth century when various legislative measures such as the Glen Grey Act of 1894, the 
Native Land Act, No. 27 of 1913 and the Native Trust Land Act, No. 18 of 1936 set in motion 
the process of racial segregation and dispossess ion. Underlying these was the principle that 
Africans should exercise their civil and political rights in the reserves. This process received 
9 This title is adopted from the study of the Gezira irrigation scheme in Sudan entitled "The Gezira Scheme : an 
illusion of development by T. Barnett 
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a boost with the coming to power of the National Party (NP) in 1948. The stated intention of 
apartheid policy was that of separate, self-governing states delineated on an ethnic basis. 
According to Stadler (1990: 133) the Bantu Authorities Act, No. 68 of 1951 became the most 
important instrument in establishing the basis of the apartheid system. The Act brought the 
chief back into the administrative network and restored some of his traditional powers but at 
the same time subjected his legitimacy to contamination by association with the apartheid 
system (Graaff, 1990:65). The chiefs were given wide-ranging executive and administrative 
powers, which were subject to abuse by the incumbents. Following then was the restructuring 
of the political landscape in the Ciskei, from regional, territorial to tribal authorities. Other 
enabling legislation designed to fast-track the process included the Promotion of Self-
government Act, No. 46 of 1959; Promotion of Economic Development of Bantu Homelands, 
No. 46 of 1968; Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, No. 26 of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Act, 21 of 1971 \0 
In pursuit of the policy of separate development Ciskei was declared a self-governing state in 
1972. Subsequently, on 4 December 1981 Ciskei became the fourth homeland to accept 
nominal independence from South Afi·ica. Independence brought a new and distinctive 
pattern of personal mle, monopolization of power (high concentration of power on the 
executive level), patronage politics of domination, nepotism, and corruption. Salient features 
of President Sebe's rule were authoritarianism, repression, elimination of constitutional 
constraints on the presidency, single-party rule, the narrowing of the public sphere and 
subordination of the judiciary (Haysom, 1983; Graaff, 1990). Graaff (1990 :56) refers to these 
as "ugly methods of survival driven by the legitimacy crisis which the incumbents suffered 
from". The consequence of this was the exercise of unchecked political power by the 
president, which represented the need to cling to power at all costs. All this was indicative of 
the realization of the vulnerability and uncertainty of homeland leadership and rule. Unlike 
post-colonial African leaders who had the support of the masses, homeland leaders were very 
10 The cumulative impact of these statutes was to fast track the process of granting political independence to the 
reserves. Africans were denied political representation and participation in so called white South Africa, with 
the result that a homeland citizenship status was imposed. Africans were regarded as temporary sojourners who 
were there to provide for the labour needs of white South Africa. What followed was massive forced removals 
to the economically depressed and resource-poor home lands which could not absorb the surplus population. 
Those who remained behind in the urban areas were subjected to harassment and brutality of the apal1heid state 
through a plethora of other legislation that defined their stay. 
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unpopular, and hence the legitimacy crisis. Autocratic rule in the Ciskei was not conducive to 
fostering public participation. 
The Tyhefu area, where the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is located, proved an enormous 
challenge for the configuration of Bantu authorities. Prior to the creation of separate tribal , 
regional and territorial authorities, settlements in the location and later reserve area roughly 
west of Peddie to the Fish River were under the jurisdiction of the South African Magistrate 
(Holbrook, 1992:182). These settlements were later placed under the control of the tribal 
authority in terms of Government Notice No. 285 of 1959. 
The Tyhefu Tribal area was originally named the Mpahla Tribal Authority. This was later 
changed to Tyhefu Tribal authority following the death of Chief Gladstone Mphahla in 1965. 
Nkebeza Tyhefu, considered senior to Mpahla, was denied chieftainship because of his 
support for the ANC as well as his trenchant opposition to the Native Affairs Department 
(NAD) and betterment planning. As a result Nkebeza's son, Douglas Msuthu, was appointed 
after Mpahla. Chief Nkebeza Tyhefu had been suspended from his post as headman on 
successive occasions since 1933, largely because under his leadership, Tyhefu men had 
refused to participate in elections for the Bunga (Ciskei General Council) or to follow its 
leaders (Mager, 1995:57)'1 "In November 1952, the police cracked down... Movements in 
and out of Peddie were monitored meetings prohibited and the militant Chief Msuthu exiled" 
(Mager, 1992:774). In spite of his banning from the area Tyhefu commanded a big following. 
People "continued to regard him as their leader, they held meetings at his home, making it 
impossible for the headman to operate independently" (Mager, 1995:57). As a result the 
Tyhefu Tribal area was never subjected to betterment planning even though it was surveyed 
in 1963. This according to Ainslie (1998 :78) can be attributed to the fact that the state 
machinery had lost its enthusiasm by then to go into an area with the reputation for resistance 
such as the Tyhefu location. Thus, the lack of development in the area has been associated 
largely to antipathy of the people towards the state and official services. 
11 Resistance to betterment planning in the Ciskei was uneven. Measures included militant confrontations with 
the authori ties and fence cutting. Ch iefs and 3 headman occupied hot positions. As Mager (1992:769) points out 
those who supported the authorit ies were repeatedly left "standing alone" wh ile those who "stood with the 
people" were accorded folk hero status. Nkebeza Msuthu was regarded as one of the militant chiefs. With the 
ass istance and influence of the African Nationa l Congress (ANC) hc wielded an enormous influence in the area. 
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Competing and Conflicting Interests 
The period before the implementation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme and formal 
establishment of the Mhala Tribal Authority was characterized by overt tribalism" in the 
Ciskei. Ciskei politics at national level filtered down to the village level. In the case of the 
Ndlambe village the need of the conservative village elite to find a chiefly candidate who 
would advance the Xhosa cause became more pronounced. Holbrook (1992: 187) summarises 
the initial challenges faced by this group "The Ciskeian Territorial Authority was chaired by 
a prominent Mfengu chief, Mabandla. The men felt it would be fruitless to appeal to a 
Mfengu for help for promoting Xhosa interests". 
Meanwhile, in an attempt to cUl1aii the power and influence of the Tyhefu Tribal Authority 
over all the settlements under its jurisdiction, the Ciskei government looked into the 
possibility of inventing and establishing the Lower Tyhefu Tribal Authority (L TT A). The 
latter would cover the villages of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme, in particular Ndlambe and 
Pikoli. These villages have traditionally been regarded as predominantly Xhosa settlements. 
12 According to Hendricks (1991: I) Afrikaner nat ionalist ideology of multi-nationalism and its implementation 
in the bantustan policy of apartheid propped up tribalism, shaped existing divisions or created these where there 
were none. The jostling for polit ical control in the Ciskei along tribal lines represents what Mamdani (200 1) 
calls a citizenship crisis. The rise of tribal consciousness and rivalry in the Ciskei originated in the Frontier 
Wars of the 1800s. Whilst it is not possible to narrate this history in detail here, suffice to say that the fact that 
the Mfengu fought along side the colonial forces has been a source of tension since then. Inst itutionally 
entrenched discriminations against the Xhosa further exacerbated the already poor relations. How these poor 
relations found expression from the late 1960s is my focu s. The ma in players in the unfolding tri bal ism that 
continued to bedevil Ciskeian politics were Justice Mabandla, who in 1968 became the first Head of the Ciskei 
Territorial Authority, and LLW Sebe who occupied the portfolio of Minister of Education. Both represented the 
Mfengu and Xhosa respectively. The working relationship between the two is summarized as follows 
"Mabandla accused Sebe of holding secret meetings and plotting against his government Sebe accused 
Mabandla of ethnic favouriti sm and blocking the aspirations of the Rharhabe chiefs for government recognition. 
When Sebe was dropped to the less glamorous agricu lture portfolio, he began to organize his own political 
party, the Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) for the upcoming 1973 elections" (Vail, 1989:399). The 
expressed sentiment by CN IP was "Why should we be ruled by the Fingo?, thereby awakening the historical and 
material grievances . .. and rall ied them to the Sebe cause" (Vai l, 1989:399). The rise of Lennox Sebe, despite 
being a commoner, is striking. From his appointment in the Ciskei Territorial Authority in 1968, to him being 
the declared life president at independence managed to ingrat iate himself and his party in Ciskeian politics and 
life. In a "landslide victory" which was marred by corruption practices, this practice became the central feature 
of his presidency. Power struggles within the CNIP were not uncommon, result ing in the dismissal of opposition 
from within. His support and power base consisted mainly of chiefs and co-opted local elites. Sebe not only 
revived old Xhosa chieftainships but also created them . In 1985 the Ciskei National Assembly had 57 members 
of which 28 were ch iefs. In 1978 the opposi tion party, the Ciskei National Party, headed by Justice Mabandla, 
ceased to exist and Ciskei became a one-party state which became more and more intolerant of opposition 
groups (Manana, 1995: 16). "After attaining a pos ition of unquestionable power " Sebe began the nation-
bu ilding exercise "by attempting to heal the ugly breach which he himself between the Xhosa and the Mfengu 
which he himself had done so much to inflame" (Vail, 1989:40 I). This he demonstrated by promoting selected 
Mfengu (including his arch-rival, Justice Mabandla) to positions of power. Effectively, therefore, broadening his 
power base. Patronage politics remained one of survival strategies. 
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This became the site of struggle between the L TTA (later replaced by the Mhala Tribal 
Authority), the headman, irrigation scheme participants and management and the village at 
large. 
In anticipation of the establishment of the LIT A Diba Msuthu, the brother of the incumbent 
chief of the Tyhefu Tribal Authority, established his "Great Place" closer to the Ndlambe I 
Pikoli villages, thereby becoming the de facto head. Predictably, as a Mfengu Msuthu was 
not welcome. This sparked outrage and swift reaction from the dominant, conservative and 
elite members of the Ndlambe community. Under pressure Msuthu had to leave. However, 
the group still had to contend with the Lower Tyhefu Tribal Authority which was active in 
the organisation and implementation of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme. 
According to Vail (1989:400) new chieftainships in the Ciskei were established in one of 
three possible ways. The population of a given location could reject the authority of their 
officially recognized chief and invite in a new chief. There are several examples of the 
creation of new chieftainships when Sebe gained power in 1973 such as the Gqunukhwebe, 
Ngcangathelo, Ngxalase. This is the route taken by the conservative elite in Ndlambe to bring 
in someone "acceptable" to them. As discussed earlier, the [Lower) Tyhefu Tribal Authority 
was always in dispute. 
Ndlambe men's attempt to secure a chiefly candidate received a boost in 1973 with the 
coming to power of the Xhosa-aligned Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) under the 
leadership of LL W Sebe. They subsequently approached the new "government" after which 
they were told to identifY the royal lineage from which they would select their chief. Their 
search ended with the Ndlambe Tribal Authority headed by chief Menziwe Makinana. His 
response was positive. This paved the way for the submission of a claim for a new tribal 
authority, with Hamilton Makinana identified as the suitable candidate. Soon after this the 
chief moved to the Ndlambe village near Tyhefu irrigation scheme headquarters awaiting his 
official appointment. Summarising the overall impact of the whole process Holbrook 
(1992: 192) states "the crisis that exploded in the arena of village politics was precipitated by 
the group looking for the chiefly candidate and the new chief and represented a serious 
breach of norm-governed relations, a breach that led rapidly to a split in the irrigation 
community and the village as a whole". 
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The Mhala Tribal Authority (MT A) was formally established in terms of Ciskeian 
Government Notice No. 84 of 1983, thereby marking the demise of the LTTA which was 
never officially promulgated and recognised. Its jurisdiction was limited only to the villages 
of Ndlambe, Pikoli, Woodlands and Runlets. The latter two villages were located outside the 
original Tyhefu Tribal Authority. At the same time they are not part of the Tyhefu Irrigation 
Scheme. Here subsistence agriculture is rainfed. In the political process that had unfolded the 
influence of the Tyhefu Tribal Authority was firmly confined to the administration of the 
Mfengu villages that had little direct interaction with the Tyhefu irrigation Scheme 
(Holbrook, 1992:200). 
The rule of Chief Makinana was turbulent. Faced with the crisis of legitimacy, accusations of 
favouriti sm, corruption and inefficiency as well as the opening of political space in the Ciskei 
in the latel980s, Chief Makinana had to flee the area. However, Mhala Tribal Authority's 
power and influence in the village and Tyhefu irrigation scheme cmmot be under-estimated. 
The Mhala Tribal Authority was made up largely of the commercial farmers \3 of the Tyhefu 
Irrigation scheme which consisted of the powerful rural elite faction that saw Chief Makinana 
rise to power. Consequently, the MTA was concerned with these sectional interests rather 
than those of the whole community. On the whole the MT A was made up of individuals who 
could not be regarded as representatives of the people. This situation was not unique to the 
MTA as Manona (1995) demonstrates in the study of Tribal Authorities in the 
Keiskammahoek district "the Tribal Authority as a conservative body could not reflect the ... 
diversity of the people it served". 
The role and responsibility of the Mhala Tribal Authority with regard to the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme proved to be a source of tension and conflict for irrigation scheme management. As 
Holbrook (1992:201) argues "the emergence of the Mhala Tribal Authority was a critical 
element in the village political factions to challenge the authority of the scheme in irrigation 
matters". The Mhala Tribal Authority demonstrated its ability to overrule management 
\3 The concept of commercial farmer in the Tyhefu irrigation scheme referred to a 4 ha plot of irrigated land. It 
implied that the "farmer" will be involved in the commercial production and marketing of high value crops 
under strict centralized control from irrigat ion scheme management. Thus, according to van A verbeke et al 
(1998:8) the commercial farmer component in many irrigation schemes was directed at providing selected 
households with an opportunity to become involved in small-scale market oriented production, the main 
objective being to create a class of black conunerciaJly oriented fanners. None of the commercial fanners in all 
the irrigation schemes managed to farm independently of irrigation scheme services. The income they derived 
from farming was limited and were always in a continual state of indebtedness. 
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deci~iol1s at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme through direct intervention in inigation mu((ers on 
behalf of commercial famlers. This not only threatened the effective function ing of the 
irrigation scheme management but through its behaviour the Mhala Tribal authority s ideEi1~d 
thc rest of the communities under its control. As Holbrook (1992:21 0) argues "th" gro' il i:.! 
power of the commercial fam1er / tribal authority elite occasioned a great deal of concem fo r 
the schemc's Interscience management and its Loxton Venn consultants for it tlu'eatened the 
continued operation of the scheme altogether". 
Political and Administrative Structure of the Cisiwi vis-a-vis the IVA I.:< 101 
Tribal Authority in 1990 (Manona, 1995:7) 
~.'"'" ~:::;:"::;::";jc" 
l1agist c rial Distri c ts - Regional Authorities - Reg iona l Pa rty 
(Branches) 
~Tribal Authorities Local p~ riY Branches 
Mhala Tribal Authority I 
Village touncils l'u r t y Ce l l.:; 
NB The Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) was the ruling party which nom iI/ally 
shared its authority with the Tribal Authority over the community (Manana, J 995:8). 
, 
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Another dimension concerned the umesolved question of the position of the 11eadm::U1 14 v 's-a-
vis the Mhala Tribal Authority and Tyhefu inigation scheme. Elections called by the C skei 
government in 1984 to resolve the issue did not help matters either. The functions and 
responsibilities of the headman were limited to minor issues in the Ndlamb~ village (COl ,niCt 
resolution, land allocation, general enforcement of the law). In contrast, the M!' tLl 'J 'i l ' :~ I 
]4 Ge!ow the Tribal Authority was a convocation of senior men and the headmen of each constituent village 
(Pikoli, Ndlambc, Run lets and Woodlands (Holbrook, 1992:205). The first two villages are part of the Tyhefu 
irrigalion scheme whilst Runlets and Woodtands are not For Ndlambe and Pikali th o govcnlmenl-appoin:cd and 
paid headman of Pikoli village had jurisdiction over the two villages . The Pikoli hcadl.l~ . 11 li)cu.\cd IHore l n hiw 
own immediate village, whilst delegating his Ndlambe responsib ilities to the unpaid sub-head.l1"n i.l N& :"bo, 
Both headmen had circumscribed powers in relation to the MTA, 
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authority was responsible for collecting and distributing land rentals from the irrigation 
scheme, for proposing irrigated land allocations and with representing the interests of the 
"villagers" (commercial farmers) vis-a-vis the irrigation scheme (Holbrook, 1992: 199), In 
effect, the Mha1a Tribal authority ' s primary interests were with the commercial farmers and 
not the village as a whole, Whilst higher-level decision making vested primarily in the Tribal 
Authority, the headman, also, had the duty of implementing all directives from the Tribal 
Authority, The two were further distinguished by the manner and nature of the meetings they 
held, The meetings held by the headman can be described as more open to the public and its 
"transparent" nature , Conversely, those of the Mhala Tribal Authority were more secretive, 
lacked transparency, limited only to the Tribal Authority and its inner circle, There was, also, 
closer interaction between the Mhala Tribal Authority and Tyhefu irrigation scheme 
management, a priviledge not accorded the headman, On the whole, the Chief participated 
minimally in community affairs, Instead he delegated his authority to his councillors, His 
main interests were the Tyhefu irrigation scheme and broader Ciskeian politics, Referring to 
the Keismmahoek district tribal authority Manona (1995: 16) summarised its role as follows 
"chiefs generally were no longer directly responsible to their people but were civil servants 
with specific obligations to the government. In the same sense, the Tribal Authority was an 
arm of government, and its decisions were made with that as its primary objective, Much of 
its power came from above" ," 
During the initial phases of the rehabilitation process community divisions regarding the 
future role of the chief in the Tyhefu irrigation scheme surfaced, A letter by Rainbow Valley, 
Social Consultants, (2000) alludes to the problem "" , there are sensitive land allocation issues 
that keep surfacing and have a potential to derail the process if not resolved or at least openly 
debated in a public forum, Unti l decisions are made by the affected parties, it looks likely that 
a protracted and unnecessarily long process is set to take place and if it continues may 
jeopardise the economic viability of the scheme", The minutes of 7 December 200 I are more 
revealing "Chief Makinana called for an indaba on land allocation during the consultative 
process to assist the community with the land allocation, The calling of an indaba by the 
Chief caused uneasiness with the Project Steering Committee (PSC) as it was perceived as 
interference in the PSC 's role and responsibilities", From the informal discussions held with 
various community members and their elected representatives there appears to be a 
unanimous decision not to allow the Chief to have any role to play, Initially, the ex-
commercial farmers and some loyalists favoured the active participation of the now defunct 
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Mhala Tribal Authority. Generally, the majority of the community does not want the 
participation of the Chief in any way. Members of the community believe that the community 
and its elected representatives should drive this process. 
Agricultural Potential in the Tyhefu Area 
The Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry annual report (1984/85) described the 
Tyhefu area as "one of the most eroded and impoverished areas of the Ciskei. Some of the 
drier parts are virtually beyond rehabilitation. The area is densely populated and is so drought 
prone that the people are unable to subsist from the land: a truly depressed area". In addition, 
Loxton. Vellli and Associates (1979) identified advanced erosion and veld degradation. They 
described the area as having very limited agricultural potential and only moderately suited to 
extensive and semi-intensive livestock production than cultivation. 
Research evidence (Manon a, 1997; Monde-Gweleta et aI, 1998) suggests that agriculture 
adds to rural livelihoods in a modest way, and hardly ever constitutes the main and reliable 
source of income and food security. According to Nagel and Spencer (2000:34) earnings 
from agriculture in the Ciskei account for less than 10% of household income for the majority 
of the rural households. State transfers in the form of old age pensions, child welfare and 
disability grants, remittances constitute the most important source of income. 
Where farming takes place, the land is not utili sed to its optimal capacity. Despite the fact 
that in some areas of the Eastern Cape Province there is overcrowding, much of the land 
remains unutilised. Agricultural productivity in the Tyhefu area is f1ll1her limited by the agro-
ecology of the region. This includes poor soils, low and irregular rainfall, water quality 
problem, high evaporation rates, seasonal extremes of temperature and a poor resource base. 
Other constraints to successful farming for the majority of the rural population include 
access to credi t and finance , poor (or non-existent) support and extension services and poor 
infras tructure. 
In view of the above, the agricultural objectives of the Ciskei were detailed in the report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Development of the Republic of Ciskei (Swart 
Commission) (1983). The SWaJ1 Commission identified two key objectives of agricultural 
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development: developing Ciskei 's agricultural potential to the optimum and the 
commercialisation of the agricultural sector. With regard to the latter the Swart Commission 
(1983:44) stated "the aim is to upgrade the level of farming from sub-subsistence to 
subsistence and the conversion of subsistence farming into commercial farming, thus placing 
farmers firmly in the cash economy". Underlying this were several interrelated objectives, 
which include inter alia: active participation of the farmers in all management functions; 
development of farmer skills and other competencies; establishment of a full-time class of 
commercial farmers whose income will compare favourably with other non-farming 
enterprises; ensuring food security and employment creation; and the generation of various 
linkages within Ciskei 's economy and that of South[ern] Africa as a whole. The Tyhefu 
Irrigation scheme is a prime example of how these objectives were not met. This will be 
clearly evident in the discussion that follows. 
THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYHEFU 
IRRIGATION SCHEME 
The South African government first considered the possibility of developing an irrigation 
scheme in the Tyhefu area in the mid-1930s. At the time one of the constraining factors was 
the high salinity of the Fish River water, with the result that the project never got off the 
ground. The idea was revisited in 1975 by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry 
when it commissioned Loxton, Venn and Associates (the main consulting firm in irrigation 
scheme planning and implementation in the Ciskei and Transkei) to conduct feasibility 
studies. The primary objective of the feasibility studies was the development of an irrigation 
scheme on the eastern side of the Fish River. Subsequently, Loxton, Venn and Associates 
recommended a large-scale, capital intensive and technologically advanced agricultural 
project in the Fish River Valley, to be initiated in the form of a pilot project, later known as 
the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. 
As mentioned earlier, widespread poverty in the Tyhefu area and its limited agricultural 
potential is cited in the planning documents as one of the driving motives for the proposed 
implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. However, the above together with the 
"perceived need to change the antagonistic relationship between the people of the Tyhefu 
area and the state" (Holbrook, 1992:63) lies at the heart of the intervention. The people of 
54 
J 
the Tyhefu area have long been described as "recalcitrant and difficult" adopting an 
uncooperative attitude towards betterment schemes" (Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 1984: I). In addition, the consultants stated "the Department (of Agriculture and 
Forestry in the Ciskei) hopes to use the irrigation scheme as a nucleus from which 
rehabilitation planning l 6 can be extended to the whole tribal area" (Loxton and Venn, 
1977:29). It is for this reason the inhabitants of the Tyhefu area believe that the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme was of strategic importance to the government. Its planning and 
development is regarded more as a way of extending state control over the Tyhefu area, 
appeasing the local population as well as legitimizing homeland rule. This is reflected in the 
reaction of the Ndwayana village, the first village approached about the proposed irrigation 
scheme in the area. Residents in the village point out that their resistance to the proposed 
development was seen as part of a broader struggle against colonialism, the apartheid state 
and its policy of separate development. After failing to convince the Ndwayana community, 
the planners approached the villages ofNdlambe and Pikoli "whose response was much more 
positive" (Van Averbeke et aI, 1998: 47). 
l' Foolnote 15 & 16 must be read together. Betterment Planning (also known as soil conservation and 
agricultural rehabilitation) - refers to successive attempts started in the 1930s by var ious South Afriean and 
homeland governments ostensibly to combat the deterioration of the natural resources and improve agricultural 
production in the reserves. The driving impetus for betterment stems from the 1932 Native Economic 
Commission which seemed to have sent panic in the goverrunent about the decl in ing resource base in the 
reserves. Unlike previous Commiss ions it called for urgent remedial measures to halt the situation and revive the 
reserve economies. The Commission aptly stated " In the economic development of the reserves must inevitably 
be sought the main solution for the native economic problem ... our problem is therefore not only as it is in 
agriculture to teach the Native how to use their land more economically, but is also a race against time to 
prevent the destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and denudation of the soil and drying up of springs" 
(Yaw itch, 1981:9). Whilst concerns about eonservation date back long before the 1930s as far as betterment is 
concerned these are rooted in the Native Trust and Land Act, No.18 of 1936. The government attributed the bad 
state of the reserves to bad fanning practices, laz iness and the irrational desire to accumulate livestock rather 
than questioning the nature of its policies. 
The procedures and processes for betterment planning were first outlined in Proclamation 31 of 1939 and later 
Proclamation 116 of 1949. An important requirement was the development of a land-use plan, wh ich included 
the division of the rural areas into residential, arable and grazing areas. This together with the limited pasture 
areas meant that no commercial farming could eyer take plaee let alone meeting subsistence needs. 
On the whole, betterment planning failed to achieve the desired results. Far from conserving the environment, 
improving agricultural productivity, betterment had the opposite effect. Reserves continued to slide in to ever-
increasing poverty. The policy had nothing to do with enviromnentai conservation and agricultural development 
but more to do with ensuring a steady supply of migrant labour and the control of the rural population. Evidence 
abounds (de Wet,1985, 1995) that bette1ment created Illore erosion, ecological and social problems than it had 
so lved. According to De Wet (! 994:362) betterment could not have succeeded in its basic aims becallse trapped 
within the land allocations of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, it could not relieve the pressure on the land. 
16 Rehabilitation planning (see footnote 15) 
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Up until the planning and implementation of the project the state did not have its grip on the 
area. Thus, the nature of the Tyhefu irrigation Scheme discourse entailed the politicization of 
the development. This is clear from the fo llowing extract "the most important benefit has 
been the 'winning over' of the local community, who are now collaborating with the 
authorities and have sent a delegation to request the rehabilitation planning of the whole tribal 
area, something to which they were previously strongly opposed. This is a most significant 
and heartening change" (Ciskei Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry, 1984:5). Furthermore, the 
Loxton Venn and Associates (1977) stated that within the area " lay seeds of trouble" and 
argued that one of the benefits of the project would be "the easing of the troublesome 
political problem" . 
[n an effort to overcome the problems discussed above the Consultants recommended strict 
centralised managerial control over the activities of the farmers. This strategy has since 
become controversial for several reasons. This approach did not allow for farmer 
participation in the initial planning process, design and implementation phases. Research 
evidence (Lowdermilk,1985; van Rooyen, 1985; Bembridge (2000) suggests a strong 
correlation between farmer participation in planning and decision making and the economic 
viability of irrigation schemes. According to Bembridge (1986b: 612) success depends on 
integration between technology, management, participants and the socio-economic situation. 
Thus, authoritarianism characteristic of the apartheid state and Ciskei government fed into the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme design. Farmer participation would run counter to the principles of 
exclusion, and the narrowing of political space on which the South African state was firmly 
grounded. Generally, strike action and or any form of unrest was not tolerated in any way. At 
best it was suppressed through vio lent means. According to Van Averbeke et al (1998:4-5) 
during the late 1980s the growing awareness among the irrigation scheme workers of their 
rights, the demand for higher wages led to a general decline of most of the irrigation schemes 
in the Eastern Cape as well as the erosion of the authority of irrigation scheme management. 
One of the major requirements proposed for the economic success of the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme was a new system of land tenure. This was based on the notion of "voluntary 
alienation" of traditional land rights. In effect, this meant the scrapping of all the existing 
land rights and subsequent re-allocation of land. Oral testimonies point out that not all people 
approved such alienation, instead people demanded that they retain their dryland holdings. 
Small plots and allotments were allocated to members of the community in exchange for 
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releasing rainfed land for irrigated production ((Monde-Gweleta et ai, 1997:619). The Lower 
Tyhefu Tribal Authority "approved" the alienation of all land rights. This effectively gave the 
management of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme total control over land. As Holbrook (1992: 70) 
puts it 'they could allocate land, determine how land was to be used and could evict 
participants from the land". To ensure that the irrigated land would be used optimally, 
Loxton, Venn and Associates proposed the following guidelines: selection of farmers subject 
to satisfactory performance; farmer servicing and training; economic discipline (1977:27). 
This made it possible for management to "evict" non-performing farmers. According to the 
fo rmer farmers eviction was not a widespread practice even though this appears to have been 
applied stringently during the early years. 
The salinity of the Fish River water presented the planners with problems which threatened 
the viability of the project. Suffice to say that despite all attempts with the problem the 
general quality of the water remained poor. To contain the problem emphasis was on saline-
resistant, high value crops and the use of sophisticated production techniques. 
The economic success of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme was in doubt from the start. Loxton, 
Venn and Associates were clear from the outset that the scheme was not economically viable. 
They stated "as a result of high pumping costs the pilot project is not economically viable 
sensu stricto, but because it will be superseded by the main gravity scheme and because of 
the tremendous benefits it is producing, this is acceptable to the Ciskei Cabinet" (Dept. of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 1984:5). In addition, water quality problems and the limited range 
of crops that could be grown affected the yields at Ndlambe, Pikoli and and Kalikeni. As a 
result the Tyhefu irrigation scheme was fUlming at a large operational loss (circa Rl million) 
prior to management withdrawal in 1995 (Bembridge, 2000:37). 
Loxton and Venn's development plan was based on the assessment of the physical 
environment (water and soil analysis), engll1eenng aspects, a market survey and crop 
technology criteria with little or no attention to the human aspects. This type of development 
was based on the mistaken assumption that technological irUlovations per se would be 
sufficiently attractive to automatically stimulate farmer participation (Backeberg et aI, 
1996:59). 
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The Tyhefu irrigation scheme was started in 1977 as a pilot project implemented in various 
phases. The pilot project started with the development of 121ha at Ndlambe (headquarters). 
The aim of the pilot project was to investigate the suitability of the area for irrigated crop 
production, especially high value crops for the urban market. According to Bembridge 
(1986b: 608) the implementation of a pilot project represented a notable exception to the 
approach taken to much irrigation development in Africa, since pilot projects or 
demonstration farms aimed at addressing technical and socio-economic problems have rarely 
preceded large-scale development. Approximately 1000ha of potentially irrigable land is 
undeveloped. This area is expected to be extended once the scheme becomes functional. At 
the time of the closure of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme the total irrigated area was 694 ha. 
The implementation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme had an effect on spatial planning in the 
village. The number of families relocated as a result of the implementation of the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme and the construction of the Mhala Tribal Authority headquarters is unclear. 
It is estimated that at least 30-50 families had to be relocated. Even though compensation is 
reported to have been paid, this is considered insufficient. Resettled families moved to 
already populated areas. The effect was the centralisation and concentration of the village. At 
the same time, the scheme's infrastructure closed off some areas for settlement and restricted 
settlement to other areas and, in addition, settlement increased as people moved to the area in 
response to the area's economic opportunities (Holbrook, 1992:95). 
58 
Map of Tyefu Irrigation Scheme. 
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The Organisation and Management of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme 
Tyhe[u irrigation scheme was first administered by management agents, Interscience (Pty) 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Loxton, Venn and Associates, on behalf of th· Cisk"j :;()VClnil1~'1l '.Il1Lil 
1984. They remained as advisors to the Ciskei government. Interscience (Ply) Ltd \I , ) ill 
charge of planning and implementing cropping programmes, budgeting and financial control 
and evaluating performance (Bembridge (1986:605). From the 1985 to 1997 Tyhefu irrig'ltion 
scheme was managed by U1imocor, Ciskei Agricultural Corporation. This take over did not 
mean the end of the influence of old management, since they became advisors to Ulim()cor. 
In the meantime, Loxton, Venn and Associates management staff was re-employed by 
Ulimocor. In effect therefore, changes in management did little to change the structural 
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principles on which Tyhefu irrigation scheme was based. Essentially decision making was 
still vested with the old management. At the same time relations between irrigation scheme 
management and the commercial farmers continued to deteriorate. 
Relations between the vanous farming groups and irrigation scheme management were 
structured hierarchically. At the top of the hierarchy was irrigation scheme management 
followed by the commercial farmers, the small plotholders or allotment holders and the 
labourers. What distinguished the above groups from each other is the amount of land each 
held as well as the size of the group. For example commercial farmers were numerically the 
smallest group but farmed more land, whilst labourers did not have access to any irrigated 
land. Holbrook (1992: 75) explains "the two variables in the hierarchy - land holding and 
group size, could be said to stand in a inverse relationship to each other - the smaller the 
group, the more land it held, the higher on the hierarchy it stood". 
Of the various farmer categories, commercial farmers were carefully controlled by irrigation 
scheme management according to the scheme's plan which emphasised centralized 
managerial control and decision-making. Management style can be described as autocratic 
and top-down with little (if any) farmer participation. The effect of this was the non-
accountabi lity of management, feelings of incompetence among the farmers, inadequate 
training and development of local institutions (Bembridge, 2000). According to Backenberg 
et al (1996:61) on most schemes the relationship between farmers and project management is 
that of customer and supplier. Farmers had no sense of ownership. This was not conducive 
for effective interaction and cooperation with irrigation scheme management. Thus, the 
farmers were limited in the degree to which they could affect and influence management. As 
a commercial enterprise, Tyhefu irrigation scheme management interpreted their role as one 
of ensuring efficient production through the provision of various inputs and marketing of the 
crop. 
At the time of closing Tyhefu irrigation scheme none of the management functions had been 
transferred to the farmers. This is proving counter-productive since the ultimate aim of 
reviving the irrigation schemes is the transfer of all responsibilities to the farmers. With no 
managerial and other skills critical for the viability and sustainability of the irrigation 
schemes, capacity building is essential. 
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Sub-Division of Irrigated Land 
After the alienation of existing land rights the Tyhefu Inigation scheme's plan proposed the 
sub-division of inigated land into three types of production units: tribal farms, commercial 
plots, food plots 1 allotments. Specifically, the land was subdivided as follows: 22 
commercial farms of 4 ha each; 223 food plots of 0,25 ha; 3 tribal farms totalling 183 ha; 66 
allotments ofO, 16ha (Van Averbeke et al 1998:45). 
Tribal farms or central unit occupied about 50% of ilTigated land on each site. The 
functions of the central unit were to manage estate farming in pursuit of an economic 
objective, and to provide farmer support services to food plotters and small-scale commercial 
farmers in line with the social objective (Van Averbeke et aI, 1998:8). The tribal farms were 
managed and farmed as commercial units on behalf of the Tribal Authority, with the profits 
"to be used for community development purposes". Oral testimonies reveal that none of the 
money was used for such a purpose, except the enrichment of the Tribal Authority and close 
associates. Perhaps an explanation of how the Tribal Authority used its finances is contained 
in the following quote by Holbrook (1992 :206/207) "The Mhala Tribal Authority was greatly 
concerned with raising funds for political purposes ... ". It was common practice for the Ciskei 
government (and by implication CNIP) to demand large sums of money from the Tribal 
Authorities who in turn extorted it from the populace. Failure by the Tribal Authority to do 
this drew heavy criticism from the state, which at times meant falling into disfavour and the 
withdrawal of certain priviledges. Considering the high level of corruption in the institution 
of chieftaincy generally, the fact that they were poorly paid state functionaries, their fragile 
position vis-a-vis the Ciskei government and that they constantly had to prove their loyalty to 
the government, it can be infened that income from the Tribal farms was embezzled. 
Besides the perceived short-term benefits of improved food security and access to 
employment, all respondents are unanimous that the scheme's impact on the village and 
region as a whole has been limited. The respondents point to the lack of development of the 
area. Available evidence on many irrigation schemes suggests that "the distribution of 
benefits was limited in relation to total need and to aggregate resources available for 
development. Although higher levels of resource use, production and wage employment were 
achieved through modern farming enterprises .. . little was done to promote a class of self-
employed farmers or to improve farming conditions for smallholders outside these 
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schemes .. .The projects ... often incurred losses, and rarely involved spill-overs or linkages 
with the surrounding communities" (V ink and Kirsten, 2000:20). Bromberger and Antonie 
(1993: 23) referred to the irrigation schemes as "islands of prosperity amidst an ocean of 
poverty". 
Farming on the tribal farms was discontinued in the late 1980s and the land subdivided into 
small plots and allotments. 
Commercial farms formed 40% of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. The objective being to 
establish a class of full-time black commercial farmers. Selection was done by the Tribal 
Authority and subject to endorsement by irrigation scheme management. Residents point out 
that this was done in an undemocratic manner and the process was closed. According to local 
residents commercial farmers were supposed to receive intensive training. After which based 
on their performance they would 'graduate' and be given access to more land where they 
would farm independently of the irrigation scheme. This vision never materialised. 
Backeberg et al (1996:56) commenting on the selection criteria of farmers notes "with few 
exceptions, there had been no selection of participants on small-irrigation schemes on the 
basis of fanning, entrepreneurial ability or trainability". Undoubtedly, this had an impact on 
the economic performance of many schemes. 
At the time of the closure of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme in 1997, the commercial farmers 
had not accumulated sufficient income to farm independently of scheme services. There does 
not appear to have been any attempt on the management's part to relinquish control over the 
activities of the farmers . At the same time many of the farmers incurred a heavy debt burden. 
In addition the number of assets acquired is minimal. 
Generally, commercial farmers belonged to Ndlambe ' s largest, dominant and influential 
kinship groups, made up basically of what is referred to as the original inhabitants of the 
area". They enjoyed a much higher and priviledged status compared to those who had 
17 Holbrook (1992:111) explains" in Ndlambe a distinction is made between people who lived in the area before 
the scheme and those that arrived after it had been established. Those people from old Ndlambe families enjoy a 
higher status in the village. The premium placed on being from Ndlambc' s "original" fa milies achieved 
palticular value after the implementation of the scheme because the planner's land-use plan restricted access to 
those people who had previously held land rights in the area". Former farm workers evicted from farms in the 
Republic of South Africa, residents of the Glenmore resettlement camp as well as staff of the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme who did not have any kinship re lations in the village were regarded as total foreigners. A term 
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relocated to the area. Such a distinction determines who plays a major and dominant role in 
community affairs. More importantly, this was an automatic mechanism of exclusion. 
Whilst a smaller group, commercial farmers farmed more land (4 ha each) and had 
preferential access to scheme's resources compared to small plotholders and allotment 
holders. The main services offered by the scheme to the commercial farmers included water 
supply, land preparation, extension, marketing, cropping regimes, seed and seedlings, 
fertilisers and pesticides, access to credit. In return, they were expected to care for the land 
and crops. Commercial farmers were charged for all these services. Commercial farmers 
were, thus, able to generate more income than other farming groups. Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, "commercial fanners were the most powerful local fanning group by 
virtue of their position in village kinship networks and their preferential access to political 
power and irrigation scheme resources" (Holbrook, 1992:207). Furthermore, their close 
association with the Mhala Tribal Authority strengthened their position. The Tribal Authority 
did not represent the interests of its constituents and hence the poor support it enjoyed from 
the community at large. Its favouritism of commercial farmers threatened and affected 
community unity. 
Generally, the relationship between irrigation scheme's management and the commercial 
farmers was far from cordial, culminating ultimately in the challenge of scheme management 
in 1987. Main grievances centred around racism, composition of irrigation scheme 
management, corruption and mismanagement, marketing policies, the credit and financial 
management system. Holbrook (1992:89) elaborates "although the opposition between 
management and the farmers was made visible in a number of ways its recurring theme was 
... that of race. The core day-to-day decision-making group within management was not only 
made up of "foreign" professional experts, but it was exclusively white. A central dimension 
to the conflict, therefore, was that participants were black while management, who exercised 
economic control over the participants, was white". Consequently, a black project manager 
was appointed. At the same time other black staff were either appointed or promoted to junior 
positions. As it is such a change was insignificant in terms of the management of the scheme 
commonly used to refer to this group is " iranuga". According to Kropf (1915:369) ukuranuga refers "to go on 
tramp seeking work". Implicit in the meaning is the notion of being a foreigner. lt should be noted that people 
from neigbouring villages and the Peddie area were never regarded as foreigners but strangers or outsiders. 
Being territorial is not something unique to the vi llage of Nd lambe but happens in varying degrees in many 
societies. 
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and policies pursued since essentially decision making was sti ll vested with the old 
management. Thus, the basic structural features of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme as well as the 
relationships of authority and control remained the same. For example the black project 
manager "relegated to the status of "fi gurehead" ... and unsure about applying himself to the 
task of making complex economic and managerial decisions found his role decline 
significantly" (Holbrook, 1992:990) . 
Small plots and allotments were a form of compensation to those community members who 
gave up their rainfed land for irrigation development. A small plot covered an area of 0,25ha 
whilst an allotment was 0,16ha. In practice, the two were regarded as the same category. 
Women dominated in these categories. Farming here was geared towards subsistence rather 
than the market. In many instances the farmers did generate a small cash profit. Fanners had 
lots of freedom compared to the commercial farmers regarding the crops they could grow and 
marketing. 
The Economic Performance of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme 
In an investigation into food plot production at irrigation schemes in the central Eastern Cape 
Van Averbeke et al (1998:58) noted the difficulty of obtaining an accurate record of actuals. 
The report stated "we had to rely on budgeted amounts only. It was impossible to separate the 
financial data applying to food plot sub-sections from those of other scheme components. 
Financial analysis at sub-scheme level was, therefore impossible". Referring to the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme Holbrook (1992: 128), also , pointed to the difficulties of collecting accurate 
data concerning yields, financial profits and losses. The above sums up financial 
mismanagement that characterized many irrigation schemes in South Africa. 
Whilst Tyhefu Irrigation scheme was able to maintain sustained production it was a financia l 
failure. The study by Hill (1984) on the "Economic Viability Studies on Three Irrigation 
Schemes in Ciskei" provided a detailed analysis of the economic performance of the Tyhefu 
Irrigation Scheme. Hill (1984:2) concluded that all the existing schemes were sunken costs. 
He made several observations regarding the Tyhefu In'igation scheme. Hill (1984: 1) noted 
that already by 1984 the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme had not produced a positive cash flow, 
even in the operational sense. Over eight years in operation the scheme's high electricity 
pumping costs totalled R4 015 000 while the scheme's operating costs and cash-flow 
64 
incomes were recorded at R4 817 000 and R3 444 000 respectively (Hill, 1984:14). Hill 
estimated development costs at R1 500 per hectare per annum. Hill (1984:28) concluded 
"over a projected 30 year life of the scheme, Tyhefu is a net drain on the Ciskeian economy 
of more than R6 million. These findings are supported by Van Averbeke's et a!., (1998:58) 
financial analysis in the period 1984/91 who states that Tyhefu inculTed a deficit every year. 
It is clear from the above that Tyhefu irrigation scheme did not operate in a cost-effective 
manner. A pertinent question is why Tyhefu ilTigation scheme after almost twenty years of 
existence could not register a positive cash flow. Related to this is why the Ciskei 
government committed itself on an annual basis to subsidizing poor functioning ilTigation 
schemes. Such a decision to continue subsiding the irrigation schemes cannot be justified in 
the economic sense. Obviously, in any economic venture a good return for one 's investment 
should be key. At another level it does not seem that performance appraisal was ever done 
throughout the life span of the project. Nor were there any performance indicators in place. It 
is also evident that there was no monitoring mechanism in place to counteract any 
shortcomings or to suggest any adjustments when and wherever needed. Considering that 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme started off as a pilot project in 1977, the decision to continue 
expanding the irrigation scheme seems short-sighted and ill-conceived. The Consultants' 
earlier reservations concerning the economic viability of Tyhefu irrigation scheme were 
proven to be COlTect. They stated "the pilot project is not economically viable ... because of 
the tremendous benefits it is producing this is acceptable to the Ciskei Cabinet" (Dept. of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 1984:5). From this it can be inferred that Tyhefu irrigation scheme 
was doomed from the start. Whether management agents or the Ciskei government had any 
interest in ensuring the financial viability and sustainability of the project in spite of the 
Consultants' concerns is questionable. Hence the government's ongoing commitment to 
funding an ailing project. 
A number of factors can be attributed to the poor economic performance of the scheme: 
corruption, lack of participation by farmers, poor management, centralised control and 
decision making, water quality, labour intensity, the use of electricity as a source of power, 
fixed market prices for crops. With regard to the latter Holbrook (1992:87) explains ", .. the 
central role Harvestime factory came to playas a market affected decision making as it 
applied to the scheme's cropping regime ... cropping programmes were designed in close 
consultation with the representatives of the freezing factory. The freezing factory indicated 
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the amount and type of crops it required in a particular season and advanced capital for the 
necessary inputs. The scheme was then paid for growing the crop. The scheme gained the 
benefits of having a secure market, but the range of crops it could grow was to a large extent 
restricted by the schedules laid down ... " Undoubtedly, this not only limited the income-
generating capacity of the scheme but also affected the income farmers recei ved. 
Furthermore, because the cropping programme was predetermined without consultation with 
the farmers, this gave the farmers little room to manouevre outside these. 
The Rehabilitation Process of the Tyhefu It-rigation Scheme 
Overall agricultural policy in South Africa stresses the need to transfer ownership of the 
irrigation schemes to its beneficiaries. The implication of this is that the irrigation schemes 
are to be totally owned, managed and maintained by paliicipant farmers. The underlying 
rationale is that poor cost recovery is often regarded as one of the major stumbling blocks to 
the sustainability of irrigation schemes. Basically, few (if any) of the state irrigation schemes 
recovered full operation and maintenance costs. Prior to 1994 governments in the former 
homelands was responsible for operation and maintenance and finance. Besides the fact that 
there was rampant corruption, irrigation scheme management found that their entire budgets 
were consumed in running and maintaining the economically non-viable irrigation schemes. 
The new policy requires that costs be recovered from beneficiaries. 
On its accession to power in 1994, the government found the financial burden of maintaining 
and operating unproductive irrigation schemes, through the provision of annual subsidies, 
impossible to justify and sustain. Consequently, financial support was withdrawn resulting in 
the collapse of many irrigation schemes. Lastly and most important external pressures on the 
government have dictated the path which the government should take with regard to service 
delivery. Specifically, the macro-economic strategy, GEAR, in line with WTO rules calls for 
deregulation and reduction of support (in terms of providing subsidies) for the agricultural 
sector. As such irrigated agriculture is deemed to be a lower order user of scarce resources 
and therefore must be seen to be moving towards self-sustainability (Maritz, n.d. :3). 
Against this background, a policy decision was taken by the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government that the agricultural functions performed by agricultural parastatals, Tracor and 
66 
Ulimocor, Transkei and Ciskei respectively, at certain irrigation schemes including Tyhefu 
would have to be rationalised. This means that the services that the parastatals rendered to 
farmers would have to be transformed (DALAIDWAF, 1997:1). Of importance is the 
emphasis on the fact that the irrigation scheme should be owned, managed and maintained by 
the farmers themselves. Subsequently, in 1997 the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Agriculture closed all irrigation schemes in the province and subsequently liquidated the two 
agricultural parastatals, Tracor and Ulimocor. In the case of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme this 
was done without consultation with the farmers and communities. Also, no interim measures 
were put in place to ensure that farming continues, thereby protecting the livelihoods of the 
communities. At present Tyhefu Irrigation scheme is considered to be technically insolvent or 
defunct. The land has been lying fallow since 1997. 
In 1998 the community of Ndlambe wrote a letter to the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry requesting the urgent revival of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The Minister's (1998) 
response is contained in the following statement "It is clear from the information supplied to 
me .. . that a number of issues regarding ilTigation need to be addressed, apart from the 
question of adequate water supply. These include the restoration of effective management, 
the development of the further irrigation potential originally planned ... I have accordingly 
requested that the whole question of development, adequate water supply, water tariffs, 
sustainability and management of irrigation be investigated ... ". Basically, this statement sums 
up the major challenges facing the farmers of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme, which does not 
seem to be understood at the village level. The elected representatives have a much clearer 
understanding of the situation. 
The Depru1ments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (DALA) and the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DW AF) have since undertaken the decision to jointly rehabilitate and 
transfer the irrigation schemes to the farmers, the beneficiaries. The Minister of Water Affairs 
and Forestry appointed a Task Team in 1997 to advise DWAF and DALA on all water-
related aspects of the schemes. With regard to Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme this involved the 
proposed extension of the water pipeline. In addition the Task Team was to make 
recommendations about which government departments and/or structures are responsible for 
what functions. The report entitled 'Report on investigations into ways of Rehabilitating the 
Water Supply Aspects of Certain irrigation Schemes in the Former Transkei and Ciskei" 
(hereafter referred to as the Report) was presented in August 1997. DW AF was assigned the 
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tasks to take over all the bulk water supply management responsibilities, rehabilitation of 
bulk water infrastructure where necessary and the creation and capacity building of Water 
User Associations (WUA). The responsibilities of the Provincial Departments of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs (PDALA) related to on-farm activities. In the Report it was indicated that 
rehabilitation of TIS would be implemented in three phases at an estimated cost of R75 
million. It was envisaged that the process would start in September 1997 and be completed in 
March 1999. Since then the proposed schedule and costs have had to be revised. The 
availability of funds being cited as the main obstacle. 
The Departments of Water Affairs and Forestry (OW AF) and Agriculture and Land Affairs 
(DLA) commissioned LawGibb (technical consultants) in June 1999 to conduct feasib ility 
studies. The main objective was to determine whether the construction of a bulk pipeline 
from the Lower Fish River Government Water Scheme, with all associated works, to supply 
irrigation water to the rest of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme will be viable (LawGibb, 1999). 
Furthermore, the Minister of OW AF requested that the restoration of the pump systems be 
looked at as a matter of priority, so that farmers can resume farming. Subsequently, in August 
1999 Argus Gibb undeliook visual inspections to assess the condition of all the infrastructure. 
They found that since the closure of the irrigation scheme in September 1997, the 
infrastructure has deteriorated considerably. This includes pump installations which require 
major refurbishment due to a combination of theft, vandalism and poor maintenance. Physical 
rehabilitation for Phase One started in 2002, with the whole operation expected to be 
completed in 2004. 
Several alternatives have been investigated on how to provide reliable, affordable and good 
quality water to the rest of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. First, the installation of a solar pump 
system for the Ndlan1be section was considered. Strategic consultants were appointed to 
investigate the use of the solar system for domestic and irrigation purposes. Following the 
submission of the consultant' s report, a decision was taken that the solar system with an 
expected cost of R973 154,00 does not provide a long-term solution. The amount of water 
that could be supplied was insufficient for both domestic and irrigation purposes. 
Furthermore, the proposed use of the solar system did not address the water quality problem, 
and failed to answer critical questions such as whether solar energy is a feasible alternative to 
electric power. Should the decision have been taken to use the solar system, the collapse of 
the scheme for the second time was going to be an inevitabi lity in the long run. 
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According to Maritz, (n.d.: 10) irrigation scheme rehabilitation and upgrading is being used 
as the primary driver in the process to introduce Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to 
small-scale irrigation farmers (and to some extent commercial enterprises. One of the main 
requirements is that the process be fully participatory. As such IMT requires maximum 
involvement of all stakeholders in every aspect of project development, hence their 
mobilization is considered critical to project success. The key role players are the farmers, 
their committees, extension officers, consultants, relevant government departments, local 
government, non-governmental organisations. This differs considerably from the way in 
which the irrigation schemes were planned and operated in the past ( i.e. top-down and super-
imposed on the communities). 
The rehabilitation process reqUlres the establishment of relevant institutional structures. 
These will act as important links between the community and other stakeholders. A Project 
Steering Committee (PSC) was formed at the beginning of the rehabilitation process. The 
PSC is a temporary structure which will be disbanded once the Tyhefu irrigation scheme 
becomes operational. Its main task is to oversee the whole rehabilitation process as well as 
work hand in hand with all the stakeholders. 
The Water User's Association (WUA)" was established in terms of the Water Act No. 36 of 
1998. The list of prospective members of the WUA in March 2001 for the various irrigation 
sites is as follow as: Ndlambe (251); Pikoli / Kalikeni (606); Ndwayana (401) and Glenmore 
(366). 
The underlying principle is that the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme should become a viable, self-
sustaining scheme where the farmers and other users of water from the scheme assume 
responsibility for the use of the scheme to the mutual benefit of all users (PDALA, 2001:2). 
Ultimately the WUA, as a legal body, will be responsible for a range of issues. This 
responsibility includes, inter alia, the functions of internal distribution amongst the plot 
" At the initial meeting of DALAIDWAF Task team in 1997 one of the main problems identified was the 
selection of a suitable legal entity to replace the water- related functions of the parastatals (DALAIDWAF, 
1997:5). After several deliberations the WUA concept was explored. The Task team, subsequently, 
recommended that a WUA be created at each irrigat ion scheme, Each WUA is required to have its own 
constitution to suits its particular needs and circumstances - it can therefore decide on what functions, duties 
and powers it wishes to have (DALAIDWAF, 1997: 12113). The constitution of each prospective WUA must be 
approved by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry before the fonnation of a WUA. 
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holders, the levy of an equitable and affordable tariff on water users to ensure the financial 
security of the scheme, the management of the scheme and the use of all funds for the benefit 
of scheme (PDALA, 2001 :2). Bembridge et al (2000:63-64) elaborates "the WUA should be 
able to take over scheme assets, take over collective loans, operate accounts and institute by-
laws enforceable by its members ... It would be responsible for arranging input supplies, 
draught power, and marketing". As it is at the moment it cannot be claimed that WUA at the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme possesses any of these skills to carry out the necessary tasks. 
Capacity building of the WUA is undoubtedly vital for the successful operation and long-tem 
viability of irrigation schemes. International experience shows that developing the capacity of 
WUAs is long-term process. Regarding this the DALA/DWAF task team (1997:34) stated 
"the DWAF may have to fulfill this role during a bridging period, at the end of which the 
WUA ought to have sufficient capacity to run its own scheme and affairs. Owing to a severe 
staff shortage as well as lack of internal expertise in this field , DW AF will probably have to 
employ specialist consultants ... it can barely be expected of a fledging WUA inheriting a 
defunct scheme of dubious economics to finance the employment of such consultants, 
whether by a loan or from water levies ... the state will have to foot the bill ... until such a 
time the WUA is self-sufficient". 
A commitment has been given by members of the project steering committee to farm 
cooperatively on a commercial basis. How this cooperative relationship will work out in 
practice in not clear at the moment. All prospective farmers from the immediate cOl11l11unity 
have registered. Understandably, the attraction is the prospect of the resumption of farming, 
job creation and improvement in the standard of living. 
Other outstanding issues relate to the crops - which will be planted, issues of marketing. 
Several crops have been suggested including sugar beet, Jojoba beans, citrus, wheat and 
various vegetables. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDCY' is promoting the 
adoption of sugar beet as a principal candidate crop, which will be processed in a factory in 
Cookhouse. It is expected that the building of the processing factory be completed in 2004, 
during which produce will have to be ready for processing. According to IDC 12 000 ha are 
19 IDe is a self-financing, national development finance institution. It focuses on contributing to economic 
growth, industrial development and economic empowerment through its financing activities. The sugar beet 
project is the IDC initiative in the Eastern Capc. It involves securing agricultural land from both the commercial 
white farmers and small-scale farmers in the ex-homelands. The project is the culmination of production tria ls 
and harvest assessments conducted since 1998 (Daily Dispatch, 2002). 
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needed in the Eastern Cape for the venture to be viable. Only 400 ha are need at the Tyhefu 
Irrigation scheme. The remaining hectares will come from the white commercial farmers. It is 
unlikely the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme will be fully operational at thi s stage because of the 
delays in constructing the pipeline and issues of capacity building which are not being 
attended to adequately at present. There are, also, many logistics (access to finance, 
shareholding) that have to be worked out between Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme and IDe. 
According to Sugar Beet Growers Association chairperson, Hilton Collett, the introduction of 
sugar beet in the Fish River valley represents a valuable opportunity to enhance the 
economics of irrigated agriculture in the region and has the potential to deliver economic 
benefits for the Eastern Cape province as a whole (Daily Dispatch, 2002). On a less 
optimistic note Bembridge (2000:45) cautions "after encouragement by the commercial 
sector and social faCilitator (my emphasis), the majority of the irrigators were keen to grow 
sugar beet ... They were led to believe that an income of R6000.00 to R8000.00 per ha was 
possible. This still has to be proven on the scheme". Bembridge (2000: 45) elaborates further 
" ... however, the proposed sitting of the mill at Cookhouse some 140 kms distant may make 
marketing costs a problem in the long term". Similarly, Backeberg et al (1996:52) observes 
"an unfavourable economic location renders the profitable production of many products ... 
impossible. It also reduces the abi lity to produce many fruits profitably". The Tyhefu area is 
located far away from major industrial centres and main markets. The absence of tarred roads 
act as a major disincentive for farmers and the prospective buyers alike. The cost of 
transportation prohibits selling of produce to large markets such as King Willliams Town, 
East London, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, unless produce is pooled and transported in 
bulk (Van Avebeke et ai, 1998:56). In the absence of good telecommunication services 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme management found it impossible to exploit favourable market 
oppo11unities (Van Averbeke et ai, 1998:56). The above quotes highlight an imp0l1ant issue 
not to raise umealistic expectations which can never be met. A realistic assessment of all the 
risks and opportunities pertaining to issues such as agricultural / income / marketing potential 
is vital. 
It can be concluded that the rehabilitation process is uncertain and is likely to be a lengthy 
process. This is a source of concern for the community. Their argument revolves around 
widespread poverty, unemployment in the area and an appeal for government assistance. 
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Conclusion 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme was a state-driven initiative. In general the justifications for the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme were conflated, with the result that the need for political control of 
the Tyhefu area far outweighed the considerations regarding the financial viability of the 
proposed proj ect. Although technical factors (assessment of agro-ecology) critical for project 
success were examined, little or no attention was paid to the socio-economic aspects. The 
root problem for the failure of the Tyhefu irrigation schemes lie at the project planning 
process (how it was conceptualised). For the planners, the main requirements for success 
entailed centralised managerial control, no participation of the beneficiaries, capital intensive 
and sophisticated agricultural techniques and the production of high value crops. Given the 
repressive political climate of the time, the planners saw no contradiction in their proposals. 
Instead their proposals were a means of meeting the requirements of the state whilst ignoring 
the needs and expectations of the beneficiaries. Therefore, it can be argued that nature of the 
Tyhefu Irrigation scheme discourse was ill-conceived, misguided and has since proved 
unsustainable. 
The extent to which "an appropriate diagnostic analysis to pinpoint major constraints and 
problems as a basis for innovative changes in the design, concept, management and economic 
participation of the farmers" (Bembridge et ai , 2000 :xvi) has been undertaken is unclear. The 
rehabilitation and revival of the project wi ll al so fai l unless based on proper and realistic 
assessment of all relevant issues peliaining to project feasibility. The lessons of previous 
development projects including irrigation schemes, necessitate a move away from top-down 
approaches to participatory ones. This is the primary emphasis of irrigation management 
transfer worldwide. As the revival and rehabi litation process of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme 
is underway several questions are important in this regard: Is there a need to rehabilitate and 
revive of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme; Are the current costs justifiable in terms of the 
viability and sustainability of the scheme; What are the alternatives? 
It is clear that the rehabilitation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme involves not only high costs 
but also a degree of risk in terms of ensuring sound management of the scheme, as well as in 
terms of individual farmers effectively util ising available crop production and irrigation 
techniques to achieve projected gross margins (Bembridge et aI, 2000:61). Such costs can 
only be justified "on the understanding that the rehabi litation and restructuring of the scheme 
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is a poverty relief measure" (Bembridge et ai, 2000:63). There is a contradiction between the 
need to farm commercially and what is possible at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme: the amount 
of income that can be achieved is no doubt an area of concern. At the moment there is no 
possibility for independent agricultural production. 
The planning and design of the new scheme rests largely with the consultants. The 
participation of the community seems limited to the report backs by the consultants during 
meetings. It cannot be claimed that the community and consultants are equal partners in the 
process. Community'S participation at these meetings is far from satisfactory. The October / 
November (2000) progress report does highlight some of the problems "Minutes are an issue. 
They need to reach them on time and a summary in Xhosa done. Members of the PSC have 
been patient considering that the meetings are conducted in English and Xhosa . .. the extent 
to which the community can participate is constrained by language of communication in this 
forum". Furthermore, the problem seems to lie in the gaps in knowledge as regards the 
intricate details of the process. The Community does not seem to have all the documentation 
that relates to the rehabilitation process. Access to these is vital so that the community can 
scrutinise these with the help of the social consultants, Provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs (PDALA), NGOs and other stakeholders operating in the area. 
Complicating the problem is the fact that there does not seem to be proper institutional 
SUppOlt either from the social consultants or the government. Concern is that the community 
is likely to get into contracts without a full appraisal of the situation. One of these relates to 
the deal being negotiated with IDC. It was clear during the meeting on 2711 110 I that the 
community lacked information, hence the confusion that existed. Also, IDC was not 
forthcoming with answers to the questions raised. For example how much income can the 
farmers expect, questions of access to credit (a loan or a grant?). In addition, the social 
consultants had already taken a decision that IDC is the only company that can best represent 
the interests of the farmers. Whether this is the case, the social consultant' s comments 
seemed to close off any other possibilities. 
The process of rehabilitating and reviving Tyhefu Irrigation scheme is complex and delicate. 
There are many details and agreements to be entered into by the community. In many ways 
this seems to be beyond the comprehension and scope of the community and their elected 
representatives. The institutional structures need to be fully conversant with the conditions 
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and terms of the contracts they are likely get into. Considering that the potential business 
partners are sophisticated (and will protect their own interests at all costs) with competencies 
not immediately available to the community, there is a need to capacitate the PDALA, NGOs 
as well as other people working in the area so that they can render effective professional 
advice to the community. If need be outside expertise should be sought. Expediency on the 
part of the community to see the project running as well poor institutional support for the 
elected structures and insufficient training are areas that need to be addressed urgently. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The poor track record of many irrigation schemes (despite huge investments) in the former 
homelands has prompted the government to reconsider its active and direct role in small-scale 
irrigation farming. This has resulted in the closure of many irrigation schemes including 
Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme (see chapter 3 for this history). It is within this context that the focus 
of this study is located. More specifically, the primary purpose of the study is to investigate 
the prospects of promoting successful small-scale irrigation farming among the former farmers 
at the now defunct Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. This investigation is conducted against the 
background of cmrentl recent attempts to rehabilitate and revive Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. 
The new policy framework is premised on the transfer of ownership of small-scale irrigation 
schemes from government to the beneficiaries. In this new set of arrangements, beneficiaries 
face formidable challenges in terms of capacity (human and financial). 
The first part of this chapter describes the research design and methodology used in this study. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Orientation and Planning 
This study commenced in 1999 when the research topic was discussed with and approved by 
the project supervisor. Fieldwork was conducted intermittently over a period of two years 
(2000 and 2001). 
A critical part of this orientation and planning phase was a review of the literature, consulting 
with officials / experts on various aspects of the research. The literatme review entailed the 
perusal of a wide range of documents (commission I research I consultant's reports, South 
African government policies and legislation, journal articles and books). Locating primary 
documents pertaining to the planning and operation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme has been 
difficult. The same goes for accessing reliable statistical information. One of the reasons for 
this is that when the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme was closed, all the documentation was removed. 
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What has been left behind in the dilapidated administrative building could not assist the 
researcher. Attempts to locate these documents have proved futile. Furthermore, the dynamic 
nature of the process of upgrading and rehabilitating Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme means 
information is changing all the time. Literature on Third World irrigation schemes, particularly 
those in Africa proved an important source of information. A common strand is the high 
failure rate of irrigation development schemes in many countries, attributed mostly to the 
marginalization of the beneficiaries during the ini tial plalming, design and implementation 
phases. 
A recorUlaissance survey was carried out in June 2000. This involved consultation with local 
leadership structures and some community members where the scope and objectives of the 
research were outlined and discussed. The attitude of local leadership was more positive 
compared to that of the community. Clearance was obtained to conduct research in the area. 
The community was notified about the pending research project, its scope and obj ectives at a 
report back community meeting about the progress made thus far regarding the upgrading and 
rehabilitation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. The researcher was not present. 
The legacy of apartheid has resulted in the community'S reluctance in accepting the presence 
of researchers, questioning their legitimacy and research raison d'etre. As a result it became 
quite evident that feelings of mistrust, antagonism and sometimes even hostility towards 
researchers and other outsiders were prevalent in the community. These frequently manifested 
themselves during the interviewing process. Such attitudes stem from among other things the 
perception that "we are not benefitting anything from the research conducted in our 
communities". Questions such as "what's in it for us", "how is the research different from 
previous ones" were common. Concerns ranged from being over-researched, complaints about 
researchers and research organisations which consistently fail to communicate research 
findings despite promises to do so, to researchers making unfulfilled promises. Some members 
of the community narrated stories of how outsiders had manipulated them in the past, with 
some still continuing to do so even now. The community did acknowledge their vulnerability 
to exploitation since feelings of helplessness and hopelessness are prevalent because of their 
impoverishment. The effect of all this has meant that the community has taken measures to 
protect itself. This means that everyone coming into the conm1Unity has to be "screened" 
before any permission is granted. Over and above the concerns mentioned above, the 
underlying deep-seated fee lings of frustration about the closure of the Tyhefu Irrigation 
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Scheme and slow progress made in upgrading and rehabilitating it seems to explain the 
community's current attitude towards "outsiders". Despite all the hostility, the community 
accepted the researcher and hoped that she could play a critical role in influencing the 
direction of the rehabilitation of Tyhefu irrigation scheme. 
From the foregoing discussion it seems that the research ethics of informed consent, voluntary 
participation, confidentiality, anonymity, avoidance of deception and protection of 
respondents from harm are violated routinely for a variety of reasons. The initial suspicions 
and or fears of the community were addressed by upholding the aforementioned ethics of 
social research. During the course of the fieldwork, I was conscious not to raise any 
expectations. The concerns of the community, further, raise the need for appropriate 
developmentally orientated research. 
The researcher attended various community / committee meetings on invitation, playing, in 
most instances, the role of an observer rather than a direct participant, except where an 
opinion/direct advice was solicited. These meetings provided the opportunity for informal 
discussions with the various stakeholders during the initial stages of and throughout the 
research period. Most importantly, these meetings led to a better understanding of the 
complexities involved in the upgrading and rehabilitation of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme, 
accumulation of additional data and provided the basis for the drafting of the questionnaire. 
Constructing the Questionnaire 
The survey research approach was adopted in order to obtain the required information. It is 
one of the fundamental methods of data collection in the social sciences. For the purposes of 
this study the questionnaire method was used. The researcher decided to use personal 
interviews instead of mailed questionnaires. These promoted flexibility by allowing the 
researcher to clarify questions, to probe and make sure that all the questions have been 
answered. [n addition, the low level of literacy in the community favoured the use of this 
approach. 
Two types of semi-structured questionnaires were compiled based on the literature review and 
preliminary informal interviews with various stakeholders, namely (a) for the ex-farmers of 
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the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme (b) a questionnaire for members of the Board of Directors'O, 
Project Steering Committee (PSC)'I and Water User's Association (WUA)22 of the Tyhefu 
Irrigation Scheme, hereafter referred to as institutional structures. No distinction is made 
between these various structures since all are involved in the process of overseeing the 
upgrading and rehabilitation ofTyhefu Irrigation scheme, even though their mandate differs. 
The questionnaire for the former farmers consists of two sections. Section A deals with 
demographic as well as socio-economic factors (age, educational level, sources of income and 
labour, income derived from farming, farming experience, contribution of Tyhefu Irrigation 
Scheme to rural livelihoods Ischeme impact). Section B focuses on farmers' perception of 
constraints, challenges and the process of reviving the irrigation scheme. The questionnaire for 
the institutional structures focused on the constraints, challenges and the rehabilitation 
process. 
Pre-testing the Questionnaire 
Pre-testing is designed to test the questionnaire on a small sample of respondents with the 
objective of improving the questionnaire by identify ing and eliminating potential problems. 
The fi rst stage involved a peer review by fellow classmates and the project supervisor(s). On 
the basis of the suggestions some modifications were made. The second stage involved pre-
testing the questionnaire on five respondents (the fonner farmers at TIS) who resembled the 
target population. Further changes to the questionnaire were made based on the feedback 
received. 
20 This is a structure that will take over the irrigation scheme assets once they have been handed over by the 
govemment. The understanding at the moment is that the government will repair all assets in bad condition. 
'I The PSC is one of the institutional structures establ ished at the Tyhefu irrigation Scheme at the beginning of 
the rehabilitation process. It acts as an important link between the community and other stakeholders. rr is a 
temporary structure which will be disbanded once the Tyhefu irrigation scheme becomes operational. Its main 
task is to oversee the whole rehabilitation process and to work hand in hand with all the stakeholders. 
22 The Water User's Association (WUA) was established in terms of the Water Act No. 36 of 1998. The primary 
purpose of WUAs is to provide for the effective representation of small-scale irrigation farmers on the irrigation 
schemes at a local level as we ll as managing water on behalf of their members. Specifically, responsibil ities will 
include levying an equitable and affordable tariff on water users, and the use of all funds for the benefit of 
scheme. Bembridge et al (2000:63-64) elaborates "the WUA should be able to take over scheme assets, take over 
collective loans, operate accounts and institute by-laws enforceable by its members ... It would be responsible for 
arranging input supp lies, draught power, and marketing". 
78 
The Sampling Process 
According to Churchill (1996:476) once the researcher has clearly specified the problem and 
developed an appropriate research design and data collection instruments, the next step in the 
research process is to select those elements from which the information will be collected. 
Since it is impossible to collect information on every member of the target population a 
sample should thus be drawn. This being a sub-set of the population from which 
generalisations can be made if the sample can be regarded as representative. 
The target popUlation for the study was all the former farmers at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme 
(whether they operated as food plot holders or as commercial farmers - see Chapter Four for 
this distinction). Also, all 6 members of the Board of Directors, Project Steering Committee 
and Water User's Association of the Ndlambe section of the irrigation scheme formed part of 
the target population. No sampling frame existed for this study, since no reliable list of former 
farmers existed. Us ing estimates of between 300 and 350 farmers in the Ndlambe section, it 
was decided to interview 10% of the target population. According to Alreck and Settle 
(1995:62) it is seldom necessary to sample more than 10% of the population to obtain 
adequate confidence. Determining the size of the sample for this study, also, took into account 
time and cost limitations. The sample was, therefore, made up of 37 farmers. Twenty-one of 
the respondents were female. 
In vIew of the problems identified earlier, the sampling procedure used in this study is 
snowball sampling. Essentially, snowball sampling entails "collecting data on the few 
members of the target population you can locate and then asking those individuals to provide 
information needed to locate other members of the population whom they happened to know" 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998:167). 
Data Collection and Analysis 
During my initial visits to the village, I managed to get myself a research assistant. She played 
an important role in helping establish contacts with respondents. The actual interviews were 
delayed because people were initially suspicious, unwilling to cooperate and failed to keep 
appointments. The presence of my research assistant, the opportunity to describe and discuss 
with the respondents the nature, purpose and significance of the research helped dispel any 
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fears and concerns they had. Interviews of approximately an hour and a half took place at the 
respondents' homes. By the time all the interviews were almost done, the community was 
more receptive of the researcher and thus willing to be interviewed. Information obtained from 
interviews was supplemented by informal discussions with various stakeholders and villagers. 
Where necessary telephone calls are made to clarifY points with key informants and to keep up 
to date with new developments. 
Once all the interviews were completed, data was analysed. 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
SECTION ONE 
Socio-Economic Profile of the Farmers 
Table I 
Characteristics No. Percentage 
Age 
20-30 - -
31-40 10 27 
41-50 13 35 
51 + 14 38 
Educational level 
No schooling 5 14 
Lower Primary 15 37 
Higher Primary 9 26 
Secondary 8 23 
Tertiary -- --
Sources of Income 
Farming - -
State transfers 23 60 
Remittances 15 43 
Formal employment 4 II 
Informal economic 23 66 
activities 
Other: Sale of livestock 7 14 
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The data in Table One provides a summary of the age distribution of respondents, their 
educational status as well as their sources of income. Frequency scores are used to present the 
data. It is clear from the table above that the age distribution of the majority of the respondents 
(62%) ranges between 31 and 50 years. A study by Kepe (1992:6 1) on the various irrigation 
schemes in the Ciskei (Tyhefu, Zanyokwe, Shiloh and Keiskammahoek) found that people 
with interest in continuing farming were farmers between the ages of 46 and 55 years. Thirty-
eight percent of the respondents are in the category of what can be regarded as older farmers. 
According to Bembridge et al (1998:51) increased age does not seriously impair the ability to 
manage the small-scale agricultural holding at least up to 60-65 years of age. However, he 
argues "besides lacking physical strength, this age group does not have the same incentive and 
motivation to increase income and living standards, and are largely dependent on income from 
pensions." They, undoubtedly, have an interest in achieving food security for themselves and 
their families. 
Based on the quote above by Bembridge et al (1998) it can be argued that not all the older 
farmers can be commercial farmers. Depending on what the subdivision of land is going to be, 
the older group is best left on the food plots rather than being subjected to stringent / rigorous 
conditions and requirements of commercial farming. This is particularly so if one considers 
that one of the major premises of rehabilitating Tyhefu irrigation scheme is that it will pursue 
a commercial approach. It is the expressed wish of the majority of the respondents (9 1 %) to 
adopt a commercial approach to agriculture so as to progress from subsistence to fu ll-time 
commercial farmers . This " is the only way we can secure a steady flow of income for our 
families. We know its not going to be easy since we lack many resources (human and 
financial)", was a general comment. However, there is concern among those in the fifties and 
beyond that they might not be able to realise this because of age and endless delays in reviving 
the scheme. 
The absence of the youth is captured in the following remarks: 
"The youth are not interested infarming but sport. 
Our children have not seen allY real benefits from farming, hence the lack of interest 
They've seen us struggling with the manugement of the scheme before und thus 
prefer either working in tlte urban areus or sturting their OWIl businesses. The 
majority of the youth ure job seekers in the urban areas 
Per/zaps with poor job prospects everywhere, the rehabilitation of the scheme might 
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prove a major incentive for the youth. A majority of them have registered as 
potentia/farmers. It's a wait and see approach ijthey will actually get involved". 
Catling and Saaiman (1996: 174) suggest that "many young people associate working on the 
land with the negative experiences of the past and a stigma is attached to agriculture. In order 
to improve agriculture and to encourage new livelihoods in the rural areas, more must be done 
to promote agriculture amongst the youth". 
Overall, the standard of education is very low. Various studies have reported similar low 
levels of formal education in the former homelands (Steyn, 1988; Williams and Rose, 1989; 
Kepe, 1992 and Bembridge, 2000). Illiteracy and the age of the farmers has been linked to the 
lack and I or reluctance of farmers in adopting new technologies, innovations and have a 
negative effect on agricultural productivity and the provision of extension services (Van 
Averbeke et aI, 1998; Bembridge, 1985). 
More than half of the respondents have not reached standard five . According to educationists, 
people with less than fou r years education are unlikely to have attained any degree of 
functional literacy (Koshy in Bembridge, 2000 :51). This observation holds true for the 
respondents of this study who have expressed concern about their lack of essential skills such 
as management, marketing, financial management, record keeping, and application of new 
agricultural techniques. Their perception is that illiteracy is a major hindrance to successful 
commercial farming. In spite of the fact that over 60 percent expressed confidence about their 
farming skills, all highlighted the need to improve thei r competency in areas such as seedbed 
preparation, seedling care, crop produce storage and meeting the standards required by the 
customers. 
Household Income Sources 
The findings indicate that the majority of respondents are not dependent on one source of 
income but on a combination of various means. State transfers in the form of pensions and 
disability grants constitute the main source of gross cash income for sixty three percent (63%) 
of the respondent' s households. According to Monde-Gweleta et aI, (1997:620) the overall 
contribution of state transfers to household income has risen significantly since 1990, from 
15,2% for the entire Peddie di strict to 54,8% to the household income of plot holding 
households at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Ainslie and Ntshona (1997) research on 
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households in the dryland environment in north-west Peddie confirm the importance of state 
transfers to household income. According to this study 65,3% of the households that were 
interviewed identified state transfers as their main source of income. Similarly, Van Averbeke 
et al (1998:1 16) found that the contribution of pensions to gross cash household income was 
60% or more at the Tyhefu, Keiskammahoek and Shiloh Inigation schemes. State transfers are 
regarded as the most predictable and stable source of income compared to remittances and 
informal economic activities. The decline in the contribution of remittances can be attributed 
to retrenchments in the urban areas and mines. Thirty percent of the respondents mentioned 
the occasional sale of livestock. 
Informal economic activities include building construction and brick making, beadwork and 
sewing projects, chicken I piggery I cattle projects. An early learning centre provides 
employment to a group of four women whose salary comes from the Provincial Department of 
Welfare. The chicken I piggery Icattle project is new and has not yielded benefits for anyone. 
Those involved expressed concern about the viability and sustainability of the projects. They 
pointed to the saturation of the local market with similar products since these have been 
established in many villages in the Peddie area. 
It is quite evident the respondents are struggling to make ends meet with the meagre financial 
resources at their di sposal and the limited employment opportunities available. The effects of 
deprivation I poverty is cushioned, albeit on a limited basis, by kinship and reciprocity. 
Farming Experience 
The age of the respondents at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme is positively correlated with their 
farming experience and their level of education. The older the farmers, the less formal 
education they have. On the other hand, the younger they are the better the standard of 
education. Although those in the 31 -40 age group constitute the smallest number of the 
respondents, they have reached secondary level. Despite the fact that they have less farming 
experience, they are more wi lling to learn the new agricultural techniques, adopt new 
innovations and are more open to change. 
The farming experience of the respondents needs to be located in context. Since the beginning 
of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme many people in the village were employed by the scheme 
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performing different tasks ranging from operating pumps, seedling care, planting, weeding, 
application of fertiliser and pesticides to harvesting. They managed to gain some farming 
experience. Some people who did not have land were helping other fan1ily members or friends 
with farming. This explains why none of the respondents has less than five years experience. 
Over seventy percent of the respondents have farming experience of up to twenty years. This 
group is made up of farmers who received land since the irrigation scheme started in 1977. 
Before the implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme many respondents claim to have 
been practicing limited subsistence fanning. After Tyhefu irrigation scheme became 
operational, this continued on a lesser scale in home gardens which form part of residential 
sites. Major crops included maize, sorghum, potatoes and other vegetables. All respondents 
pointed out that subsistence farming has traditionally been hindered by unfavourable agro-
ecological conditions and lack of inputs. Even though they claim that subsi stence farming was 
an invaluable experience, the general perception is that the introduction of irrigation entailed a 
radical change in their way of doing things. Not only did their subsistence farming experience 
become insignificant, they ceased having any control over their production activities. 
Sources of Labour 
Table 2 
Sources of labour 
Husband 
Wife 
Children 
Relatives 
Hired labour 
Frequency 
All the time 
All the time 
Occasionally 
Occasionally 
Seasonal 
No. % 
30 81 
37 100 
27 73 
28 76 
15 41 
The respondents did not consider availability of labour a constraint. Most of the farmers 
tended their fields by working on the land with members of their families , with husband and 
wife assuming most of the responsibility. However, there are variations in terms of husband-
wife labour contributions. These are attributed by the respondents to other family 
commitments other than farming. Other explanations in the literature reviewed revolve around 
the sexual division of labour in traditional African societies and the absence of men due to 
labour migration. Backeberg et al (1996: 57) fo und that women playa crucial role in all the 
irrigation schemes particularly in weed control and harvesting operations. Similarly, 
Bembridge (1984); Steyn (1988) and Williams (1994) have observed that women are more 
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active in crop production than men. 
Children were, also, an important source of labour, though their contribution was far less 
compared to their parents. This is associated with several factors such as the age of the 
children, household chores, schooling and other activities such as sport which tend to occupy 
the youth as well as their migration to cities in search of employment. 
Kin-based labour and the use of seasonal labourers were common, especially with the 
commercial farmers during peak periods such as planting, weeding and harvesting. This 
ensured a small-cash income for relatives and more importantly the sharing of the harvest. At 
the same time this provided the much needed source of income for the unemployed in the 
surrounding villages. However, the hiring of labour did not contribute meaningfully to 
employment in the area around the scheme (van Averbeke et ai, 1998:ix). 
Income Derived From Farming 
Since the closure of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme there is no income derived from farming. 
During fieldwork it became clear that the amount of income derived from farming varied 
considerably between the commercial farmers and small plotholders. According to the 
respondents income ranged from as little as R300,00 per season for the small plotholders to 
RIO ,OOO for the commercial farmers. No records were provided to confirm this. 
Dissatisfaction among the farmers is quite evident, especially the ex-commercial farmers, 
about the income derived from farming. 
It is clear from the research findings that agricultw'e contributed to the livelihoods of the 
farmers in a modest way. This is particularly so if one considers the unpredictable nature of 
the income derived from farming by all the farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation Scheme. This 
supports the conclusion of the research by Monde-Gweleta et al (1997) that in both dryland 
and irrigated environments in the Peddie district, agriculture does contribute to the livelihood 
of many households, but rarely constitutes a livelihood in its own right. 
In a review of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme, Bembridge (l986b: 607) notes "a problem is that 
individual incomes of commercial farmers do not give as a good a return on labour as in the 
urban sector. There is therefore a need for a more dynamic incentive system which allows 
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farmers who have proved themselves to increase their income". Backeberg et al (1996:57) 
commenting on the actual performance of many irrigation schemes and the income of the 
farmers states "although irrigation farming has contributed to household food security and 
income, household incomes were in most cases well below minimum subsistence levels. On 
some of the larger "commercial" irrigation schemes ... farmers carry high debt loads and not 
more than one in four showed a profit from farming. A general conclusion is that ... income 
from irrigation farming has been disappointingly low. The viability of many schemes becomes 
questionable". Similarly, van Averbeke et al (1998: 117) reached a conclusion that many plot 
holding households on the schemes lived in poverty. Van Averbeke et al (1998) found that 
irrigated crop production on small plots contributes to gross cash household income in a minor 
way, whereas at schemes with large plots, irrigated crop production was an important source 
of income. These observations suggest that the contribution made by irrigated crop production 
to the gross cash income of plot holding households is positively related to the area of irrigable 
land to which the households have access (van Averbeke et ai, 1998: 117). 
The accounting systems and payment method used by scheme management was a source of 
discontent for all the farmers. In addition, the farmers pointed out that they were in a vicious 
circle of indebtedness, having to use credit all the time in order to pay for inputs. The 
following sums up their responses: 
"There was lack of transparency 011 the part of management regarding our 
financial records. We never knew how much per season we were going to earn. 
Management robbed us. We were always charged for inputs we never used. 
Uneducated as we are, we made sure t"at we kept records of what was provided by 
the scheme. Unfortunately, most of the time our records, never tallied with the 
scheme's records. At tlte end of the day, the scheme's records were taken as the 
correct ones. Management made sure that the financial management / accounting 
and credit system was beyond our comprehension. The resulting problem is that 
some of us were unable to service the loans we received from the Ciskei Agricultural 
Bank (CAB). Some of us still owe the Bank. It has not been made clear to us if the 
debts will be written off or not. We know that tlte scheme still owes us lots of money. 
The question is how we will recover that, now that the scheme is closed". 
The majority of the respondents claim that they are sti ll in possession of the financial receipts 
given to them by Scheme management. At the same time they claim to keep the "correct" ones 
which they kept for themselves. Stories are rife about the many fanners who at the end of each 
season did not get income "because scheme management claimed that input costs far exceeded 
crop yields". "My mother at one point collapsed and has not been well ever since. She 
decided to quit farming. I took over her allotment. I experienced the same problems as my 
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mother and other farmers" said one respondent. 
The s ituation of the farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation Scheme bears lots of resemblance with 
that in the Gezira Irrigation Scheme, Sudan. As Barnett (1977:73-76) observed "The holder of 
a tenancy is party to a complex system of payments which mould his entire financial situation 
unless he has sources of income other than the tenancy ... The tenants are paid ... in terms of 
their cultivation performance ... Before payments are made, various deductions will have been 
made ... On the whole agreements have had to be settled to the disadvantage of the tenants ... 
Most tenants find it very difficult to relate their income to the effort which they put into their 
work. They also find it very difficult to understand the payment system ... " It operates very 
efficiently as a mechanism for the production of cotton at a price which creates continual 
indebtedness for the majority of the tenants (Barnett, 1977: 132). 
In a study of various irrigation schemes in central Eastern Cape van Averbeke et al (1998:181) 
found that the only scheme from which money spent on operating costs was not recovered 
fully through cash sales was the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. Consequently, Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme has always had a deficit. According to Cloete (1987: 547) the high costs of production 
led to much dissatisfaction from landholders who find that their share of the harvest, after 
deduction of costs, is little better than they would have achieved on their own account. This is 
one of the reasons identified by the farmers which stifled their opportunities for development. 
Contribution of Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme to Rural Livelihoods / 
Development 
Sixty percent of the respondents believed that Tyhefu irrigation scheme made an important 
contribution in improving the quality of life (poverty alleviation, food security, employment 
creation, skills and household income). Hence the revival of the scheme is considered critical 
to rural livelihoods. The remaining forty percent were ambivalent about the impact of the 
Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Even though TIS contributed significantly to food security "not all 
the food requirements of the households were being met by crop production" (van Averbeke et 
aI , 1998:x). 
Besides these perceived short-term benefits, all respondents are unanimous that the scheme's 
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impact on the village and region as a whole has been limited. The respondents point to the lack 
of development of the area. A view, also, echoed by Vink and Kirsten (2000:20) "the 
distribution of benefits was limited in relation to total need and to aggregate resources 
available for development. Although higher levels of resource use, production and wage 
employment were achieved through modem farming enterprises ... little was done to promote 
a class of self-employed farmers or to improve farming conditions for smallholders outside 
these schemes ... The projects ... often incurred losses, and rarely involved spill-overs or 
linkages with the surrounding communities". Bromberger and Antonie (1993: 23) referred to 
the irrigation schemes as "islands of prosperity amidst an ocean of poverty". Referring to the 
Gezira Irrigation Scheme Barnett (1977: 122) states "no great wealth and no great changes in 
the material conditions of the people has yet resulted .. . " 23 
The foHowing statement might shed some light into the above scenario " .. . It is not the duty of 
the future Gezira management to administer general services for the population within its 
agricultural boundaries. Its duty is to promote the welfare of its workers, mainly tenants; the 
welfare of the general population and the concomitant services remain the duty of the 
government"" 
SECTION TWO 
Perception of Constraints, Challenges and the Process of Reviving the 
Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme25 
Respondents were asked about the factors that affect the degree to which they can farm 
successfully, based on their experiences as fOlmer farmers at the now defunct Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme. Eighteen items were used to measure the perceived main constraints and 
challenges. These can broadly be divided into the following categories: 
• Quality and nature of support and extension services 
• Skills and training needs: agricultural training, information and research 
• Input and product markets 
• Physical factors influencing irrigated crop production: climatic conditions, soil and 
water quality and availability, pests and diseases, tenure security and farm size 
23 Quoling unpublished notes by Gaitskell- first Chairman and Managing Director of the Sudan Gezira Board 
24 Unpublished note by H. Wooding, Managing Director, Sudan Plan lations Synd icate, 
" Data is not tabulated- see Appendix for questionnaires 
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The respondents identified the perceived constraints and challenges using the following 
ratings. 
1. No problem 
2. Problem can be ignored 
3. Needs attention 
4. Serious problem 
S. Very serious - needs urgent attention 
Findings in this study indicate that the views of the respondents (particularly the former 
farmers and the institutional structures) differ markedly in terms of the perceived priority 
constraints and challenges. This can be attributed to the proximity of the institutional 
structures to the various agents involved in the revival and rehabilitation process. As a result 
they show a clear understanding of the complexity of the process. On the other hand, the 
farmers seem to have a limited vision of the challenges that lie ahead. 
The responses of the ex-farmers are more concerned with survival and the "here and now". 
This is clearly illustrated in the following statement" We are starving, we are battling to make 
ends meet. Our survival hinges on the revival and rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme". 
Hence, the immediate concern of the former farmers at the Ndlambe section of the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme is the reliable supply of affordable, good quality water, the reconnecting of 
the electricity to the pumps and the construction of the pipeline so that farming can resume. It 
is for this reason that water quality and availability is considered by all the respondents to be 
main constraints, with salinity posing problems for crop development. They mentioned that 
the proposed construction of the pipeline is likely to address the water salinity problem and 
effectively cut down the cost of providing the water to the irrigation scheme than was the case 
in the past. Water availability is the main reason mentioned for lack of any farming since the 
TIS closed in 1997. 
In contrast, the responses of the institutional structures centre around issues of the viabil ity 
and sustainability. Therefore, of the constraints and challenges listed in the questionnaire, 
access to markets and marketing facilities, agricultural training, information and research; 
access to finance and credit; level of functional literacy, support and extension services are 
rated as very serious and requiring urgent attention. More or less the same items identified by 
the institutional structures are closely related to the ones identified by community based 
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organisations and local farmers in the Western Cape. They identified four major problems: 
finance and credit; access to land and tenure; water for livestock and irrigation and lastly 
training, extension and support services (Catling and Saaiman, 1996: 164). Vandalism, theft 
and deterioration of irrigation scheme infrastructure is another area of concern for the 
institutional structures: 
"We have called community meetings to address these issues and have reported this 
to the police. The problem continues unabated. We know who the culprits are but the 
community seems powerless or unwilling to do something. We are concerned that 
when the irrigation scheme assets are handed over to liS and when farming is ready 
to resume there'l! be nothing left. This is definitely a step back for us.". That 
irrigation scheme infrastructure is deteriorating rapidly has been discussed in the 
technical Consultants' reports (Gibb Africa, 1999). 
QUALITY AND NATURE OF SUPPORT AND EXTENSION SERVICES 
Support and Extension Services 
The quality and nature of support and extension services was described by eighty percent 
(80%) of the respondents as very good during the early years of the irrigation scheme. 
However, all respondents were quick to point out that the service deteriorated considerably 
during the 1980s until its closure in 1997. Respondents are critical of the type and nature of 
the service rendered. The service is described as having been top-down and authoritarian. 
In spite of the presence of extension staff on the irrigation scheme premises farmers indicated 
a limited rate of contact. Extension officers were described as working more in their offices 
and rarely doing anyon-site visits. "This made it difficult for us as farmers to get advice and 
establish good working relationships with the extension officers. In most cases the type of 
service was irrelevant to the real needs of the farmers". Overall the respondents in the study 
rated the quality of service as poor, ineffective and misdirected. The result was that farmers 
relied more on their colleagues for advice and assistance. 
The views expressed by the ex-farmers are shared by the institutional structures. The 
respondents pointed to the need to establish a good working relationship with extension 
officers than was the case in the past. "We regard them as critical to the success of the future 
rehabilitated TIS. We need well trained competent extension officers resident on the irrigation 
scheme particularly during the first few years. They are an important link between us and new 
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developments in the sector, especially, agricultural training I information and research". 
Respondents are unanimous that the extension service structures need to be overhauled, 
revamped and re-oriented to address the needs of all farmers , especially small-scale farmers. 
According to Mashaba (2000:7) "extension service remains an important factor to the 
development and support of most of the illiterate small-scale farming communities. More 
focused and high level extension services wi ll enable small-scale farmers to engage in 
agricultural production as entrepreneurs". In addition to the above emphasis is the need to 
upgrade and reorient research and extension services to focus on the needs and problems of 
small-scale and emerging farmers. On this Catling and Saaiman (1996:165) argue "New 
research will have to be carried out to address the problems of small farmers and to develop 
appropriate farming systems. Many of the standard recommendations for intensive, high input 
agriculture developed on experimental stations will not apply to small farms". 
That "the general level of training and agricultural competence of the extension staff is far 
below standard" (Botha and van der Wateren, 1993:80), has long been identified as one of the 
main contributors of poor agricultural performance . Bembridge (2000) conducted a study 
among extension officers at Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme and Bululwane Irrigation Scheme. 
Extension officers were asked to rate their own knowledge of irrigation, farm economics and 
extension. According to Bembridge extension officers expressed deficiencies in their own 
knowledge and competency. This impacts directly on their ability to provide sound training 
and advice. The study identified the need for further training in irrigated crop production, 
irrigation scheduling, water application and farm economics, extension programming, and 
irrigation techniques. Further more, the study found that there was an ad hoc approach to 
extension on the irrigation schemes. A study of the Qamata Irrigation Scheme by Bembridge 
(1984) and Fisser (1988:25) found that extension officers lacked training, guidance, 
motivation, clear-cut policies and lacked an objective extension and development programme. 
Backeberg et al (1996:62) concurs with the findings of Bembridge (2000). He states " ... there 
is a dire need to train extension workers in irrigation methods, crop technology, farm 
management recording, as well as in communication skills in transferring knowledge and 
technology to farmers with low levels ofliteracy ... " 
The issue of agricultural extension in South Africa has been explored in varying degrees by a 
variety of authors (Machete & Moller, 2000; Botha, 1994; van Rooyen and Vink, 1996; 
Thomas and Tyobeka, 1998; Chikanda and Kirsten, 1999; Botha and van der Wateren, 1993; 
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Backeberg et aI, 1996). Generally, the adequacy and appropriateness of extension services in 
the former homelands is questioned. There is widespread acknowledgment that the dualistic 
nature of extension services along racial lines has done more harm to the agricultural sector in 
the ex-homelands whilst it favoured the development oflarge-scale commercial farn1ers. 
The history of the agricultural sector mirrored the [racial) divisions within South African 
society. A major feature of the agricultural sector in South Africa has been its dual structure. 
This dates back as far as the 1913 Native Land Act. This dualism with significant differences 
in cost, infrastructure and level of production is well documented (Lipton, 1977; Schrire, 1992 
World Bank, 1992). According to these sources agricultural development has been viewed in 
terms of the efficient, capital intensive and largely white-owned, technologically advanced 
large-scale commercial sector. Conversely, small-scale agriculture has been characterized as a 
traditional , unproductive and inefficient subsistence sector and generally associated with the 
homelands. Extension and support services have always emphasized this dichotomy between 
commercial and subsistence agriculture. As a result, the major service institutions were biased 
in favour of white commercial agriculture. The interests and needs of white commercial 
farmers were catered for through the various institutional support structures such as finance, 
marketing structures, technical services, pricing policy, tax concessions on machinery 
purchases, tariff protection and government spending on agricultural education, research and 
advisory services. At the same time they have traditionally been served by relatively few but 
well qualified staff compared to their homeland counterparts. This further widened the gap 
between black and white farmers. In contrast, many small-scale farmers in the homelands 
either had limited or no access to support services. Where such services existed the quality had 
been inferior. As a result, this sector has been restricted to low input levels. This not only 
limited the way people could patiicipate in agriculture, it also constrained the emergence of a 
true picture of the potential and productivity of small-scale farming as a development strategy 
(Vaughan, 1992:421). Vaughan (1992:421) further argues "the historical undermining of 
smallholder production, which so significantly reduced the significance of the peasantry as a 
social and economic category, contributed to the widespread assumption that a smallholder 
class no longer exists as a significant locus of production in South African agriculture". This 
bias has resulted in an inappropriate extension message (Chikanda and Vink, 1999:151). 
According to Catling and Saaiman (1996: 172) encouraging progress is being made in closing 
the gap between the powerful commercial farming sector with its range of support services, 
and the small disadvantaged farming communities of the Western Cape. It is doubtful if the 
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same can be said about the Eastern Cape or the rest of the country, in spite of the institutional 
restructuring of agricultural services that has taken place. 
INPUT AND PRODUCT MARKETS 
Access to Markets and Marketing Facilities 
There was a marked difference between the responses of those who were commercial farmers 
and small plot /allotment holders. Generally, all the small plot/allotment holders did not 
consider the marketing of produce a constraint. This is probably because of the size of their 
plots and the fact that the bulk of the produce was meant primarily for consumption and small 
cash for profit. However, their main problems and concerns centred around intense 
competition among themselves, poor or no storage facilities, cost and lack of access to 
transport. According to them successful marketing, also, depended mainly on establishing 
informal networks. From the responses, a large propol1ion (85%) of the farmers did not 
transport their produce elsewhere because of the costs involved. They relied on traders coming 
to the scheme or selling from home. This effectively meant that produce got spoilt before it 
reached the market, thereby resulting in reduced profit levels to the extent that it was 
impossible to generate surpluses critical fo r re-investment, improved productivity and growth. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that marketing by the farmers was not organised, poorly 
developed based on the availabi lity of buyers, and marketing skills were limited and was done 
on an ad hoc basis. 
Unlike commercial farmers they did not feel constrained by the scheme's marketing policies, 
since they were not obliged to use the scheme's services. At least fO l1y percent (40%) 
mentioned that they used the scheme's marketing services occasionally. According to them, 
they were able to market their crops much more profitably on local markets than when using 
the scheme as a marketing agent. Van Averbeke et al (1998 :174) found that the main 
complaint at Tyhefu irrigation scheme and HeJ1zog Agricultural Cooperative Irrigation 
Scheme (HAIS) with scheme marketing services was the low monetary returns they received 
from selling their produce when using the scheme as a marketing agent. 
The ex-commercial fanners, on the other hand, were quite vocal and expressed dissatisfaction 
about the scheme's restrictive production and marketing policies. They felt that their produce 
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was sold well below its market value. Furthermore, they could only know their income 1 profit 
1 loss once the scheme has deducted all the inputs and the loans received. In most cases, they 
were dissatisfied with the monetary returns. Both the commercial farmers and small plot 
holders preferred having a greater degree of control on what, who, when and how they sell - to 
be independent. 
The key constraints that block the development of small-scale rural producers have been an 
important focus of attention (Arnon, 1981; ILO, 1995; Lele, 1982). For example Lele (Fenyes, 
1982) has observed that insufficient information concerning present and future market 
conditions is one of the most common shortcomings in less developed areas, due to mainly the 
large number of small producers, inefficient communication systems, low levels of education 
and administrative problems related to the accumulation and distribution of marketing 
information. 
That the success of any business venture hinges on the efficient functioning of the marketing 
system, of which a proper transportation network is part, is beyond dispute. The village 1 rural 
infrastructure (roads and telecommunications) though not regarded by 77% of the respondents 
to be an impediment needs to be upgraded. The study area is served by poorly maintained 
secondary roads. Together with a poor functioning telecommunication system, has made it 
difficult, if not impossible, to exploit favourable market opportunities. The absence of tarred 
roads means that vehicle owners are likely to charge a lot of money for transportation of goods 
(van Averbeke et aI, 1998:56). Consequently, the expense of delivering produce to the market 
can even exceed the cost of production making the produce very expensive to the consumer 
(Van Averbeke et ai, 1998:21). Backeberg et al (1996:52) fUliher, argues" irrigation, even 
with the existence of sufficient water resources, will remain an undeveloped farming activity 
in some former homelands until good transport and other communications have been 
established". 
For the institutional structures access to markets and marketing facilities are considered major 
constraints. Related issues are the type of produce that will be grown, the ability to adhere to 
high production and quality control standards and meeting contract obligations. The challenge 
is the development of a marketing system that will serve as a mechanism through which 
farmers can channel their produce. The responses of the institutional structures are captured in 
the following quote "We need a well-defined market so as to counteract the problem of 
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distance to markets, transport and transaction costs and poor infrastructure". There' s a 
recognition that for Tyhefu irrigation scheme to be economically viable it needs to farm on 
high value crops which will provide good economic returns. It is for this reason that sugar 
beet, jojoba beans, citrus and some of the vegetables that were produced previously at the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme are being considered as prospective candidate crops. The 
institutional structures argued "At present sugar beet seems to offer the best long-term 
prospect of a sustained economic return. Marketing problems for this crop are resolved as the 
produce will be sold at a processing plant which will be built in Cookhouse. Some members of 
the community have been sent abroad to learn more about the crop. At the same time, the crop 
has been tested at Tyhefu irrigation scheme as part of a feasibility study and was found to be 
suitable for sugar beet". According to Sugar Beet Growers Association chairperson, Hilton 
Collett, the introduction of sugar beet in the Fish River valley represents a valuable 
opportunity to enhance the economics of irrigated agriculture in the region and has the 
potential to deliver economic benefits for the Eastern Cape province as a whole (Daily 
Dispatch, 2002). 
This optimism is not shared entirely by Bembridge (2000). He states "after encouragement by 
the commercial sector and social facilitator (my emphasis), the majority of the irrigators were 
keen to grow sugar beet ... They were led to believe that an income of R6000.00 to R8000.00 
per ha was possible. This still has to be proven on the scheme" . Bembridge (2000: 45) 
cautions " ... however, the proposed sitting of the mill at Cookhouse some 140 kms distant may 
make marketing costs a problem in the long term". Similarly, Backeberg et al (1996:52) 
observes "an unfavourable economic location renders the profitable production of many 
products ... impossible. It also reduces the ability to produce many fruits profitably" . In 
addition, if the crop will be sold abroad this ignores the major challenges sugar beet or any 
other primary product will face in international markets. The issue of subsidies given to 
overseas farmers as well as the declining prices of agricultural products is currently not being 
addressed. 
Level of Functional Literacy and Farming Skills 
The poor educational level of the farmers is positively related to the their level of functional 
literacy. Over eighty percent (80%) of the farmers expressed concern about their level of 
functional literacy and are fully aware of the limitations this imposes on successful farming. In 
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spite of this the majority (66%) is not worried about their farming skills. They believe that 
they gained "reasonable" knowledge and experience over the years. Conradie (Lipton, de 
Klerk and Lipton, 1996: 166) confirmed that existing small scale Coloured fruit farmers in the 
Western Cape possess useful knowledge gained from their experience of working on and 
"looking over the fence"at commercial farms, but they need training in new practices and the 
selection of cultivars. Also, informal discussions with the ex-farmers did reveal that all the 
farmers need to acquire various skills through training if TIS is to be viable. This is especially 
the case with regard to the adoption of new technology, production techniques and basic skills 
like seedbed preparation, seedling care, weed control, use of pesticides, integrated pest 
management techniques, harvesting, and storage. It is for this reason that all the farmers regard 
agricultural training/information/research as one of the prerequisites to successful farming, a 
component that was missing in the past. 
A persistent thread running through all the responses of the institutional structures is the 
limited resources (financial and human) available to the community. Skills considered lacking 
are the drawing of business plans, formulating and reading contracts, financial management / 
record keeping, computer literacy, adopting latest technology, project planning, management 
and evaluation, keeping minutes, communication, marketing and management, operation and 
maintenance, quality control. The institutional structures stated "We need training in various 
aspects of operation and maintenance so that we do not have to call for outside assistance. We 
need to do things ourselves. This can save us a lot of money and prevent unnecessary delays. 
The problem is that capacity building in many areas is not forthcoming". 
For Bembridge (1996) lack of properly qualified management, extension staff and farmers is a 
major drawback to the effectiveness of many small-scale irrigation schemes. It is for this 
reason that Catl ing and Saaiman (1996:165) advocate that training or re-orientation is 
necessary at all levels - from farmer through extension worker, scientist to administrator, 
whilst at the same time accommodating different levels of literacy and education. In addition, 
Backeberg et al (1996:47) argues "investment in human capital through education, training 
and extension is more often than not the most important contributing factor to the economic 
success of irrigation schemes ... Training programmes at all levels should receive a high 
priority. Assessment of training needs should be the basis on any well-planned upgrading and 
restructuring of specific irrigation schemes". 
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Rogerson (2000) looking at rural producers in general and more specifically rural handicraft 
enterprises has identified numerous constraints faced by this sector. According to him the lack 
of management or business skills serves to worsen all the other problems of rural producers 
since they lack the capacity to analyse situations and chart ways to minimise the adverse 
impact of constraints on their businesses. This includes their inability to respond to new 
opportunities or changes in market conditions. 
Access to Credit 
The responses of the ex-farmers and the institutional structures indicate apprehension about 
access to loans / finance and credit in the new dispensation. This is clearly evident in the 
statement made by two members of the institutional structures "We need more information 
about the financial packages available to us. We are going to explore all the options. What 
worries us is that the Land Bank offers credit at market related interest rates". This seems to 
confirm the observation that even though institutional restructuring of agricultural services has 
been done, with formerly white institutions (Agricultural Research Council and Land Bank) 
re-orienting their activities to meet the needs of small-scale farmers, little has been achieved in 
this regard. A study by Mashaba (2000) anl0ng small-scale farmers in the Northern province 
indicates that the farmers are critical of the role of the Land Bank. Fanners argue that the 
failure of the Land Bank to develop favourable lending conditions acts as a negative incentive 
for small-scale farmers , who find it impossible to invest in agriculture. With regard to high 
interest rates the Land Bank has responded that this serves as an incentive discount for timely 
repayment (Mashaba, 2000:50). An informal discussion with members of a micro-lending 
agency which specializes in agricultural development in the Eastern Cape concurred with the 
views of the small-scale farmers mentioned above. This micro-lending institution sources its 
funds from the Land Bank at a rate of 14%. In turn they charge customers a much higher 
interest rate (approximately 17%). This is necessary in order to ensure ongoing liquidity of the 
agency. What is of concern to them is the high rate of defaulters in terms of repaying the 
loans as well as the number of agricultural projects that are collapsing on a wide scale for 
several reasons. These include among others lack of group cohesion and commitment among 
project participants, inattention paid by the micro-lending institution to issues of viability and 
sustainability of the projects, lack of training, poor understanding of the business plans since 
in most cases these are compiled by consultants. 
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In addition to the other constraints / challenges identified above, the question of access to 
finance, especially working capital, is often regarded a critical constraint on rural producers in 
the developing world. Fenwick (1998) found that small-scale farmers in KwaZulu-Natal are 
constrained by low levels of liquidity, high transaction costs, inadequate collateral and poor 
debt servicing capacity. With regard to the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme the critical question 
therefore becomes the ability of the farmers to repay the loans. According to Dawson and 
Jeans (1997) in order to improve access to finance there is a need for improving the rural 
financial market performance as a whole which includes measures to improve the mobilisation 
of rural savings, augmenting the competitiveness and institutional diversity of the financial 
market and to increase the use of innovative financial structures. 
The Strauss Commission into the Provision of Rural Financial Services (1995) was appointed 
to make recommendations aimed at improving financial services for rural households. Not 
much attention is given by the Commission to constraints inhibiting the development of small 
farmers. According to Bottral (Fenwick, 1998:4) if funds are to flow towards agriculture in 
rural areas, the environment needs to be as attractive as possible. A view supported by Van 
Averbeke et al (1998:31) who states" commercial banks wish to lend to creditworthy projects 
and individuals, but will be reluctant to lend money if the farmer is not certain on reaping the 
returns from the project". A lack of investment opportunities, or the perceiving of them, may 
playa greater in inhibiting the adoption of innovations than do credit constraints (Fenwick, 
1998 :4). Barriers to entry for small-scale farmers are real despite the various transformation 
initiatives by the Departments of Land Affairs (DLA) and Agriculture (DoA) since 1994. 
The issue of access to finance and credit calls into question concerns around tenure security 
and adequacy of plot size at Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Ninety one percent (91 %) of the 
farmers reported that their plots were too small for viable far·ming and expressed a wish to 
increase far·m size. A view that is, also, held by the institutional structures. Van Averbeke et al 
(1998:144) in a study of irrigation schemes in Central Eastern Cape found that the interest 
shown by respondents in acquiring more land contrasts with the relatively low general use 
intensity of irrigated lands. Those who felt that the size of the far·ms was adequate were older 
farmers over the age of fifty-five who believed that they would not be able to manage a large 
farm. According to Backeberg (1996:46) policy on farm sizes should be flexible , leaving room 
for the better entrepreneurs / managers to expand, and also for poorer managers to contract 
should economic realities force them to do so. It has been decided by all the stakeholders at 
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the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme that land subdivision according to various farm sizes will not be 
a priority. Land wi ll be farmed by all those interested conunercially on a cooperative basis. A 
small portion of land will be reserved for food plots. How this will work in practice has not yet 
been finalized. 
Tenure security is not regarded a problem in the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme by thirty four 
percent (34%) of the ex-farmers. Sixty six percent (66%) indicated that because they do not 
own the land they have no sense of securi ty and ownership. There is always a feeling that they 
could easily be evicted from the land. According to them having title deeds is the only way 
tenure insecurity could be reso lved. On the question of tenure security, the institutional 
structures believe that this will be addressed once the scheme is transferred to the farmers. 
They stressed the need for tenure security, and is considered vital to give the farmers a sense 
of ownership. More importantly, tenure security is associated with market oriented agriculture 
and possible involvement of the private sector. According to Van Averbeke et al (1998 :31) 
increased tenure security in the form of land title, long-term lease may facilitate farmers ' 
access to credit. 
Physical Factors Influencing Irrigated Crop Production 
Heat, wind, cold, hail and sometimes heavy rains are the main climatic constraints identified 
by all the respondents. Heat was regarded as a main constraint, especially during the summer 
months. This is because the area where the irrigated lands are located is regarded to be the 
hottest. 
Overall the quality of the soi l was perceived by seventy nine percent (79%) of the farmers to 
be good. Twenty-one (23%) identified soil texture, drainage and infiltration as main 
constraints. However, farmers did point to the decline in soil fertility, attributed to a reduction 
in fertili ser application rates by farmers since the scheme transferred soil nutrient management 
to fanners. However, since the soil has not been tilled for the past five years many believe the 
natural fertility of the soil has been restored. 
With regard to pests and disease eighty three percent (83%) of the farmers identified insects 
and fungus, respectively and birds as constraints. Livestock were not a constraint before the 
closure of the scheme but with the vandalism of scheme infrastructure, which includes 
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fencing, farmers foresee problems if production resumes. Basically, most of the fencing has 
been stolen with livestock having free access to irrigation lands. They predict that by the time 
any farming starts there will not be any fencing left. This is a problem which the local 
resident's committee and the institutional structures are unable to deal with. They believe that 
this is likely to increase the refurbishment I rehabilitation costs of the infrastructure. 
INSTITUTIONS TO HELP WITH THE CONSTRAINTS I CHALLENGES 
IDENTIFIED AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED 
The government is regarded as the principal agent that should assist farmers I community with 
all the problems they experience, with finance topping the list. The main reason given being 
that government is the only institution farmers and the community has been dealing with all 
their life. This is clearly reflected in the following comment made by all the farmers "We 
know only the government as the provider of services, and should continue as such. The 
government should assist us at Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme until such time we can stand on our 
feet (time frame not specified)". Members of the institutional structures have elaborated 
further on this " What we' d like the government to do is to prioritise us (small-scale farmers) 
as the needy in the agricultural sector. Without this it would be impossible for us to achieve 
our goals. The government has got the capacity to mobilise resources and other support 
services on our behalf. Its impossible to achieve this on our own". A sense of dependence on 
the government is clearly evident. As Backeberg et al (1996:59) argues" Farmers' perceptions 
have been affected by the "benevolent autocratic" style of management on most irrigation 
systems. This has resulted in over-dependence of farmers on government and other 
management agencies. This has discouraged grassroots initiative and endeavour". This can be 
attributed to the top-down nature of development in the past, where participation by the 
beneficiaries was the exception rather than the norm. In addition the impoverished nature of 
many of the communities makes it impossible for them to think of any other form of help that 
might be available. Generally communities have to grapple with the shift in terms of the 
development discourse in South Africa as well as the responsibilities and policy changes 
accompanying these. 
The attitude of the respondents towards the government, NGOs and researchers is worth 
noting (see, also, methodology section). Whilst the government is regarded as the main player 
in ensuring the revival of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme, it has generally lost credibility. The 
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goverrunent's commitment and willingness to help is questioned. The respondents highlighted 
several key areas of concern when dealing with various government officials and NGOs. First 
of all the high rate of staff turnover which impacts on continuity. According to the respondents 
goverrunent employees do not inform communities when they resign or transferred to another 
department. This means that all that was discussed previously has to be narrated all over again. 
The consequence is that all decisions that were agreed on earlier are forgotten. With someone 
new, everything has to be started afresh because there' s no smooth hand over. This has 
resulted in delays in implementation. Also, the frequency of visits is a problem - the time 
lapse between last and next visit is far too big. Equally, there has been a problem of poor or no 
coordination between the various government departments, NGOs and other stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, the government and NGOs are believed can assists with funding , training, 
advice, support and extension services. The majority of the respondents believe that NGOs are 
better placed to lobby the government on behalf of the community. At the same time, NGOs 
have an important role to play in complementing the government departments since they have 
valuable links with communities but the staff of some of these organisations will need training 
in appropriate service provision for small scale farmers (Catling and Saaiman, 1996:166). 
With regards the public and private sector, this proved difficult for the majority of the 
respondents to single out their respective roles because of poor knowledge and lack of clarity 
about these institution's roles. Three respondents (9%) aptly stated "we still need to explore 
what services can be provided by the public and private sector. We have not yet approached 
them. The goverrunent as the main player should provide a facilitative environment for these 
institutions / agents to help us". Machete and Mollel (1999) looking at the provision of 
extension services, note a shift from the public sector as the sole provider to private sector, 
NGOs, farmers and other organisations. 
However, unlike the ex- farmers who had problems identifying the roles of the private sector, 
the institutional structures believe the private sector could be a major source of funding in line 
with the goverrunent' s public-private partnership approach. It became clear during the 
interviews that this is an area that needs to be explored further and the ran1ifications of such a 
partnershi p explained in a mafU1er that is understood by all. 
All the respondents associated the role of farmer organisations with advice, protecting and 
promoting farmer interests and rights, training and assisting with marketing of farm produce. 
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There was no indication if they belonged to a farmer organisation or not. Reference was, 
however, made to the history of conflict / division of the community farmer organisations 
brought to the community. All the respondents stated "We need a strong farmer organisation 
that can lobby the government, the private sector and other organisations to take our needs 
much more seriously than is the case at present". According to Chikanda and Kirsten 
(1996:152) the formation or strengthening of farmer's unions is increasingly being used for 
effective communication with input suppliers, as a basis of cooperative input buying 
arrangements and as a lobbying platform for the delivery of inputs such as research and 
extension services to smallholders. 
The provision of agricultural training / information and research is regarded as the domain of 
agricultural colleges and universities. The respondents expressed the wish that these 
institutions develop training programmes that will cater for the needs of emerging farmers 
with a low standard of education. 
The community IS not associated with the prOVISIOn of any resources because of the 
prevalence of poverty in the area. Their role was described as commitment and participation in 
the project in order to make it a success as well as operation and maintenance which should be 
preceded by training if they are to perform this task efficiently. 
Two members of the institutional structures felt that the donor community could assist with 
funding so as to hasten the process of reviving the scheme. The argument is that "if the 
government does not have sufficient funds it should look elsewhere". 
The experience of the Western Cape on how the various institutions can cooperate and work 
together is instructive (though lots of ground remains to be covered). Encouraging progress 
has been made on how to forge links between various organisations that have been divided 
along racial lines and in nan-owing the gap between the commercial farming sector and the 
small farmer sector. At the same time, we have seen "the emergence of new organisations 
dealing exclus ively with the problems of small farmers and strengthening of existing bodies 
serving small farmers and rural communities" (Catling and Saaiman, 1996: 172). Operational 
problems included the duplication of effort and confusion among the various institutions. 
However, these have since been addressed Witll the major role players defining their roles and 
coordinating their programmes more effectively. This process must be accelerated before 
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noticeable improvements can be expected in the income and standard of living of small 
farmers and before many rural livelihoods are created Catling and Saaiman, 1996: 172). 
On the question on which institutions have adequate knowledge of their problems, the 
government, NGOs and agricultural colleges / universities and farmer organisations, were 
identified in order of impOltance. In doubt is the capacity (in terms of skills and resources) to 
deliver and the approach they adopt in dealing with the community as discussed above. The 
institutional structures believe that they've managed to lobby the government and some NGOs 
to help in reviving the scheme. However, with regard to the other agents / institutions nothing 
seems to have been done in this regatd. 
USER CHARGES AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SERVICES 
Respondents were asked about the serViCes they are willing to pay for. Basically, all 
respondents realise the importance of paying for the irrigation scheme services. Fourty three 
percent (43%) were non-committal stating as the main reasons lack of clarification as to how 
this will be done as well as the prevalence of poverty in the atea. This concern is , also, evident 
among the fifty-seven percent (57%) who are committed to paying. Affordability featured 
prominently in all the responses . Services identified as warranting payment ate: water, 
operation and maintenance, electricity, communication and land preparation services. These 
are considered critical to the smooth running of the irrigation scheme. This issue needs to be 
viewed against widespread nonpayment of water for household consumption in the village. 
The introduction of user-charges in the water sector has been the most consistent policy 
prescription to emanate from the International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade 
(IDWSSD), 1980-1990 (Schur, 1994:419). There are basically two lines of argument with 
regard to user charges. The first argument revolves around issues of equity. What informs this 
position is that water is a basic human need ( and thus a fundamental human right) and should 
be supplied free of charge. It is therefore the state's responsibility to ensure that everyone has 
access to water and sanitation facilities. 
Proponents of the cost-recovery argument view water as a scarce resource and hence an 
economic good (WHO, USAID, World Bank). They assert that the majority of people in the 
developing countries will continue to be denied access to safe drinking water if free water 
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policies are pursued and if cost recovery mechanisms are not introduced as important 
components of water supply projects (Katko in Schur, 1994:420). Thus, cost recovery is seen 
as key to water supply development. Poor cost recovery is often cited as one of the major 
constraints to the long term sustainability an economic viability of water supply schemes. 
What needs to be recovered has been one area of intense debate. For example bilateral 
agencies such as USAlD have advocated that all running costs (operation and maintenance) be 
recovered. The World Bank's position has consistently been the recovery of both capital and 
recurrent costs. Emerging consensus in the literature seems to favour the recovery of recurrent 
expenditure as a short-term objective, while the long-term objective should be the recovery of 
full marginal cost. 
Basically, few (if any) of the state irrigation schemes in South Africa recovered full operation 
and maintenance costs. Prior to 1994 governments in the former homelands was responsible 
for operation and maintenance and finance. Besides the fact that there was rampant corruption, 
inigation scheme management found that their entire budgets were consumed in running and 
maintaining the economically non-viable irrigation schemes. 
In South Africa institutions such as the Development Bank of South Africa (DB SA) had 
supported the cost-recovery argument long before 1994. In line with international trends on 
cost recovery especially from international development agencies the White Paper on Water 
and Sanitation Policy called for the recovery of at least the recurrent costs of water services 
through direct user charges (DWAF, 1994:21-22). This includes operating, maintenance and 
replacement costs. Given the poverty levels in the rural areas it would be unrealistic to expect 
the communities to pay for capital costs as well. As Schur (J 994:425) argues " The 
assumption that utility user charging can raise enough revenue in rural areas is unrealistic in 
the present and in the future". The utilisation of community labour can reduce costs. This 
resource is used extensively already in South Africa in many water supply projects. Not only 
does this provide much needed employment but it also guarantees and enhances community 
commitment to project maintenance. 
The record of cost-recovery has been disappointing, jeopardising the financial viability of 
continued infrastructural expansion (Alence, 2002:699). There is evidence that in many rural 
communities the new water sources are under-utilised since many communities do not afford 
costs whether in the form of pre-paid meters or agreed-upon monthly tariffs. The result is that 
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communities continue to use unsafe drinking water. In addition questions about project 
sustainability abound. According to Ruiters and Stein (2002:266) Mvula Trust acknowledges 
that almost half of the projects it established would fail because of inability to maintain the 
system. They elaborate further "reasons for unsustainability invariably include very real 
affordability constraints and an unwillingness to pay for communal standpipes ... Other 
important reasons for failure include poor quality of construction, areas within communities 
without service and intermittent supply" (Ruiters and Stein, 2002:267). 
A number of cost recovery issues at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme and the village at large still 
need to be finalized. The Water User's Association (WUA) was established in terms of the 
Water Act No. 36 of 1998. The underlying principle is that the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme 
should become a viable, self-sustaining scheme where the farmers and other users of water 
from the scheme assume responsibility for the use of the scheme to the mutual benefit of all 
users (PDALA, 2001:2). Ultimately the WUA, as a legal body, will be responsible for a range 
of issues. This responsibility includes, inter alia, the functions of internal distribution amongst 
the plot holders, the levy of an equitable and affordable tariff on water users to ensure the 
financial security of the scheme, the management of the scheme and the use of all funds for 
the benefit of scheme (PDALA, 2001 :2). Bembridge et al (2000 :63-64) elaborates "the WUA 
should be able to take over scheme assets, take over collective loans, operate accounts and 
institute by-laws enforceable by its members ... It would be responsible for arranging input 
supplies, draught power, and marketing". As it is at the moment it cannot be claimed that 
WUA possesses any of these skills to carry out the necessary tasks. Capacity building of the 
WUA is undoubtedly vital for the successful operation and long-tern viability of irrigation 
schemes. International experience shows that developing the capacity of WUAs is long-term 
process. 
PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS WITH REGARDS MOVES TO REVIVE THE 
TYHEFU IRRIGATION SCHEME 
At present Tyhefu Irrigation scheme is considered to be technically insolvent or defunct. The 
land has been lying fallow since 1997. In 1998 the community ofNdlambe wrote a letter to the 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry requesting the urgent revival of the Tyhefu Irrigation 
scheme. The Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (DALA) and the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) have since undertaken the decision to jointly rehabilitate 
105 
and transfer the irrigation schemes to its users. The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
appointed a Task Team in 1997 to advise DW AF and DALA on all water-related aspects of 
the schemes. The responsibilities of the Provincial Departments of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs (PDALA) related to on-farm activities . The report entitled 'Report on Investigations 
into Ways of Rehabilitating the Water Supply Aspects of Certain Irrigation Schemes in the 
Former Transkei and Ciskei" (1997) indicated that rehabilitation of TIS would be 
implemented in three phases at an estimated cost of R75 million. It was envisaged that the 
process would start in September 1997 and be completed in March 1999. Since then the 
proposed schedule and costs have had to be revised. The availability of funds being cited as 
the main obstacle. Rehabilitation for Phase One started in 2002, with the whole operation 
expected to be completed in 2004. It can be concluded that the rehabilitation process is 
uncertain and is likely to be a lengthy process. This is a source of concern for the community. 
Their argument revolves around widespread poverty and unemployment in the area. 
Respondents were asked if they are satisfied with the progress made with regards the efforts to 
rehabilitate and revive the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Generally, feelings of frustration and 
helplessness prevail among the farmers. Eighty-four percent (84%) of the respondents are 
skeptical about the progress. They expressed disappointment and have reservations about 
government' s commitment, willingness and sincerity to help. The response of the majority of 
the farmers is summed in the following quote "We have seen some development in other 
areas of the province and the rest of the country. Our area has disintegrated further since this 
government came to power". They called on the government to speed up the revival and 
rehabilitation process. The rest of the respondents (16%) were cautious and reluctant to answer 
the question and preferred not to commit themselves. Whilst a feeling of helplessness and 
skepticism is evident among the institutional structures, all the members are confident that 
Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme will be revived in the end. What is not certain is when production 
will resume. There is concern that the process is slow and needs to be accelerated. 
A question was asked about the commitment of the community to meeting the objectives of 
the project. All respondents have confidence that the community is committed to meeting the 
objectives of the project. This is more so in view of the need to overcome widespread poverty, 
crime, unemployment and feelings of destitution in the community. Participation is seen as 
vital for the success of the scheme. The community wants to be part of all decisions taken and 
not be undermined as in the past. 
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Other 
The institutional structures were asked about their shol1- and long-tern1 vision for the scheme. 
Their short-term vision includes: resumption of farming to fight poverty, unemployment and 
crime; and skills acquisition. The Long-term vision revolves around the economic viability 
and sustainability of TIS by generating sufficient income so as not to rely on loans. " We 
would like to see TIS as a leader in the supply of fresh produce locally and / or internationally; 
raise the standard of living of the farmers and community in general; training new and 
emerging farmers" 
The last question was about any comments and issues that have not been raised that can assist 
the researcher: 1) phasing of the pipeline : respondents believe that in order to speed the 
process, the construction of the pipeline need to be implemented at the same time rather than 
in phases as proposed by the government and Gibb Africa. 2) Interim measures as requested 
by the community impossible because of the costs involved. 3) Training - considered critical 
so that institutional structures can have confidence in themselves and perform the tasks 
effectively. 
Conclusion 
This study found that the poor educational level of the farmers is positively related to their 
level of functional literacy. Overall, the standard of education is very low. More than half of 
the respondents have not reached standard five . Feelings of incompetence among all the 
respondents are widespread. No doubt this is one of the major constraints on their ability to 
run and manage the irrigation scheme effectively. 
None of the farmers has any formal agricultural training. The majority of the farmers are 
confident about their level of agricultural knowledge and farming skills because of their 
prevIOus involvement in irrigation farming. This is insufficient for successful irrigation 
farming. There is a need for specialised training on various irrigation and production 
techniques . Equally important, critical skills are lacking in various key areas such as business 
and financial management, interpersonal skills, marketing, operation and maintenance and 
quality control. 
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It is clear from the research findings that agriculture contributed to the livelihoods of the 
farmers in a modest way. Effectively, irrigated farming generated income that can be said to 
supplement overall household income. This is particularly so if one considers the 
unpredictable nature of the income derived from farming by all the farmers at the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme. In most cases income has been low and many families lived in poverty. The 
farmers, especially, the commercial fanners had a high debt load on a continuous basis. 
The quality and nature of support and extension services was found to be poor, misdirected 
and ineffective. Respondents had reservations regarding the knowledge and skills of extension 
officers. It is evident from the findings that the competence of extension officers is questioned. 
Clearly, the viability and sustainability of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme will demand a 
complex package of interventions that address variously issues of markets and marketing, 
capital investment and access to finance, technology, education and training, and institutional 
structures. The challenges that lie ahead for the community are enormous. 
The revival of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is considered critical to rural livelihoods. This is 
evident in the fact that the majority of the respondents believe that the Tyhefu irrigation 
scheme made an important contribution in improving the quality of life (povelty alleviation, 
food security, employment creation). 
Though the process of reviving the scheme is proceeding slowly, respondents have, generally, 
not lost hope. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The poor performance record of many irrigation schemes, despite huge investments, in the 
former homelands has prompted the government to reconsider its active and direct role in 
small-scale irrigation farming. Basically, few (if any) of the state irrigation schemes have 
recovered full operation and maintenance costs. Prior to 1994 governments in the fonner 
homelands were responsible for operation, maintenance and finance . Besides the fact that 
financial mismanagement was widespread, irrigation scheme management found that their 
entire budgets were consumed in running and maintaining economically non-viable irrigation 
schernes. Consistent with the overall agricultural policy principles there is a move away from 
government-owned irrigation schemes. Internationally, there is a pervasive policy consensus 
in favour of reducing state control and management of irrigation schemes based on the 
argument that state managed enterprises are costly, oversubsidised, inefficient and tend to 
deepen state financial crises. Transferring state responsibility to farmers, according to 
proponents, relieves the state of financially burdensome obligations, while at the same time 
enhancing farmer involvement. 
The new policy framework in South Africa, known as Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) 
is premised on the transfer of ownership, authority and responsibility of small-scale irrigation 
schemes from government to the farmers. In addition, the new policy requires that costs be 
recovered from all participating farmers. Effectively, this means that the irrigation schemes are 
to be totally o\\TIed, managed and maintained by participant farmers, in the form of Water 
User Associations (WU As). 
Farmers and institutional structures at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme have welcomed this 
development to be able to take over management responsibilities. However, a shift in the 
mindset that the government is the facilitator and not the implementer of development could 
not be discerned in this study. The government is still expected to be directly and actively 
involved. This is hardly surprising considering that development projects have always been 
imposed. At the same time the high levels of poverty and deprivation reinforce this attitude. 
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Current pol icy thinking is a major depaliure from the previously top-down, supply-driven 
approach. Whilst this represents a notable ilIDovation, participatOlY development alone is a 
necessary but not a sufficient requirement for the success of small-scale irrigation schemes. 
This shift exposes farmers to new challenges and creates new demands organizationally and in 
terms of production practices. The real test for irrigation management transfer is the extent to 
which it is accompanied by a comprehensive package of support and extension services and 
farmer empowerment so that the viability and sustainability of the irrigation schemes is 
assured. 
While the need for the transformation of small-scale irrigation schemes is undisputed, the 
hurried implementation of irrigation management transfer raises questions about the long-term 
viability of these irrigation schemes. This study suggests that improving the situation of small-
scale resource poor irrigation farmers , such as the ones at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme appear 
to be the secondary aim of this reform. In essence, fi scal capacity pressures (and international 
trends) have been the determining factor for the adoption of irrigation management transfer 
rather than the potential far-reaching effects of this reform on the livelihoods of the farmers 
and concrete evidence about enhanced performance and cost-efficiency and effectiveness in 
the South Africa situation. Farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme need special support. 
Radical policy changes are vital before any significant improvements can be achieved in 
income, livelihoods, general standard of living and agricultural productivity. Without this the 
possibility for independent agricultural production is minimal. 
The government needs to articulate a clear policy for small-scale farmers but also be prepared 
to commit sufficient resources. The possibility of establishing a special ministry for small-
scale farmers within the Department of Land and Agricultural Affairs needs to be investigated. 
Given the supportive environment within which white commercial farmers thrived it cannot be 
claimed that the same exists for small-scale resource poor [irrigation] farmers . At a general 
level, despite the legislative and policy changes initiated since 1994, prospects fo r revitalising 
agriculture in the fonner homelands and establishing a new class of emerging farmers are 
bleak. The dual nature of agriculture remains very much intact. In this sense small-scale 
farming needs to be targeted specifically. Currently, poor political SUppOli for small-scale 
[irrigation] farming is a perennial problem in spite of the fact that small-scale farming is 
viewed as an important policy obj ective by the government. FUlihermore, the goals of 
achieving equity, efficiency and sustainability in the agricultural sector will remain elusive. 
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IMT raises critical questions about the nature and quality of paJiicipation and decision-making 
at local level. Whether IMT enhances farmer participation and decision-making or whether it 
concentrates these on the elite is an area for further research. In other words, how do power 
relations play themselves out at this level? Given the history of strife in the Ndlambe 
community, attention to group dynamics should be one of the areas that receive priority. 
Attention needs to be paid to issues of leadership and management, group cohesion, conflict 
resolution and commitment to the project purpose. There is evidence that many projects fail 
because of inattention to these issues. 
Access to information by the farmers is vital for all to participate effectively in the process. 
Even though community report back meetings are held on the rehabilitation process at the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme, findings in this study indicate that the views of the respondents 
(particularly the former farmers and the institutional structures26 differ markedly in terms of 
the perceived priority constraints and challenges. This can be attributed to the proximity of the 
institutional structures to the various agents involved in the revival and rehabilitation process. 
As a result they show a clearer understanding of the complexity of the process. On the other 
hand, the farmers seem to have a limited vision of the challenges that lie ahead. The responses 
of the ex-farmers indicate that they are more concerned with survival and the "here and now". 
It cannot be claimed that all the respondents aJ'e fully conversant of the implications of the 
IMT process. 
Research evidence suggests that South Africa has a wealth of lessons to draw from on the 
African continent on irrigation development and irrigation management transfer. Lessons 
indicate that the continent is littered with examples of derelict and costly failures. Many 
irrigation projects have suffered from a combination of technical, institutional and 
organisational constraints. A recurring theme in the literature is the lack of consultation with 
the intended beneficiaries with the aim of securing their active involvement and ownership of 
the projects. This has not only posed a threat to the sustainability of irrigation projects but has 
been singled out as one of the primary causes of failure . 
Primary constraints and challenges identified by the respondents for the future rehabilitated 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme are finance and credit, markets and marketing, institutional suppOli, 
26 Even among members of the institutional structures it cannot be claimed that the information held is uniform 
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training, support and extension services. These have the effect of undermining the viability 
and sustainability of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. 
The quality and nature of support and extension services was found to be poor, misdirected 
and ineffective. Respondents had reservations regarding the knowledge and ski ll s of extension 
officers. It is evident from the findings that the competence of extension officers is questioned. 
Hence, it is believed this limited their abi lity to provide sound advice to farmers on key 
production and irrigation practices. Well-trained competent extension officers res ident on the 
irrigation scheme particularly during the first few years are critical to the success of the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme. Specialised training of new and serving extension officers should 
receive priority. There is a strong argument for the overhaul and re-orientation of the 
extension service to address the needs of small-scale [irrigation] farmers. Working 
partnerships between farmers, institutional structures and extension officers need to be forged. 
This relationship should differ markedly from the one that existed before the collapse of the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme, which was top-down, technocratic and authoritarian. Extension 
service needs to strive through training towards encouraging greater farmer independence and 
collaboration rather than the subordination of farmers. 
Related to the above is the need to upgrade and reorient research to focus on the needs and 
problems of small-scale and emerging farmers. It is for this reason that all the respondents in 
this study regard agricultural training/information/research as one of the prerequisites for 
successful small-scale irrigation farming. A major anomaly identified by the respondents is the 
inability of the farmers to access timely agricultural information and services. This includes 
information on new crop cultivars with high yield potential and market value, soils analysis, 
advice on fertilizers and pesticides, effective weed, pest and disease control, farm management 
methods and techniques. Research evidence suggests that previous research effort has been 
devoted largely to commercial farming and that such research output is marginally relevant to 
the needs of small-scale farmers (Catling, 1996). 
There are several role players involved in the rehabilitation of the Tyhefu inigation scheme. It 
is important to enlist the assistance and cooperation of individuals / organizations and 
institutions (such as white commercial farmers, agricultural institutions, farmer organizations) 
that have potential to contribute positively. There is a need, therefore, for greater cooperation 
between those role players with complementary competencies. Critical attention must be paid 
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to issues of closer coordination of programmes and services as well as the possibility of 
redefinition of their respective roles . 
This study found that the poor educational level of the farmers is positively related to their 
level of functional literacy. Feelings of incompetence among all the respondents are 
widespread. All the respondents realize that they need to acquire various skills through 
training for greater independence. Critical skills considered lacking are the drawing of 
business plans, formulation and reading of contracts, financial control and management, 
record keeping, computer literacy, adopting latest technology, project plaJming, management 
and evaluation, keeping minutes, communication, conflict resolution, marketing and 
management, operation and maintenance, quality control. Research evidence (Cousins, 
Cousins and Theron, 1996: 185) on small-scale commercial faJ"mers in the Western Cape 
suggests that business management skills, which include keeping proper farm accounts and 
records, are often limited. According to Rogerson (2000:210) the lack of management or 
business skills serves to worsen all the other problems of rural producers since entrepreneurs 
lack the capacity to analyse situations and chart ways to minimize the adverse impact of 
constraints on their business. Thus, a high level of financial management will no doubt be one 
of the critical areas that need to be addressed. 
None of the farmers have any formal agricultural training. Even though the majority of the 
farmers are confident about their agricultural knowledge and farming skills (as a result of their 
previous involvement in irrigation I subsistence farming, sometimes as farm labourers in the 
commercial farm sector) they need training in new production, irrigation techniques and 
practices. This is particularly important especially given the fact that the rehabilitation and 
revival of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is premised on maJ'ket-oriented farming. The skills 
they possess can largely be regarded as general farming skills such as weeding, fencing, 
driving. Specialised farming skills cannot be said to exist on a wide scale. Innovative practical 
training suited to the needs of the farmers is critical. 
Marketing of produce for the majority of the farmers, particularly the food plotholders, was a 
serious problem. It is clear from the findings that marketing was, generally, not organised, and 
was poorly developed based on the availability of buyers. There was stiff competition among 
the farmers whilst at the same time they restricted their activities to narrow localized markets. 
In most cases this resulted in reduced profit levels. For the commercial farmers low monetary 
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returns when using the scheme's marketing services was a source of tension between the 
farmers and the inigation scheme management. 
In the past rural infrastructure and the fact that Tyhefu irrigation scheme is located far away 
from main markets made it difficult, if not impossible, to exploit favourable market 
opportunities. Overall, farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme require both improved access 
and improvements in marketing of their produce. Also, one of the challenges is the 
development of a marketing system that will serve as a mechanism through which farmers can 
channel their produce. Similarly, an improvement in marketing information system is vital. 
Other areas of concern relate to the availability of storage facilities, the ability to adhere to 
high production and quality control standards and meeting contract obligations. The 
suggestion by van Averbeke et al (1998:203) that there is a general need for the identification 
of suitable crops that can be grown profitably, without being sensitive to market conditions 
and distance is valid. Even though sugar beet has been identified as a preferred candidate crop, 
no final decision has yet been reached as to the suitable crops. There is agreement, however, 
that emphasis should be on high value cash crops. 
Respondents are apprehensive about their ability to access finance . They need credit for 
various Sh011-, medium- and long-term purposes. More importantly, the fact that credit is 
offered at market related interest rates highlights difficulties the farmers are likely to have in 
servicing their loans. This is regarded as a negative incentive for small-scale farmers , who are 
likely to find it impossible to invest in agriculture. Farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme 
are, also, constrained by low levels of liquidity, high transaction costs, and inadequate 
collateral. In other words, even though institutional restructuring of agricultural services has 
been undertaken to meet the financial needs of small-scale farmers, there are many 
requirements needed in order to qualify for financial assistance. In many cases they do not 
comply. The possibility of providing start-up finance on favourable terms requires further 
investigation. Equally crucial is whether the Tyhefu ilTigation scheme will be able to have a 
positive cash flow in the long-term rather than relying on credit to sustain itself. 
A number of cost recovery issues at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme still need to be finalized. 
The introduction of user charges and cost recovery is one of the thorny areas in South Africa. 
Generally, the record of cost-recovery is di sappointing, resulting in the termination or 
discontinuation of a particular service. The fact that forty three percent of the respondents 
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were non-committal in terms of paying for services is a cause for concern. Affordability 
featured prominently in all the responses. When taking into account the socio-economic status 
of the respondents, it seems unrealistic to expect them to carry the full cost of operation and 
maintenance. 
The Ndlambe community IS eagerly awaiting the eventual resumption of farming at the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme. They are pinning all their hopes for poverty alleviation, 
employment creation, income generation and the general improvement of the standard of 
living and rural livelihoods on this one project. There is potential for this, albeit on a limited 
basis in the short term. Whether the Tyhefu irrigation scheme can generate sustainable rural 
livelihoods is questionable and subject to debate, especially in view of the constraints and 
challenges that lie ahead. 
It is clear from the research findings that agriculture contributed to the livelihoods of the 
farmers in a modest way. Effectively, irrigated farming generated income that can be said to 
supplement overall household income. This is particularly so if one considers the 
unpredictable nature of the income derived from farming by all the farmers at the Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme. In most cases income has been low and many families lived in poverty. It 
needs to be realized that the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is not and will not be a panacea for the 
socio-economic ills facing the community. Since agricultural development is just one aspect of 
the rural economy, for the rest of the community other income generating activities need to be 
considered. Rural development experience suggests that a complementary blend of 
interventions offers an integrated way of dealing with the various development problems 
communities face. 
Diversification is widely regarded as an important risk management strategy for small-scale 
farmers. Since small-scale, capital-intensive commercial farming is a particularly risk-laden 
activity, farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme rather than focusing on a single high value 
crop need to spread their risks. 
The rehabilitation costs of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme are high. Based on previous economic 
performance, which was far from satisfactory, the decision to revive and rehabilitate the 
Tyhefu irrigation scheme is difficult to justifY in economic terms. 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire for the Tyhefu irrigation scheme institutional structures 
Main Constraints, Challenges Experienced by the Farmers 
Which of the following factors affect the degree to which you can farm successfully? These are 
not organised in any order of priority. Indicate this by choosing the appropriate ranking. Give 
reasons for your answer. 
I = No Problem 
2= Problem can be ignored 
3=Needs attention 
4=Serious problem 
5=Very serious - needs urgent attention 
Access to markets 
Marketing facilities 
Rural infrastructure 
Irrigation infrastructure 
Fann size 
Tenure security 
Agricultural training linformationlresearch 
Access to finance 
Support and extension services 
Water quality and availability 
Climatic conditions 
Farming skills 
Soil quality 
Theft 
Level of functional literacy 
Pests and diseases 
Theft 
Inadequate access to proper and timely land preparation services 
Other (Specify). 
I 
ii)a Which of the following institution(s) should assist you with the problems you have 
identified? Elaborate. 
Government 
Private Sector 
Farmer Organisations 
Agricultural Colleges I Universities 
Non-governmental Organisations 
Ndlambe Community 
Other (Specify) 
ii)b What kind of assistance do you expect form these institutions? 
Training 
Finance 
Marketing 
Operation and Maintenance 
Support and Extension Services 
Other (Specify) 
iii) Which services are you willing to pay for" Explain. 
Water Supply 
Operation and Maintenance 
Support and Extension Services 
Training 
Other (Specify) 
iv) Are you satisfied with the progress made thus far regarding attempts to revive Tyhefu 
2 
I 
I 
irrigation scheme? Give reasons for your answer. 
v) How committed is the community to meeting the objectives of the project" Explain. 
vi) What is your vision of a future rehabilitated Tyhefu irrigation scheme? 
v) Any comments? 
r 
Thank you for you cooperation. 
3 
Questionnaire for the Former Farmers at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme 
A. Socio-Economic Profile 
i) Age 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51 + 
ii Education 
No schooling 
Lower primary 
Higher primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
iii) Sources ofIncome 
Farming 
State Transfers 
Remittances 
Formal Employment 
Informal Economic Activities 
Other: 
iv) Farming Experience in Years 
0-5 I 6-10 11-20 
21+ I 
v)a Sources of Farm Labour 
Wife 
Husband 
Children 
Relatives 
Hired Labour 
Other (Specify) 
v)b How often do they help with the farming? 
All the time 
Occasionally 
Seldom 
Never 
vi) Amount of income derived from farming per annum 
Less than RIOO 
RIOO-300 
R400-R600 
R700-RIOO 
RIOOO+ 
vii) What benefits did the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme have? 
Poverty alleviation 
Food security 
Employment Creation 
Agricultural Skills 
Other (Specify) 
Section Two 
Main Constraints, Challenges Experienced by the Farmers 
i) Which of the following factors affect the degree to which you can farm successfully? 
These are not organised in any order of priority. Indicate this by choosing the appropriate 
ranking. Give reasons for your answer. 
1 = No Problem 
2= Problem can be ignored 
3=Needs attention 
4=Serious problem 
5=Very serious - needs urgent attention 
Access to markets 
Marketing facilities 
Rural infrastructure 
Irrigation infrastructure 
Farm size 
Tenure security 
Agricultural training !information/research 
Access to finance 
Support and extension services 
Water quality and availability 
Climatic conditions 
Farming skills 
Soil quality 
Theft 
Level of functional literacy 
Pests and diseases 
Theft 
Inadequate access to proper and timely land preparation services 
Other (Specify). 
ii)a Which of the following institution(s) should assist you with the problems you have 
identified? Elaborate. 
Government 
Private Sector 
Farmer Organisations 
Agricultural Colleges / Universities 
Non-governmental Organisations 
Ndlarnbe Community 
Other (Specify) 
ii)b What kind of assistance do you expect form these institutions? 
Training 
Finance 
Marketing 
Operation and Maintenance 
Support and Extension Services 
Other (Specify) 
iii) Which services are you willing to pay for" Explain. 
Water Supply 
Operation and Maintenance 
Support and Extension Services 
Training 
Other (Specify) 
iv) Are you satisfied with the progress made thus far regarding attempts to revive Tyhefu 
irrigation scheme? Give reasons for your answer. 
v) Any comments? 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
I 
